OVER the past month, people from Tirah valley of Khyber District are again being forced to leave their home out of fear for their safety. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, that collects data on terrorism, over the last three years since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, incidents of terrorism have increased 300 per cent in Pakistan. The highest increase has been in KP, especially in border areas like Khyber’s Tirah valley. So, the question is, if terrorism has once again become such a grave problem, then why is there local opposition to military operations in the area?

There are primarily four reasons for this. First, since the early 2000s, numerous such operations of various sizes have been conducted in the merged areas (previously Fata), with Zarb-i-Azb probably the best known. As a result, many communities were displaced for well over a decade. However, the displacement was justified as necessary to thoroughly purge the area of violent actors, so that once communities returned, they could live peaceful lives. Now, it seems that those hardships were for naught. After only returning home a few years ago, merged area residents were again told to leave. What are the guarantees that this time the government will be able to bring lasting peace through these operations?

A slightly more historic perspective helps understand the second reason. Arguably, no part of Pakistan has been made to undergo a greater societal and cultural shift over the last 40 years of warfare in Afghanistan than the merged areas. It has been pointed out that this disruption of tribal life was deemed necessary and the region used as a platform to ensure that a pro-Pakistan government, under the banner of the Taliban, could come to power in Afghanistan. Now that this has been achieved, rather than bringing lasting peace along the border, it has resulted in increased militant activity. So, the question being asked by the locals is why were they made to sacrifice their autonomy and way of life for what proved to be a grave miscalculation.

Third, the local rumour mill is ripe with conspiracy stories born from the erosion in trust between the state and the local population over the last couple of decades due to local exclusion in key policy and development decisions. Theories abound — especially with Pakistan’s promotion of precious minerals and rare earths that exist in large reserves in the merged area — that this is a resource grab. Others argue, based on the timing, that this is an effort to take over local hemp production by the government, given that the harvest season is over and the region is abundant with the product. In the absence of any livelihood opportunities, hemp production is the only activity sustaining lives. Similarly, many locals suspect that this is a land grab by the state for large-scale projects. Rumours are also rampant that the disastrous ‘good Taliban vs ‘bad’ Taliban strategy is again being followed as a way to control terrorism and achieve other assumed national goals. This further fuels suspicions amongst locals about the efficacy of military operations and whether the government is even committed to building lasting peace. Who is engaging with local communities to try and quell these misnomers and get them behind state policy?

What are the guarantees that this time the government will be able to bring lasting peace through operations?

Finally, and perhaps the most critical reason why locals are opposed to operations, is their previous experience as IDPs. As mentioned, this same generation of people, just a few years ago were displaced, so the memory of being forced to live as refugees within one’s own country is still fresh. Although locals were told, as they were this time, that this temporary displacement would be for a couple of months, for many it was over a decade before they were allowed to return. They were given minimal state livelihood support with appalling conditions in the refugee camps set up for them. Most chose to use all their savings and sell whatever assets they had to find housing. However, in their host communities, they faced discrimination stemming from negative stereotypes held among mainstream Pakistanis about tribal Pakhtuns. When they eventually were allowed to return, they came back to demolished homes and markets, with their tilled agriculture fields indistinguishable from the wilderness. All the support they received was a paltry Rs400,000 per extended family — an amount insufficient to remove the rubble of their homes let alone rebuild them. For businesses, other than a couple of towns in North Waziristan, none of the people received any compensation. What are the guarantees, they ask, they won’t be left to fend for themselves in similar fashion and made to return to ruins again, but this time without having any savings or assets to rely on?

As the powers that be debate how to address the resurgence of terrorism in the merged areas, they seem to be missing that the most important component in fighting terrorism is local buy-in. Terrorism thrives in any void created between the public and the state. This is why leading experts on terrorism like Bruce Hoffman, widely regarded as the ‘father of modern counterterrorism,’ argues that while hard power might be necessary in places, it will be insufficient to bring long-term success. Instead of relying on force the government needs to build its soft power — the ability to influence through attraction and persuasion rather than by force. To do this they must begin with community engagement and trust building. They must begin to follow through on promises and engage local communities. Without a good faith effort to address their concerns any policy of the state is likely to fail.

The writer is a development practitioner and a former parliamentarian.

X: @GhaziGJ

Published in Dawn, February 7th, 2026