THAT the Republican Party would lose the midterm elections for the US Congress was never in doubt. It was its overwhelming defeat that surprised everyone. Democrats have attained a clear majority in the 100-member US Senate (54 Democrats, 44 Republicans) and a massive lead in the 435-member House of Representatives (253 Democrats, 157 Republicans). What explains this major shift? One plausible answer is the Iran war and its effects on gas prices, inflation, and the higher cost of living. Importantly, America’s younger population never owned this war. It has been widely seen as Israel’s war that America was fighting. Vice President J.D. Vance has rightly concluded that “the reason we lost [in the elections] is the war”. Even Donald Trump acknowledged that the war with Iran was a factor, though he defended its objectives.
While the Iran war and its side effects may have been the main reason for the Republicans’ defeat, several other factors also weighed in. In his election campaigns, Trump had opposed distant wars, yet he entered into one with Iran at the behest of Israel. American voters saw this as a clear repudiation of the ‘America First’ approach that Trump had touted in his speeches. It was hard for Americans to accept America’s subordination to Israeli interests. This, in turn, raised questions about US legislators’ links with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, whose activities are aligned closely with the agenda of a foreign government (Israel), Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and US complicity by continuing to provide weapons and assistance to Israel. All this did not sit well with young Americans.
How will it impact America’s foreign policy? Two aspects merit attention. First, Trump is unlikely to resume the war with Iran or follow through on his threats to use the mother of all bombs against Iran. The reason is clear. His Republican Party will not want a return to a war that is so unpopular with Americans. A return to war could jeopardise the party’s future stakes, including the race for the White House. In fact, America would like to see an honourable exit from the war. The answer lies in diplomacy and a return to the Islamabad MoU, which meets both the key US demand that Iran should not produce nuclear weapons and the Iranian demand that economic sanctions be lifted and Iran’s frozen assets released. This provides an honourable off-ramp to both sides to end a war that serves no one but Israel.
As for the Strait of Hormuz, everyone wants it to reopen fully because disrupted supplies of oil, gas, petroleum products, and fertilisers have been hurting the world economy. To that end, America should end its naval blockade, and Iran should agree not to interrupt shipping in the strait. All these points have been amply covered in the Islamabad MoU. The parties to the Makkah Agreement — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye — have a special role. They must increase their diplomatic efforts, as should Qatar and Oman. Even China and Russia may need to step in to help find a diplomatic solution. China, in particular, has an interest in ensuring fuel supplies and the smooth functioning of markets. The window of opportunity may be limited, as the caretaker Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, might plan some manoeuvre, a false flag operation, or some drastic action like using a tactical nuclear weapon to force Iran to respond and then rope the US into the war with Iran.
Republicans will not want to return to a war unpopular with Americans.
The second aspect of US foreign policy relevant to us is whether it will affect Pakistan-US ties. The latter have always been transactional and viewed through America’s own geopolitical interests. As of now, post-Marka-i-Haq Pakistan continues to enjoy respect as a stabilising force in the region. Further, given that Afghanistan is once again becoming a safe haven for the world’s terrorist organisations, Pakistan’s geopolitical importance as the only state fighting terrorism in all its forms, including proxy terrorism by India from Afghanistan, will remain valid. Pakistan has flourishing bilateral trade with the US, along with cooperation in multiple areas, including agriculture and IT. Relations between Pakistan and the US are, thus, likely to continue at their own pace.
Although many in the ranks of the Democrats tend to have pro-Israel, pro-India, anti-Iran, and anti-China sentiments — similar to the Republicans — American foreign policy will remain a major subject of discussion in the Democrats-dominated Congress in the months ahead. Transatlantic alliances, relations with Canada, adventures like Venezuela, opposition to climate change, tariff wars, Islamophobia, subservience to Israeli interests, and Trump’s refusal to regulate AI technologies could all be up for review when the re-composed Congress starts its work next January.
The writer is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Published in Dawn, November 8th, 2026
