“And worse I may be yet. The worst is not
So long as we can say, ‘This is the worst.’”
— William Shakespeare, *King Lear*PROLOGUE
The United States’ on-again, off-again war against Iran continues. While we are witnessing another lull at the time of writing, after a brief escalation following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the structural logic of the conflict remains unchanged. If anything, Ukraine’s sinking of Iran’s merchant ship in the Caspian Sea threatens to imbricate the European and Asian theatres, especially if Kyiv attacks more Iranian ships and Iran retaliates.
The war imposed on Iran by the US and its Zionist partner already involves 12 active state actors, a number that makes untangling the entanglement into a nightmare. Notwithstanding, many people in Pakistan have raised a number of questions regarding Iran’s policy and continue to fuss over why Iran can’t just cut a deal with the United States, get sanctions relief and get on with life.
This article is an attempt to explain what guides Iran’s politico-strategic approach and how that affects Tehran’s operational strategy and its tactical responses, the three distinct but overlapping levels of war.
The critics’ frustration is understandable. Pakistan is contiguous to Iran. Any internal and external shocks in that country affect it. Oil and gas and the entire ecosystem that impacts petrochemical industries and agriculture is Pakistan’s lifeline. Given Pakistan’s fragile economy, energy scarcity and price shocks have a direct and negative impact on the country.
Pakistan also has friendly ties with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. These states are in Iran’s crosshairs. That adds to Islamabad’s diplomatic and economic woes. It desperately wants an early end to the war, which is what informs its mediation efforts.
Problem: the war is much bigger than Pakistan’s interests.
With the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East and their escalation, many concerns have understandably been expressed in Pakistan about where the war is headed. Some have questioned Iran’s strategy and its steadfast refusal to come to a compromise with the United States on conditions dictated by the latter. What is Tehran’s endgame, they wonder. Ejaz Haider attempts to unpack the strategic logic that underpins Iran’s decisions…
By now, Iran has been subjected to US perfidy four times: US President Donald Trump unilaterally scuppering a multilateral deal — the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — with Iran in 2018; the 2025 attacks, even as Iran was negotiating with the US; the repeat in 2026; and the US violation of clauses 1 and 5 of the MoU, which resulted in the latest round of fighting and escalation.
Flagging this is important because the current line of questioning runs the risk of shifting the burden of war termination and making a deal from the aggressor (US) to the victim (Iran). That framing is problematic by all metrics and renders the methodology flawed a priori.
WHY IS IRAN NOT MAKING A DEAL?
A counter question could be, is Iran playing solitaire?
Expecting Tehran to make a deal without any reference to actions by the US, which imposed this war on Iran, is to either falsify all known facts or insinuate that Iran must accept the terms set by the aggressor — ie seek a deal without reference to why the US-Zionist duo started this war, what were/are their objectives, and what it means for Iran if they were to achieve those objectives. And for Iran to make such a deal for what? To avoid pain? Get rich?
In an ideal world, avoiding pain is the best course of action. There is nothing bad about getting rich, either. Iran definitely wants to avoid pain and get rich if it means exploiting its full potential as a state and society with a very high literacy rate and impressive STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) achievements.
But there’s a context here, of perpetual threat, and it requires that Iran, after having taken and absorbed much pain, must ensure that no external power can attack it in the future, whenever it so desires. Not ensuring that would mean squandering its current thin advantage, taking pain without any gains. That’s stupidity, not strategy.
The central lesson of Iran’s history with the US, and more specifically with Trump, is simple: never make concessions on the basis of future promises. The operating principle, after being stung by Trump consistently, is zero trust and verifiable implementation.
Those who say that Iran shouldn’t play hardball would do well to listen to what Oman’s foreign minister, Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi, told CBS News on February 27 about the concessions Iran had made. He stated that a nuclear deal with Iran was “within our reach”, ensuring that Iran would not accumulate nuclear material (zero stockpiling) and accept full verification.
He said that Iran had gone beyond the 2015 JCPOA and stressed that there was no alternative to diplomacy. The interview took place in Washington, DC, shortly after Albusaidi had met with US Vice President J.D. Vance to conduct high-stakes diplomatic negotiations. By the early morning hours of February 28, the US-Zionist decapitation and degradation strikes had begun.
So, yes, critics must forgive Iran if it is not entirely convinced of US-Zionist intentions and understands that talks have been a treacherous shield in preparation for war. Iran has no option but to take the hard path, a path not of its choosing but thrust on it by circumstances.
