THE government’s decision to boycott the Bonn conference next week needs to be carefully parsed. Statements attributed to officials about the boycott did not appear to categorically rule out a last-minute reversal in the Pakistani opinion. It is possible, given the behind-the-scenes lobbying that the announcement will trigger, that Islamabad may agree to participate in Bonn on the advice and suggestion of ‘friends’ in the international community. If that were to happen, it would be in Pakistan’s best interest. Since the attack in Mohmand Agency which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the state has made its intense displeasure over the incident known. The closure of Isaf/Nato supply routes through the country, the demand that Americans evacuate the Shamsi airbase within 15 days and the rejection of initial half-apologies, half-explanations from Isaf and US officials all suggest a serious response to a very serious incident. Now by deciding to boycott Bonn, the depth of unhappiness in Pakistani circles has further been communicated and will likely trigger some kind of response from key Bonn participants to placate Islamabad.

However, the government must also be mindful of the implications of boycotting a conference that will be attended by representatives of 90-odd countries and which has been billed as an important step towards the American/Nato/Isaf goal of handing over the security of Afghanistan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014 and to determine internal and external arrangements for Afghanistan that will keep it from falling apart once the active role of Isaf forces winds down. True, the Istanbul conference, in which Pakistan did participate, did not achieve any milestones and there are question marks over what exactly can be achieved in Bonn. However, as a country with critical interests at stake, Pakistan should be wary of at least two things: finding itself on the wrong side of an American-led international consensus on Afghanistan and not even being at the table to give its input at a conference in which some major decisions could be taken.

In the world of diplomacy, whatever the risks of a bad outcome despite participation in a process, the risks are that much higher when there is no participation. Particularly as the mistrust between Washington and Islamabad appears to keep growing, there is a need for Pakistan to remain within the circles of policy discussions, to be able to defend itself where necessary and advance its interests where possible. Bonn may not turn out to be a defining moment in the so-called endgame in Afghanistan, but if does, then Pakistan should be represented there.