WITH the furore continuing over last month's attacks by Nato on Pakistani border posts, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on Saturday told the Parliamentary Committee on National Security that the latest incursion and the Abbottabad raid last May “compel us to revisit our national security paradigm”. No doubt this is a welcome move — and one that should have been made more than a decade ago. But any review of the country's security paradigm, which has several aspects, should start with the nature of the threat emanating from within the country, i.e. Islamic militancy. The latter has been conceded by armed forces' personnel, independent security experts as well as foreign governments. For instance, the US is not the only one to have raised the issue of militant groups finding safety within Pakistan. Iran and even China have expressed similar apprehensions, while for India, Islamic militancy remains one of the biggest stumbling blocks in its relations with Islamabad. Yet, despite its own losses, and those of others, inflicted by groups operating within Pakistan, the country has yet to frame a policy that is clear and that can become the basis for a comprehensive security plan.

Since the 1980s, when the Mujahideen in a US-led effort were supported in their resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Pakistan has legitimised the idea of militant Islam. Its 'security paradigm' has included using Islamic militants when convenient, with crackdowns occurring mainly after 9/11 when external pressures became too great to withstand. The piecemeal efforts to curtail the operations of some groups have included bans being imposed on them. Many continue to operate under different names. Feeling betrayed, many amongst them have hit back at the security forces, even targeting civilians, while others have not been prevented from carrying out their activities. Arrests also tend to take place on a case-to-case basis; there is no coordinated effort to neutralise the leadership of the various extremist groups. Moreover, the security establishment has been accused of having links with Afghan militant groups using Pakistani soil to launch attacks across the border. The lack of a cohesive policy means that even as we lose men and money to the fight against extremism, Islamic militancy cannot be controlled.

Coming up with a proper policy does not mean Pakistan would have to change its stated position on other issues, such as Kashmir. It would, in fact, give it room to undertake an honest assessment of the pro and cons of its relations with countries in several areas, and fine-tune its policies accordingly. The decision to revisit the security paradigm must be implemented keeping this in mind.