While the US and the Zionist entity overlap quite a lot on Iran, it’s important to make a distinction: US wants Iran to surrender and be a subject state; Zionists want Iran destroyed as it stands today. The choice for Iran is not even about getting rich and losing sovereignty. It is about losing itself as a state. It has no choice but to stand up for its sovereignty and force the imperial power’s hand by raising the cost-exchange ratio for it.
WON’T A COMPROMISE BE BETTER FOR IRAN’S ECONOMY?
On that point about getting rich… Conflicts do not just happen one day. They have a structural-historical dynamic. They are also dictated by the interests of state parties, whether one is defending against an aggressor or has chosen to be the aggressor. The sense of history also defines how states and societies perceive themselves and their place in the world.
This is not mere theoretical assumption. Take China. As a superpower today, its grand strategy merges historical pride with past trauma to drive its modern global ambitions. For millennia, China viewed itself as the Middle Kingdom, Zhngguó, centre of the world. The term reflected China’s ancient worldview, cultural pride, and geopolitical strategy. This status was shattered by the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839–1949), an era of Western and Japanese colonial exploitation, unequal treaties, and deep national subjugation. That century, as Sinologists agree, deeply informs China’s modern approaches.
Iran too is a civilisational state. Much like China, its civilisational trajectory was violently disrupted and it was subjugated by foreign intervention — the humiliation and concessions of the 19th century; the CIA-MI6 coup of 1953; and the Iraq aggression of 1980 that lasted for eight years, with Baghdad being supported by Arab-Gulf states, the US and its European allies.
Just as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses historical trauma to validate its rule, the Islamic Republic of Iran utilises this legacy as a core pillar of state ideology. The 1979 Islamic Revolution is officially framed as the moment Iran broke free from a century of colonial humiliation. There are multiple internal negatives of this policy in both states but that is outside the scope of this article.
Realism, in both its classical and structural incarnations, offers empirical evidence that when security is scarce, a state cannot afford to care about perceived absolute gains in the future for two existential reasons: the peril of future intentions and the vulnerability of interdependence. With respect to the first, no state can ever truly know another state’s future intentions, a lesson Canada and European allies of the US are learning, forcing Canadian PM Mark Carney to talk about “the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality.”
With respect to the second, chasing absolute gains usually requires deep economic or strategic cooperation. In a secure world, this liberal-internationalist approach — cooperation will make me wealthier and more secure than I was yesterday — is easier to answer and can also be hugely profitable. In a scarce-security environment, however, interdependence can create strategic vulnerabilities. If you rely on another state for your energy, technology or supply chains to achieve future gains, you have handed them a weapon. Realism demands strategic autonomy and self-reliance over future prosperity.
This too is on full display through small-yard, high-fence strategies to kneecap adversaries by denying them access to tech, re-shoring, friend-shoring and domestic redundancies! Moreover, for Iran, Lockean cooperation has never been on offer; the demand is to surrender. The 2015 JCPOA, if it were allowed to continue, might have changed the dynamic, but Trump put paid to it.
There’s another variable too when it comes to Iran: the Zionist serpent. While the US and the Zionist entity overlap quite a lot on Iran, it’s important to make a distinction: US wants Iran to surrender and be a subject state; Zionists want Iran destroyed as it stands today. There’s enough evidence of this emerging from Western sources and statements for me to belabour the point.
The choice for Iran is not even about getting rich and losing sovereignty. It is about losing itself as a state. It has no choice but to stand up for its sovereignty and force the imperial power’s hand by raising the cost-exchange ratio for it.
Before I put this point to rest, an example is in order: Gulf states are very rich; they attract a lot of global capital. And yet, not one is really sovereign; all are dependencies bowing to the very imperial power that’s waging war on Iran. At least two of them sleep happily in the Zionist bed despite the murderous, genocidal policies of the Zionists.
WHY DID IRAN ATTACK SHIPS AFTER SIGNING THE MOU?
Many analysts in Pakistan blame Iran for this round of fighting. They argue that Iran should have looked at sanctions relief rather than insisting on controlling the Strait. Others have spoken about the illegality of collecting fees. Still others blame hardline elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who presumably wanted to upstage the moderates and were not happy with the MoU. A few point to the four working groups and the High-Level Committee set up by the MoU and argue that Iran should have taken up the issue there.
The issue of fees is controversial. But so far, Iran has not charged any fees, as per the MoU. The working groups had not begun functioning because Iran was involved in the state funeral of Syed Ali Khamanei. The US found the opportunity to push ships through the southern route.
Missing the point leads to a flawed causal chain. The analyses adopt a geopolitical frame that views the US navy as a default, passive guarantor of global commons. That’s just not true and blinds them to how that action will act as a catalyst in regional escalation in this case.
