Battling autocracy
THE case against autocracy is strong. Most developed states progressed under maturing democracy. Most autocracies do poorly — economically and on human rights. The few doing better have non-replicable traits: tiny size, oil or strong revolutionary parties. Even most such parties do poorly. Autocracy does well mainly in East Asia. Democracy does well in diverse realms, including our region even when not fully mature.
Yet, autocracy is growing globally. Democracies are reverting to illiberal electoral set-ups (Donald Trump’s America), to rigged electoral set-ups (Bangladesh and us), and to absolute autocracy (Myanmar). Given its poor record, it’s critical to resist autocracy by reviewing its means of survival, which vary widely where the stages and type — army, one-party, one-family rule; oligarchy, monarchy, technocracy, theocracy or hybrid of autocracy — are concerned.
They may include a core ‘selectorate’ — unlike an electorate in democracy — which selects and deposes the top autocrat — senior family, clergy, army or party figures. Beyond insiders, there is a big supporter base that helps to control dissent: business, tribal, landed and other elites with big financial, military or human resources. Some get foreign money and arms too. Their strategies include progress, patronage or repression. Those that can deliver the first two opt for a milder form of autocracy; those that can’t do so, use repression under absolute autocracy. Fissures within the selectorate or support base or a fall in resources flow result in a change of faces or the fall of the system.
The resistance actors and strategies vary too by autocracy type and stage. Where fully or partly liberal democracies become illiberal (stage one reversion), state bodies, such as courts and parliament, can often check autocracy, backed by public pressure via the media. When autocracy moves to rigged poll set-ups, peaceful struggle by political and societal groups becomes critical, too. Finally, under absolute autocracy, armed groups often become the only resistance actors when peaceful resistance is crushed.
The system persists and these cosmetic changes give it life.
Pakistan, unluckily, is among the few states that have mostly seen autocracy. The same face didn’t stay for decades but the same regime has stayed in various forms. Military rule changes into a light hybrid where polls may be fair but the establishment controls the core areas of security and external policy; or there may exist a deeper hybrid where polls are rigged and even politics and economics bend to the establishment’s will. Civilian façades are easily deposed when they become too big for their boots. Even top honchos can get fired by the selectorate in their ranks. But the system persists and these cosmetic changes give it life.
We now see a hybrid system with rigged polls and non-elected control of all major policies after the peak of two fair polls and mild liberalism during 2008-18. The reversal came fast and unleashed a range of resistance forms, normally spanning several reversion stages elsewhere, as an autocratic state faced an autarkic society.
One now concurrently sees brave judges vainly fighting the executive-cum establishment, as in stage one reversion. Major parties like the PTI and JUI-F are protesting both in the assemblies and outside, and rights-based groups nationally on the streets as in stage two reversion. Even armed groups of varied ideologies exist, as in stage three reversion. They and extremist groups are inflicting the biggest body blows to the state and making it helpless in all provinces: the TLP mostly in Punjab, TTP in KP, BLA in Balochistan and criminal gangs in Sindh.
The aim should be to remove not just the civilian or non-civilian façade but the whole system to unfurl electoral democracy and civilian sway. For this, all legal political groups must unite. But legal resistance, too, in a divided state gets divided by class, ethnicity, distance, ideology, needs felt, abuses faced, goals and institutional links to easily unite. Even united they may be too weak to achieve true civilian sway in the face of a strong top autocratic entity that is not too dependent on others.
In this context, grassroots progressive resistance from non-militant groups is growing and can be seen in Balochistan and KP. The same might be happening elsewhere including in Sindh where protests against the Cholistan canals continue. The parasitical autocracy may even collapse under the weight of its own sins. But these groups have to mature and avoid chaos before they can provide leadership from a common platform.
The writer is a political economist with a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, and has senior-level work experience across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, March 18th, 2025
