AS the global order shifts away from unipolarity toward fragmented multipolarity, middle powers have gained unprecedented strategic weight. In a fragmented multipolar world, middle powers serve as indispensable diplomatic bridges and economic shock absorbers that keep the international system functioning despite great-power paralysis.

Middle powers lack hegemonic ambitions, and retain the credibility to mediate active conflicts, build agile issue-specific coalitions, and maintain open trade and supply-chain corridors across rival blocs. Ultimately, these middle powers are preventing total global bifurcation of the international system between Washington and Beijing by stabilising their immediate regions and upholding international rules.

However, scholars and policymakers rarely agree on a single checklist for middle power status, largely because different states exert influence through different mechanisms. Some, such as South Korea or Australia, earn the label through thriving, high-tech economies and global trade integration. Others, like Norway or Qatar, leverage niche diplomacy and active mediation to punch above their geographic weight. Still others, such as Türkiye and Pakistan, rely primarily on formidable military capabilities and regional security projection.

Scholars generally evaluate middle power status across three core pillars including military capability, diplomatic outreach, and comprehensive national strength. National strength is largely defined by sustainable economic vitality and technological adaptation.

Over the past two years, Pakistan has demonstrated a resurgence in the first two arenas, vaulting itself back into global strategic relevance. Yet, because its third and most foundational pillar remains weak, Pakistan’s recognition as an emerging middle power rests on a fragile foundation that cannot endure without a decisive domestic economic pivot.

A credible middle power must possess the military capacity to defend its sovereignty and project stabilising influence across its neighbourhood. Between 2025 and 2026, Pakistan highlighted its hard-power credentials through both high-intensity deterrence and institutionalised defence partnerships.

History shows that hard power and ingenious statecraft cannot substitute for domestic economic strength.

During the brief but severe four-day conflict with India in May 2025, South Asia witnessed its first multi-domain confrontation integrating aerial clashes, drone swarms, and precision missile exchanges. Pakistan’s military response, culminating in Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, demonstrated modern warfare capabilities and aerial superiority. Pakistan’s swift military response compelled a rapid White House-facilitated ceasefire on May 10. By denying a larger neighbour unilateral escalation dominance, Islamabad reinforced its conventional and strategic deterrence.

Since May 2025, Pakistan translated its battlefield credibility into a web of security pacts across the Middle East and the Muslim world.

In September 2025, Islamabad and Riyadh signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, and in August 2026, Pakistan joined Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to sign the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. These pacts not only created a formal collective deterrence network but also enhanced Islamabad’s strategic utility in the Gulf. The Badr agreement with Türkiye, Qatar, and Indonesia, has further strengthened Pakistan’s position as a net security provider of Arab Gulf states.

Beyond military muscle, middle powers distinguish themselves through niche diplomacy. Following the outbreak of direct US-Israeli military hostilities against Iran in early 2026, traditional Gulf mediators found their channels strained. Adopting a posture of active neutrality, Islamabad stepped in.

In March 2026, the US accepted Pakistan’s role as a primary conduit to Tehran, which led to the historic Islamabad peace talks in April 2026 and the subsequent June MoU that temporarily reopened the Strait of Hormuz. Even as the truce faced repeated strain through late 2026, the civil and military leadership of Pakistan continued shuttling proposals between Washington, Tehran, and European capitals. The decision to join Trump’s Gaza peace plan as a founding member also proved Islamabad could exercise diplomatic power beyond its immediate borders.

However, despite these military and diplomatic milestones, history demonstrates that hard power and ingenious statecraft cannot substitute for domestic economic strength. In this third pillar, Pakistan exhibits severe structural deficits that undermine its middle power aspirations.

Macroeconomic indicators showed surface stabilisation in FY2025-26 with inflation remaining between 7-9 per cent and GDP growth edging up to 3.7pc. However, the underlying growth model remains weak. For instance, investment hovers near 15pc of GDP, far below the 20-plus per cent threshold required to sustain the 6pc growth rates needed to absorb a booming youth population. Deindustrialisation and high energy costs continue to stifle export competitiveness. Foreign investors are largely concerned with the security situation in Balochistan and KP. Unrest in AJK has further marred prospects of foreign direct investment.

The privatisation process is critically slow, while political consensus is absent over reforms for new provinces. With a low tax-to-GDP ratio and heavy external debt servicing, state solvency still relies heavily on remittances, multilateral bailouts, bilateral rollovers (such as a $3 billion Saudi cash deposit in April 2026) rather than productive capital formation.

Hence, Pakistan today represents a textbook case of an asymmetric emerging middle power. Its disciplined military and seasoned diplomatic corps have successfully leveraged regional crises to earn Islamabad a seat at high-stakes global tables. However, geopolitical leverage built on security crises and external rent is inherently transactional. When regional wars subside or great-power priorities shift, Islamabad — lacking economic autonomy and technological innovation — will risk losing its strategic relevance.

Therefore, to cement its status as a genuine middle power, Pakistan must execute an urgent domestic pivot. This requires dismantling elite economic capture, broadening the tax base, overhauling education to build a tech-literate workforce, and enhancing an export-driven industrial base. Until Islamabad matches its battlefield deterrence and diplomatic agility with sustainable economic sovereignty, its middle power status will remain an aspiration suspended over a precarious fault line.

The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.

X: @itskhurramabbas

Published in Dawn, November 15th, 2026