By starting the timeline only at the moment Iran fired at the ships, they exclude the compounding variable (the US naval escort deployment). With this boundary setting, they choose to analyse the “action” (the attack) while systematically omitting the “antecedent” (the escort policy). A proper methodology would require mapping all structural inputs that led to Iran’s action.
The US escorting of ships is not a neutral act. It signals a provocative, forward military posture in Iran’s backyard. A robust analysis requires a dialectical approach to recognise the security dilemma, where US projection of power and Iran’s encirclement anxieties constantly feed into each other. The real question to ask is this: why does Iran want to control the Strait and why does the US want to deny Iran that control? The MoU’s clause five is clear in its wording (by the way, talk about the MoU being loosely-worded is just that, post-facto talk):
“Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf Littoral States, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”
There are three points here, two in bold letters and the third in italics. 1. Iran will make arrangements, with no charge for 60 days from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. 2. Iran will conduct dialogue with Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait. 3. Any such arrangement will be in line with applicable International Law and the sovereign rights of coastal states.
The first clearly states that Iran will make arrangements (not the US); the first 60 days will be free. This links up with the second point: “to define the future administration and maritime services” in consultation with Oman. Implication: beyond 60 days, Iran and Oman will figure out the administration and maritime services. Corollary: after 60 days, there may be a fee and the routes will be coordinated with Oman and Iran. (Oman is already in consultation with Iran and has forwarded its proposal to Iran. What will become of it remains to be seen.)
The after-thought that the clause does not refer to any particular route and, therefore, the US navy can escort ships through the southern route is shystering. The US was/is clearly attempting to dilute Iran’s control, in violation of what MoU’s relevant clause states. When an express power or duty is given, the law implies the concurrent assignment of the necessary powers to execute it. The post-facto interpretation by the US contravenes the principle of good faith.
WHY HASN’T IRAN ATTACKED THE ZIONIST ENTITY?
Iran has not attacked the Zionists in this round because the Zionists have stayed away, embroiled as Benjamin Netanyahu is in the upcoming October polls and on the northern front against Hezbollah. Iran does not have unlimited resources. Any sensible planning requires that it husband its war-fighting capability. Hezbollah is keeping the Zionist entity busy at this stage.
Internally, Netanyahu is being challenged effectively. As for targeting the Gulf states and Jordan, it’s somewhat amazing that this point is raised, given how deeply these states are interlocked with US interests. But there’s another reason too, as noted by some former US military officers, including Lt Gen Mark Hertling. Hertling identified Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base as the largest concentration of advanced US airpower in the Middle East, housing F-35s, F-15Es, A-10s, and critical air defence networks like THAAD.
He explained that the base is vital for projecting power against Iran while enabling “strategic plausible deniability” for Jordan. That hasn’t worked, as is clear from Iran’s strikes targeting early warning and radars. Jordan has been critical in shielding the Zionist entity from incoming Iranian missiles and drones. This is why Iran targeted and destroyed a $300 million AN/TPY-2 Forward Based X-band Transportable Radar operated by the US Army at the base, rendering the THAAD battery effectively blind. Iran has done this to US electronic warfare and radar systems elsewhere too. This makes the space for it to target the Zionists more effectively when it needs to do so.
IS IRAN OVERPLAYING ITS HAND?
This is an interesting question and subtly contains in it other questions! It is also grounded in some nuance. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz spoke of the “culminating point of victory”, the point that denotes the critical threshold where military gains peak and begin to reverse into a disadvantage if pushed further. History offers many examples of this overreach.
But this point is not on a metered scale; the buzzer doesn’t go off for the commander when gains reach that point. It is a judgement call. A commander has to work through and analyse multiple variables to figure out where and when to stop.
I believe that while Iran must remain cognisant of this, the situation needs to be contextualised. The war has led to pain on both sides and a stalemate. Neither side has been defeated or has won in the classical sense. And while Iran has so far denied the US its strategic objective of bending Tehran to its will and fracturing it, the contest is on and Iran simply cannot let its guard down until the US realises that gambling for resurrection is resulting in increasingly diminishing returns.
I have already discussed the structural logic of Hormuz above so I don’t need to repeat it. The essential point is that, in this contest, Iran is defending and reacting. Its victory lies in denial strategies. But yes, it has to be careful about figuring out the balance. The Strait is central to its strategy, sure. But what kind of balance can be struck, and as early as possible, is a vital question. Iran also has to signal to the Gulf states that its attacks have a context and, outside of that context, it seeks cooperation with them, not just because of geographic contiguity but also historical, cultural and trade ties.
