August 25 was observed as the “Ninth Anniversary of Rohingya Genocide Day” in the camps of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. Tens of thousands of the displaced Rohingya people gathered to remember the atrocities that drove them from Myanmar nine years ago, with a concerted demand for a rightful return to their home. The world responded with characteristic complacency.
Praise for Bangladesh’s generosity and hospitality is diminishing rapidly. Meanwhile, the source country does not even recognise these people as their own. The international community is glad to see this expensive problem being managed by someone else. The official figure of the Rohingya sheltered in Bangladesh stands at a little over 12 lakh; the unofficial number could be much higher. The noble gesture of opening its border in 2017 to a people fleeing the horrendous cruelties of the military junta in Myanmar gave Bangladesh a moral edge. While this might help certain individuals to cash in on the moral metrics in different international fora, the country has been left to bear the demographic, environmental, financial and security costs of a crisis it did not create.
The temporary situation seems to have become permanent. The initial sympathy has withered. The temporary camps now house more than a million people where food assistance is precarious, education is limited, and legal employment is severely restricted. The system has become a fertile ground for illegal activities like drug and human trafficking. Armed groups and criminal networks allegedly operate inside the camps. Community leaders have been murdered. Residents face extortion, abduction, violence, trafficking and forced recruitment. Rival organisations compete for control. Some of them claim to fight for liberation while coercing the people they claim to defend. They have reportedly recruited refugees to fight the Arakan Army, turning stateless young people into expendable proxies.
It is tempting, but foolish, to criminalise the entire Rohingya population. Crime feeds on hopelessness. A young man born and raised inside the camp lacks a future to anticipate or an identity to cling to. Therefore, the challenge for Bangladesh is threefold: i) it must address the source of violence inside the camps through intelligence-led actions against armed groups acting both inside and outside the camps; ii) it must invest in education and skills development for the people and offer them controlled livelihood opportunities; and iii) it must provide its people the confidence that the temporary guests are not being supported at their expense.
When the Myanmar government delays verification procedures and imposes “security conditions” to stall the return of its own people, Bangladesh cannot adopt a policy that makes it the sole responsible party for these individuals who have been forgotten by others. Then there is the issue of the Arakan Army, which now controls much of northern Rakhine.
Whom should Bangladesh negotiate with for the return of the Rohingya? The Arakan Army cannot be deemed an automatic liberator of the Rohingya just because it has a common enemy in the guise of the military junta.
Published in Dawn, August 31st, 2026
