Alert Sign Dear reader, online ads enable us to deliver the journalism you value. Please support us by taking a moment to turn off Adblock on

Alert Sign Dear reader, please upgrade to the latest version of IE to have a better reading experience


Challenging conventions

Published Feb 12, 2017 01:33am


Your Name:

Recipient Email:

THE recent action against Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) leaders is being interpreted in many ways. Some say it is an attempt to avoid sanctions by Donald Trump’s administration. Others link it with Chinese pressure. Only a few look at the development from an internal perspective.

The emerging debate on internal security in recent months has mainly revolved around the status of banned organisations, madressahs and operations against militant networks in the urban areas mainly in Punjab. One of the major challenges confronting the state is about how to deal with conventional militant groups, including the JuD. These groups have developed huge infrastructures inside the country. Contrary to anti-Pakistan militant groups, these conventional groups are fairly visible on the ground and active within the domains of politics and social welfare. They are not involved in terrorist activities inside Pakistan, and are gradually becoming part of the far-right politics in the country.

Security institutions are nonetheless worried about the members of such groups, who are being targeted for recruitment by various terrorist groups including the militant Islamic State (IS) group, Al Qaeda and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

How should the state neutralise groups that once served a strategic purpose?

These conventional militant groups also contribute to shaping Pakistan’s international image and often cause the state diplomatic stress — the JuD is on top among these groups. The dilemma for security institutions is that the world believes such groups are under the complete control of certain state institutions. It is difficult for the world to conceive of these groups operating independently when they exploit the state’s ideological and nationalist narratives and present themselves as custodians of state interests.

Another major challenge for the state is how to neutralise groups that once served its strategic purpose. The most practised way in a post-insurgency perspective is to reintegrate them into mainstream society. However, many experts and most of Pakistan’s civil society believe that these groups should be treated under the rule of the law and that Pakistan must fulfil its commitments under UN Security Council resolutions.

There is a need to reassess the ways of bringing such groups under the rule of law completely. The state can freeze their assets, shut down their charity and organisational operations, put their leaderships under different schedules of anti-terrorism laws, try their leaders in courts of law, and, in the worst case, strip them of their nationality. But will this eliminate the problem? Do we have an idea about the penetration of these groups in society, different layers of their members from mid to lower ranks, and their numerical strength? How will they behave and what kind of responses can they evolve?

The case study of a self-proclaimed ‘second line of defence of every Muslim state’, Harkatul Jihad-i-Islami (HJI) may provide some insight. Once the biggest Pakistani jihadist group, active in Afghanistan and India-held Kashmir, it became a parasite of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban pre-9/11 owing to internal rifts. Its founder, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, was killed last month while fighting against the Afghan security forces. It is significant that the once mythical jihadist leader’s death did not receive much coverage in mainstream or the militants’ media.

The first Pakistani group to launch attacks on its own soil was HJI. Before the Lal Masjid siege in 2007, HJI and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi factions were behind most of the terrorist attacks carried out in Pakistan, mainly between 2002 and 2006. The Pakistani state had decided to dismantle HJI in 2003. Although a small group, HJI took more than nine years to become non-functional. During that time, it not only caused enormous damage to the country through terrorist attacks but also provided trained militants to other terrorist groups. It contributed towards the formation of the Punjabi Taliban groups, which comprised HJI’s splinter terrorist cells besides others. Militants from HJI also joined the ranks of Al Qaeda and the TTP.

Those who oppose the reintegration of conventional militant groups argue that it will only encourage these groups, who will reconnect with their radical and violent agendas once the pressure is off them. They fear that these groups will continue nurturing hate narratives among Pakistani society. Few also see a design behind such initiatives by state institutions to cover up their proxies.

However, the more important question is: what kind of the options are available for reintegration? Some look towards Saudi Arabian and certain Western models, which are mainly based on individual rehabilitation. Pakistan also has such models of detainees’ rehabilitation programmes and one can argue about their effectiveness. But reintegration of conventional militant groups is a different sort of challenge that requires our own local framework. Certain conventional groups, including JuD, have already developed far-right credentials, and their political reintegration can help to neutralise their radical tendencies.

Certainly, the reintegration approach can be more effective for conventional groups; even among them, some will have a greater tendency to reintegrate as compared with others. Here one may argue that reintegration cannot resolve the whole issue of militancy and extremism in Pakistan, and that the possibilities of more radical ideological inspirations will remain in place — pushing the youth towards more organised militant groups. Despite all its weaknesses, IS is still able to inspire members of more conventional groups.

