In a 2005 article in The New York Times, then US national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and homeland security adviser Frances Fragos Townsend admitted that “countries with huge standing armies equipped with lethal weapons are defenceless against terrorists”. After just four years of intervention in Afghanistan, the US administration had concluded that fighting terrorists was a challenge: US forces were not going to exhaust them, since they adapted quickly to changing situations and learned to exist within societies.

The whole world was then under the scourge of terrorism. The September 11 attacks were followed by a series of suicide bombings and other attacks: the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001; suicide bombings in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002 that killed 202 people; multiple bombings of Western targets in Casablanca, Morocco, that killed 39 people; multiple bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 29 people; the bombings of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, in August 2003 and of the Australian embassy there in September 2004; the bombing of commuter trains in Madrid in March 2004 that killed 200 people and injured more than 1,000; the explosion on the MV SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines in February 2004; and the London bombings of July 2005.

The evolving threat for Pakistan

The evolving nature of terrorism in the mid-2000s highlights the complexity of the global security environment. The US, despite being the world’s most powerful nation and leading the global fight against terrorism, admitted it could not counter terrorist threats effectively. One can imagine how difficult it would be for Pakistan, with its limited resources, an enemy five times its size on its eastern border and an unstable border in the west.

In many parts of the world, these attacks may have been isolated incidents or the inevitable fallout of 9/11, and several countries were able to deal with them one way or another. For Pakistan, however, terrorism has never been an isolated episode.

In the 1980s, geopolitical compulsions put Pakistan in a difficult situation when it sided with and supported the Afghan mujahideen in the so-called noble cause of dismantling the ‘godless regime’ to save the world from communism.

The September 11 attacks once again brought Pakistan to a difficult turn, at a time when it was still dealing with the legacy of the 1980s — extremist ideologies and the Kalashnikov culture. Pakistan had no choice but to reverse its strategy of dealing with ‘terrorism’ and chase the ‘terrorists’. That struggle, unfortunately, continues to this day, and Pakistan has failed to uproot extremism in the country. Withdrawing recognition from the Afghan Taliban regime and cutting off official supply lines was a costly decision.

Reputational damage

While Pakistan, a front-line state, fought the US-led war against terrorism and put its own security at risk, New Delhi was busy building the perception that “Pakistan was sold out to serve the interests of the United States”.

The Indian propaganda did not stop there. There was an effort to mislead the world, the US and the people of Pakistan, aimed at eroding Pakistan’s regional authority and its standing in the Islamic world, and at fuelling anti-Pakistan and anti-American sentiment among religious groups in Pakistan.

The Indian diaspora, too, played a role in building a ‘villain’ image of Pakistan. Many Indian-born Americans nursed a negative perception of Pakistan under the guidance of the Indian government. They fed propaganda to special interest groups and to major journals and newspapers on almost any topic that could defame Pakistan. This campaign raised doubts among US politicians and decision-makers about Pakistan’s commitment to the fight against terrorism. The scepticism led not only to questions about military support for Pakistan but also to pressure on it through Washington’s ‘do more’ policy.

Despite condemnation of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and assurances of support to curb militancy from Pakistan’s then president, prime minister and foreign minister, India chose to play the blame game. Instead of providing evidence, New Delhi refused to cooperate on joint investigations to establish the truth about the attacks.

Joint statements issued after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to the US, including his last meeting with US President Donald Trump, consistently “called on Pakistan to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11, and Pathankot attacks and ensure that its territory is not used to carry out cross-border terrorist attacks”. This reflects how the Modi government continues to exploit the Mumbai and Pathankot attacks — and, more recently, the April 2025 Pahalgam attack — to its advantage.

This Indian policy towards Pakistan after 9/11 has not only misled the world about Pakistan but also complicated its fight against terrorism. Pakistan’s role in the US-led war against terrorism was the most visible and the most extensive. Its support for US and coalition operations in Afghanistan was also strategically more vital than that of any other regional country, and it was key to the effectiveness of US naval and ground forces.

Where we stand today

Pakistan now faces a third wave of terrorism, which followed the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021. The Afghan Taliban’s support for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the spread of leftover Nato weapons in Afghanistan have led to a rise in terrorism in Pakistan, adding to its two-decade struggle. Since the withdrawal, Pakistani security forces have conducted thousands of operations, recovering foreign weapons from militants killed in them. The availability of Nato weaponry to militant groups threatens Pakistan and the stability of the region.

The country has also seen a significant rise in cross-border attacks involving Afghan nationals fighting alongside the TTP. The complexities of dealing with terrorism in Pakistan are still unfolding. Pakistan needs sustained regional and international support, as it serves as a barrier against the spread of militancy. Its failure to tackle terrorism would mean the failure of the entire region.

Instead of exploiting Pakistan’s situation, regional countries — particularly New Delhi — and the international community need to strengthen Pakistan’s hand against terrorism. It is the only country that has remained steadfast despite the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and a struggling economy.