The most notable example is the backchannel between the UAE and Iran. It’s going to be a frosty peace; the UAE will use this as part of a suite of strategies. But pragmatism could work for both sides. This is also applicable to other Gulf states.
WON’T IRAN BRINGING ANSAR ALLAH INTO THE FIGHT BRING KSA AND UAE TOGETHER?
This question takes it for granted that Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis is the wrong shorthand for the movement’s name) operates purely at the behest of Iran. As multiple analyses suggest, Ansar Allah, while a strong ally of Iran, primarily operates within the Yemeni context. Recent analytical and investigative reports present a nuanced picture that goes beyond the narrative of Ansar Allah being an Iranian puppet.
The current escalation was sparked on July 13, when Yemen’s Aden-based Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) bombed the runway at Sanaa International Airport, preventing an Iranian plane from landing. The plane carried an Ansar Allah delegation that had traveled to Iran for Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral. The strike shattered a fragile, unwritten four-year truce between the Saudi-led coalition and Ansar Allah.
Regional reports underscore that Ansar Allah operates primarily on its own local calculations rather than acting purely on Iranian command. In fact, it is far more independent than the IRG, which is an extension of Riyadh. The group’s decision to transition from targeting global shipping to a direct, localised “siege-for-siege” blockade on Saudi Arabia is driven by local dynamics, including economic stress. The group is facing domestic strain over a longstanding financial stalemate with the Aden government.
Framing their actions as a defence of Yemeni sovereignty against external blockades, Ansar Allah uses the escalation to rally mass public support domestically. Their military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, explicitly framed the missile strikes on Saudi oil hubs such as Yanbu as local retaliation for airspace violations.
While Ansar Allah has its own domestic drivers, there’s no gainsaying that the crisis serves Iran’s broader geopolitical goals. The blockade on Saudi shipping allows Tehran to project power and threaten global energy corridors without engaging in a direct state-on-state conventional war. Within the Yemeni context, neither the IRG nor Ansar Allah is looking for a return to full-scale war. In the broader context, Iran’s offer to mediate between Ansar Allah and Riyadh is a signal that Tehran does not want it to escalate.
The essential point is that, given the complexity of the actors involved and their varied interests, all sides are attempting to create a balance between the pressures of the immediate and the long-term reconfiguration of the Gulf and the Middle East. As for bringing Riyadh and Abu Dhabi together, they will come together on certain issues while remaining apart on others because of structural reasons.
EPILOGUE
There are three sets of actors in this war: the United States and the Zionist entity (the latter operates with and also independent of the US); the Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt; and Iran and its regional allies (the ‘Axis of Resistance’). There are also differences within the Gulf set but we will not press that point here.
Each set has its objectives. The US has been the primary force in the Greater Middle East since World War II; the Zionists act as its outpost. Jordan and Egypt are US dependencies and have peace treaties with the Zionist entity. The Gulf set, excluding Saudi Arabia, comprises tiny states with oil wealth in varying degrees. These states, most notably the UAE, have tried to compensate for their geographic and demographic weaknesses by allying with the US and modernising their militaries within a capital/tech-intensive model. They are also, with varying degrees of success, trying to diversify their economies, investing abroad and attracting investments at home. The model requires peace and security.
Iran is under sanctions since 1979. Its attempts to break out of isolation have repeatedly failed. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf states, the US and its European partners fully backed Iraq. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was birthed for the very purpose of containing Iran. Iran’s allies, non-state actors, are labelled “terrorist”. Its state ally, Syria, is now controlled by a former ‘Islamic State’/Al Qaeda leader, newly-minted and koshered by the West because he serves a purpose.
Iran wants to secure itself. The US/Israel want to destroy it. The Gulf states want the US to defang Iran. These objectives create their respective incentive structures. They also impact Iran’s tactical, operational and political-strategic approaches. This is a very sketchy overview, of course. But the point is that analyses have to bring in multiple factors to figure out the dynamics at play. The situation is far too complex for linear causalities.
In the end, however, the world remains anarchic. The US is waning but it still remains the strongest power. It never allowed itself to be subjected by laws and norms but Trump has expressed his disdain for norms and laws openly, even bragged about it. In the wolf world, one is reminded of King Lear’s eldest daughter Goneril’s cynical question in Shakespeare’s play, after her villainy is exposed: “Say, if I do, the laws are mine, not thine. Who can arraign me for’t?”
The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider
Published in Dawn, EOS, August 2nd, 2026