Can the state evolve a reintegration framework with a zero-tolerance approach to violence? Can state institutions explore such probabilities within the limits of the rule of law and the Constitution? There remains the need to deconstruct radical narratives that have been nurtured over the past decades — without this, such narratives will continue to haunt members of these groups put to reintegration. Disconnecting conventional groups from anti-Pakistan terrorist groups will also be a challenge.

It seems that the state is thinking about the future of these conventional groups, but it is not yet clear where this thinking process is headed.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, February 12th, 2017


Your Name:

Recipient Email:

Author Image

Muhammad Amir Rana is a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

The views expressed by this writer and commenters below do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Dawn Media Group.

Comments (13) Closed

El Cid Feb 12, 2017 02:47am

The question is not how should but why should? Why should Pakistan bleed its strength at the call of those who are eventually going to attack Pakistan ... this is as certain as night follows day!

kumar Feb 12, 2017 03:30am

Interesting article.

Alba Feb 12, 2017 04:18am

Do not think in terms of religion. Think of the big picture. Think in terms of revolution. Think in terms of past Russian communism and nihilism. These groups may be religious but they are also nihilists. If they can destroy the institutions of the state and make Afghanistan or Pakistan collapse they can rule. People in Pakistan may have their problems with democracy, but what do the citizens of the state prefer, democracy or arbitrary rule? We have seen the arbitrary rule of ISIS. Whether people lived or died depended on what kind of mood the conquerors were in that day, or what the latest directive was.

Jag Feb 12, 2017 04:44am

Pakistani's such as the author, have taken the first step. Acknowledging that there is a Terrorist problem in the country. The second step would be to regulate the teachings in Madrassas. Third, Stop hate speech, against other religions. Fourth, stop their funding from within the country and outside.

SDA Feb 12, 2017 05:26am

This article is an excellent piece and plenty of food for thought. However it's not possible that some Pakistani think tanks have not already made the same conclusions and presented it to the Govt. If there is no will to act on these because Pakistan does not want to stop the flow of funds from KSA and others like Qatar, then nothing will come out of this. But I guess mainstream media must keep trying as complete reintegration will actually take a couple of generations considering the deep rot.

N C Mishra Feb 12, 2017 07:35am

Supporting groups for "strategic" purpose - thereby meaning encouraging non constitutional methods for attaining a desired scenario has always been counter productive. These extremist outfits work outside the legal framework and consist mainly of uncontrollables. Nations have tried this within their own country and also across borders. Ultimately the sponsor and these groups fall out and even become arch enemies. All this only increases suffering for the common man who would hardly care as to "who would be the king".

Good Point Feb 12, 2017 08:38am

Much needed analysis. Sir, we hope people like you form a consultative and pressure groups to govt efforts ( of genuine)

Muhammad zahid Feb 12, 2017 01:11pm

Well written...proper solution is not mentioned in the article.

NN ojha Feb 12, 2017 01:23pm

In most cases such mikitant groups owe their origin and existence to presence of two extremes in the society; a group of extremely smart people whose sole aim is to control the reins of state power and the other group of extremely naive and credulous people willing to offer themselves as cannon fodder fooled by the lure of meagre mundane rewards in this life but unbelievably massive rewards in the next world. The process remains unhindered largely because of the silent majority who though averse to the whole idea remains nevertheless a silent spectator. Pakistan has all the three components to help sustain these groups. The logjam can be broken only if the smart guys become conscientious or the silent majority decides to speak out. The prospects though difficult aren't impossible at all.

Arabia irshad Feb 12, 2017 01:32pm

Action against JuD is well analysed. . Yes, there is an urgent need to deconstruct radical narratives and disconnect such small or powerful conventional groups to reintegrate and work as anti Pakistan terrorists.

Princess_of_DHUMP Feb 12, 2017 05:36pm

Its not clear where your thinking process is headed either!

QalanDar Feb 13, 2017 04:07am

This article and recent incidents in Pakistan make me believe that sooner or later, we will get rid of this "Frankenstein's Monsters" and improve Pakistans image in the world. Finally the common Pakistani is realizing that all this time we were blaming neighbors and crying conspiracy theories but we ourselves had a lot of negatives that needed attention. Better late than never.

Asad Asif Feb 14, 2017 12:50am

It is a very small minority who talks like author. The other side a vast majority thinks opposite. Now I wonder whether this must be called a democracy where the minority has every right to do everything while the majority needs to suffer just because Mr. X and Mr. Y are saying so ......

How come you want to put behind bars millions of people just because UN is saying. How about the oldest but still under obliged resolution of UN still pending decision at Indians hands. I guess we need to talk about that first? NO?