Politics or ‘war’?
OCTOBER has been most cruel to our fragile democracy. It has seen Liaquat Ali’s unresolved murder, 1954’s emergency, 1955’s One Unit move, Suhrawardy’s 1957 ouster, the 1958 and 1999 coups, governor’s rule in Sindh, and emergency/governor’s rule in KP now. This grim record reveals a deep malaise: broken institutions unable to resolve conflicts via reason and compromise, letting coercion fill the void. But no civilian era may have seen them as broken, biased and besmirched as now. A parliament born with a murky mandate has grown up to author partisan laws and fuel conflicts. Courts are seen as partisan players, not reliable referees. The executive uses one gear against dissent — force —true to its hybrid DNA.
The contrast could not have been starker as the centre’s maximal rigidity faced the PTI’s minimal demands. The centre’s misrule and disputed mandate justify peaceful protests on much bigger demands across South Asia recently: freshpolls, free courts, human rights, and the economy. But the PTI only sought the mild relief that the courts had given their leader Imran Khan on meetings and medical care. The centre reacted to even these timid asks with threats of emergency rule which has now been imposed.
It wanted the PTI to back a harsh Afghan eviction policy. But evicting Afghans in need of refuge from the Afghan Taliban’s sins is hardly fair. Some may qualify for nationality and many contribute capital and labour, replacing millions of us now abroad. We must, instead, sympathise with ordinary Afghans as both of us are the worst victims of the sins of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Mistreating them may boost our common foe. At the moment, ordinary Afghans here, far away from TTP training camps abroad, seem unlikely recruits. But harsh evictions may change both access and motive for some.
The centre blames PTI for the failure to end KP terrorism. But the centre also notes that terrorists cross borders, thus indicating that the primary responsibility lies with itself. Inland too, federal forces flex bigger muscles than the KP Police. So, the responsibility must be shared. Also, any large operation may again displace locals and most KP parties oppose it. Intelligence-led commando action closely coordinated with locals seems more suitable both tactically and morally. Islamabad should have accepted these ground realities.
The twin actions in KP will not help the centre.
Given the minimalist demands and these policy nuances, the twin KP actions in the midst of talks and a slow-motion march seem harsh. There are many PTI faults but also reasons for them being rooted in the party’s repression since 2023. The centre has bigger faults and fewer excuses. It should have first fixed its own shortcomings to convince the PTI to fix its faults and then forged a joint anti-terrorism strategy. Instead, it seems bent on a winner-takes-all war, not win-win politics with rivals. Force has replaced laws, norms, reason, compromise and decency as its default tool. This aspect has taken many past conflicts from institutions to the streets, where the state prevails easily, and then to the bush, where it struggles to end even those that lack popular and moral roots.
The twin actions in KP will not help the centre in either politics or security. Emergency rule may hand it administrative control in KP but not political authority. It may have tamed a hostile set-up but has also inflamed its voters. The vast power this regime has amassed has not translated into delivery, and is even less unlikely to do so in a troubled KP with an ad hoc, unpopular set-up. So, the PTI may gain politically as intensified repression helps it develop a victimhood narrative.
Defeating terrorism needs both public support and arsenal. Emergency and governor’s rule in KP may erode support to levels no arsenal can compensate for. The key drivers of terrorism may persist too. TTP camps may survive cross-border bombing. Porous borders will persist despite harsh travel and trade bans if federal policing remains weak.
The humility in a hybrid centre to adopt a terrorism policy that combines force with local wisdom and support may remain absent. It will gain an obedient KP junior partner, but one with weak support, legitimacy, and capacity. It has had such partners for decades in Balochistan, and yet terrorism persists there. KP may meet the same fate. The centre’s obsession with force may feed terrorism more than fight it.
The writer has a PhD degree from the University of California, Berkeley, in political economy and 25 years of grassroots to senior-level experience across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, October 13th, 2026
