Wheat is back at the centre of Pakistan’s news and policy debates following the federal government’s decision to import one million tonnes through the Trading Corporation of Pakistan in response to the provinces’ reported requirement of 2.2m tonnes.

The decision is surprising. Until only a few weeks ago, the government consistently maintained that this year’s harvest of 29.8m tonnes — up 4.8pc from last year’s 28.4m tonnes — combined with over 2m tonnes of carryover stocks, would be sufficient to meet the country’s annual demand.

This abrupt policy reversal raises a fundamental question: does Pakistan possess the capacity for precise, data-driven crop modelling based on annually updated variables, or do national staple crop policies still rely on imperfect data, ad hoc assessments, and a simple incremental approach to planning? Crucially, who benefits from these persistent institutional weaknesses — and at what cost to vulnerable farmers and consumers?

When it comes to wheat production estimates, the government claims to draw data from multiple sources, including provincial Crop Reporting Services (CRS), Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (Suparco), Land Information and Management System (Lims), and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). However, official figures rely primarily on CRS, which uses conventional area-frame sampling (in Punjab). This sample-based technique depends heavily on the skills, diligence and, above all, the integrity of field enumerators.

The credibility of official data has eroded to the point where key stakeholders no longer trust it

Although area-frame sampling is a scientifically proven technique, its effectiveness has become increasingly challenged by changing agricultural realities. Shrinking farm sizes, greater choices in seeds and inputs, diverse cultivation practices, and varying levels of mechanisation have significantly increased yield variability between progressive and conventional farmers.

As a result, farms located even in close proximity have become increasingly heterogeneous, reducing the accuracy and reliability of CRS yield figures. Meanwhile, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continue to use list-frame sampling — an even older technique.

These shortcomings are clearly reflected in this year’s wheat estimates. According to press reports, Suparco’s satellite-based models estimated wheat production at only 27.48m tonnes, based on lower-than-expected crop yields and a cultivated area of 8.84m hectares, compared with the CRS estimate of 29.8m tonnes from 9.48m hectares.

Turning to consumption, national wheat requirements are derived from a variety of distinct criteria. At the upper bound, the Planning Commission’s caloric target — wheat requirements based on calorie needs — projects 124 kg per capita annually. By comparison, the Agriculture Policy Institute (Ministry of National Food Security and Research) pegs per capita availability at around 112 kg. It uses a three-year balance sheet average that accounts for carryover stocks, production, and net external trade — after excluding allocations for seed, feed, and wastage.

In contrast, the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 2018–19 estimated direct household consumption at just 84 kg per capita annually, excluding commercial and industrial use. Due to conflicting figures, official planning has been relying on a middle-ground benchmark — 115 kg per capita — for several years.

Putting these divergent statistics aside, one reality remains indisputable: economic conditions in Pakistan have deteriorated significantly over the last four years. A sharp increase in tax collection — driven largely by indirect taxation — combined with weak economic growth (ranging from negative 0.21pc to a modest 3.7pc) has severely eroded household purchasing power. Unsurprisingly, over this period, Pakistan’s ranking on the Global Hunger Index dropped from 94th to 106th.

The latest HIES data reveals that household wheat consumption fell by 5.57pc, down from 84kg in 2018–19 to 79.3kg in 2024–25. Applying this 5.57pc reduction to the official 115 kg benchmark would lower national requirements by around 1.6m tonnes. Ironically, purchasing power is likely to weaken further in 2026-27, as wheat prices remain about 60-70pc higher than last year.

Other developments also point to lower wheat demand this year. Poultry feed mills have stopped using wheat as maize — the preferred grain — is significantly cheaper. Furthermore, formal wheat and wheat flour exports and cross-border smuggling to Afghanistan have virtually ceased after the border closure in October 2025. Taken together, these factors suggest that actual national wheat requirements in 2026–27 are likely to be well below official projections.

Such faulty estimations of production and consumption have serious implications for both farmers and consumers. For instance, in 2023–24, Pakistan imported 3.59m tonnes of wheat amid fears of a domestic shortage. Yet, the country subsequently harvested a record 31.8m tonnes in 2024. The resulting glut depressed market prices and caused significant losses for farmers that also spilled over into the 2025 crop because of large carryover stocks.

In the past, flawed data has repeatedly led Pakistan to export wheat only to re-import it months later at a higher cost to consumers. However, from all these imports and exports, certain segments gained enormously.

Now, based on questionable data, the government aims to import 1m tonnes of wheat. Meanwhile, the Cereal Association of Pakistan has urged the government to allow private-sector imports of 4m tonnes. In contrast, farmers’ organisations strongly oppose any imports, contending that domestic stocks are already adequate.

Simply put, the credibility of official estimates has eroded to the point where key stakeholders no longer trust them. The result is policy uncertainty, conflicting narratives, and growing disorder in the wheat market. In this environment, without reliable data, the government’s decisions on imports, local procurement, buffer stocks, and price regulation remain purely reactive rather than evidence-based.

The state must therefore strengthen its analytical capacity through advanced modelling based on updated data. Otherwise, policy missteps will continue to reward speculation, penalise farmers, burden consumers, and put the country’s food security at persistent risk.

Khalid Wattoo is a development professional and a farmer. Dr Waqar Ahmad is a former Associate Professor at the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad.

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, August 10th, 2026