THE Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) ceasefire offer to the state and the political leadership may surprise many, but one thing is obvious that the terrorist group is speaking from a position of strength.

The self-confidence manifested in a recent letter of TTP’s principal ally Asmatullah Muawiya to a journalist suggests that not only is the militants’ command structure intact, their belief in their strength to engage with the state on their own terms, too, is fairly strong.

The militants’ ceasefire conditions as reported in the media include non-interference from Pakistan in the Afghan war and constitutional and foreign policy reforms in line with the precepts of the Quran and Sunnah. The militants also demanded that Pakistan refocus on the war of ‘revenge’ against India. Though TTP spokesperson Ihsanullah Ihsan endorsed the demands, it is not yet clear whether or not all factions of the TTP and foreign militants based in the tribal areas have struck a consensus on the ‘charter of demands’.

The flip side of this charter of demands is the opportunity it offers to the political leadership to evolve clarity in their perceptions and positions on the menace of terrorism in the country, an exercise they are still trying to avoid. It would be interesting to see how political leaders respond to militants’ demands in their electoral campaigns in the coming months.

The militants’ confidence derives mainly from their operational strength to hit their targets anywhere in the country and the fear they have sowed in the minds of the people and the political leadership. The reason why the TTP is considered by many as a primary actor of instability in Pakistan is because of its ability to generate terrorism and exploit the fear that results.

In 2012 alone, the lethal group managed to carry out some 230 terrorist attacks across Pakistan, which killed approximately 430 civilians, and almost 270 security personnel. According to the Pakistan Security Report 2012, prepared by an Islamabad-based research institute the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, the group has had 63 small- to medium-scale armed clashes with security forces in Fata and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2012.

The report further says that the TTP has extended its outreach across the country and is able to launch big terrorist attacks through a vast network of its allies. The group has diversified its operational tactics from guerrilla-style operations to suicide attacks and targeted killings.

It has also expanded its range of targets, from security forces to political and sectarian targets. The assassination of Bashir Bilour and the failed attempt on Malala Yousafzai are two major incidents which indicate the TTP’s aggressive mood against moderate forces in the country.

The capacity of the group for launching major guerilla-style operations is still intact as it managed two terrorist attacks of this kind this year, one each at airbases in Kamra and Peshawar. After the killing of Ilyas Kashmiri, a self-styled expert in multilayered terrorist attacks, Qari Hussain, who was known as the master of suicide bombers, Badar Mansoor, chief of Al Qaeda’s operational network in Pakistan, and Abu Laith al-Libi, Al Qaeda’s strategy mastermind in the country, it was presumed that the terrorists were losing their destructive edge. But their frequent lethal attacks point in another direction.

The major suspect reportedly behind the two major attacks on Pakistani airbases was Adnan Rasheed, a former employee of the air force who was sentenced to death for his role for the attempted assassination of Gen Pervez Musharraf. He was among those who escaped from Bannu jail in April this year.

Apart from Rasheed, the TTP and its affiliates still have some dangerous men who can pose as major security threats like Farman Ali Shinwari, successor to Badar Mansoor as Al Qaeda’s operational chief in Pakistan, Ustad Farooq, head of the so-called Punjabi Taliban, Abdul Shakoor al-Turkistani, a powerful Al Qaeda leader, Saiful Adil, who operates from Iran, Mullah Fazlullah, now based in Afghanistan’s Kunar province and Hakeemullah Mehsud, head of the TTP.

Despite the destructive edge of the TTP, the state never quit the strategy of reconciliation and still continues to engage the group’s different factions, but the objectives of such attempts have never been clear. The state must first decide what it wants to achieve through talks and most importantly carefully assess the implications of any potential reconciliation, otherwise its moves could have a negative impact on the security forces’ operational strategies.

The compromising stance has always proved beneficial for terrorists. The state must be clear in its approach in what ultimately it wants to achieve through reconciliation; minimising terrorist attacks in the country, or dismantling terrorists’ networks? Are the decisions swayed by a craving to regain lost ground or to reintegrate militants in society? Also of crucial importance is what the state demands of the militants, and what it offers in return. What is required is a comprehensive approach based on a lucid policy that is mindful of the lessons learned from previous peace deals.

At the same time, the political leadership has to realise that the real strength of the militants belonging to most groups has been their ability to sell their cause, and through their propaganda strategies they have tried to counterbalance the differences between the capabilities of security forces and those of the militants.

Apart from a well-defined ideological inspiration, the Taliban have got logistic support from international terrorist groups and used terrorism to achieve objectives to destabilise the state’s security apparatus, keep engaging the security forces out of their territories and to force the state to bring structural changes into its laws or the constitution, or to usher in a new system according to their agenda.

On the other hand, the state is still in a dilemma over which approach to prioritise; reconciliation or strike? It has tried both but has never pursued either with zeal because of the difficulty in choosing between strategic equilibrium and securing socio-political values.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com