DISASTERS happen when hazards hit vulnerabilities. The greater the awareness of this lethal combination, the higher the sensitivity to disaster risks and the better the preparedness. Resultantly, the stronger the resilience. This is a global lesson. Its conceptual journey, however, took many decades.
A major breakthrough was achieved in 2005 in Kobe, Japan, during the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. Member countries adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-15, which aimed at “building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters”. Subsequently, in 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-30, was approved and adopted by member countries. Its target was “to reduce losses in lives, livelihoods, economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, communities and countries”. Pakistan, too, adopted both frameworks. But, unlike other countries, for Pakistan, it has turned out to be easier said than done.
Interestingly, Pakistan’s disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) structures are primarily based on the above two frameworks and were being prepared by international experts with UN and donor assistance. The establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is being financed lavishly and empowered through the National Disaster Management Act, 2010.
The authorities have failed miserably to respond effectively to the recent disaster.
Proverbially, power and responsibility are two sides of the same coin, but not here. Since its creation in 2006, except for two years, the NDMA has been run by serving or retired generals. Its website is impressive. Barring a few shortcomings, it contains world-class documents, provides a wealth of knowledge, including hazard and vulnerability mapping, impressive plans and toolkits. The NDM Act and policy also value stakeholders’ participation at each stage of the disaster management cycle. One can also find community-based DRRM training manuals, annual and five-year plans, as well as contingency plans. Above all, most of its units appear to be run by smart people.
However, just as the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the relevance and efficacy of the above lies in its practice. Sadly, despite the legal requirements under the NDM Act, one can’t find anything on the ground regarding community involvement in DRR or the capacity building of disaster-prone people. The NDM Plan-25 also commits to community awareness and participation as its top priority. Chapter 3 of the plan under anticipatory actions requires strengthening the capacities of district disaster management authorities, coordination with community organisations to improve disaster response efficiency and risk reduction. Yet, one finds little evidence on the ground. I spent hours trying to find proof of DDMAs’ presence on the websites of NDMA and the provincial and district disaster management authorities, but failed. Then I asked ChatGPT. It said: “Under the NDM Act, every district is required to form a DDMA, but in practice, many of these DDMAs are inactive or only exist on paper.” I also asked the members of Coalition-38 and individuals in flood-affected districts. Except for one, all validated the ChatGPT statement.
But, the story doesn’t end here. Conceptual confusion in emergencies can cause chaos and harm. Therefore, advance preparedness and assignment of roles are vital. The authors (if any) of the NDMA’s Monsoon Contingency Plan 2025 confused contingency planning with the Contingency Plan. Whilst the former is a process, the later is the product. According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, contingency planning is a “process that analyses disaster risks and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses”. Interestingly, the MCP-25 was approved in June 2025, when the early monsoon had already begun. Hence, there was no time, for example, to conduct drills or rehearsals, or to prepare communities for response. Consider the following list of the MCP-25: prioritise the desilting of dams and reservoirs, and submit the annual reservoir report to the NDMA. The following tasks are also mentioned in the plan: train female disaster responders at the local level, and ensure gender-sensitive relief provisions. How on earth could these gigantic tasks have been performed in a couple of weeks? Though these tasks are also part of the strategy and long-term plan of the NDMA, progress in the last 20 years has been insignificant.
Moreover, due to the poor quality of contingency planning, lack of participation by disaster-prone communities in planning and implementation, the absence of effective DDMAs and a top-down management system, the authorities have failed miserably to respond effectively to the recent disaster.
Consider this. The director general of Punjab DMA recently said that more than 4,000 villages, spread over 1.3 million acres of 41 million acres of farmland, had been inundated by Sept 5. Punjab has roughly 30,000 villages. This means about 13 per cent of villages and 3.6pc of crop area have been affected or damaged. The officials also claimed that in total 3.8m people have been affected and 2.26m ‘evacuated’. Only 2.5pc of the rescued persons have been kept in 602 government-run relief camps, while 97.5pc of the displaced are likely to have reached safer places on their own and have been living without the government’s help since then. The NDMA website shows that between June 26 and Sept 7, the Punjab government received 20,000 tents from the federal government but could distribute only 3,569 to the affected persons. This not only shows the Punjab government’s low capacity but also its callousness as thousands of families continue to live under the open sky.
This huge void would not have occurred had DRRM plans been implemented vigorously and diligently in the last 20 years. A logical question arises — if it didn’t happen in two decades, will it ever? I leave it to the reader’s imagination.
The writer is associated with Pattan-Coalition38.
X: @BariSarwra
Published in Dawn, September 10th, 2025
