THE spotlight is once again on Karachi. On Wednesday, the Supreme Court’s criticism of the law-enforcement agencies for failing to keep the peace in the city was followed by a news conference in which Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan called for a political solution to Karachi’s troubles. In response to MQM chief Altaf Hussain’s demand that the city be handed over to the army, Chaudhry Nisar rightly pointed out that without political consensus among the stakeholders, no security agency could turn around the situation. Unfortunately, it is the very absence — for several years now — of such a consensus that has made Karachi a security nightmare for its citizens. The city has seen two major security operations — in 1992 and 1995 — and the results have been anything but lasting: the sectarian, ethnic, political and criminal violence that exploded with fury in the mid-1980s continues to gather steam. Shootouts, assassinations, arson, kidnappings and extortion seem to have become Karachi’s destiny. Thousands of people have met a violent death, while few perpetrators have been arrested and hardly anyone brought to justice.

Given that most targeted killings in the city are politically motivated, any operation aimed at taking out all those who perpetrate violence must necessarily focus on the armed wings of the main political parties and religious groups operating in the city. Would the MQM or any other political party or religious group for that matter be prepared for such action if their members are picked up on charges of extortion, violence and targeted killings? It is better then for the parties, whether or not in government, to take the initiative themselves and come to a consensus to crack down on all those who disturb the peace regardless of their affiliations.

At another level, the army’s induction into Karachi could have dangerous consequences for Pakistan’s nascent democracy. To the generals, a politician seeking the army’s help to solve a political problem could be seen as an invitation to usurp what should be policing functions. True, the Constitution does provide for the army to “act in aid of civil power”. But the question is, what will the army’s modus operandi be? Will it be any different to the one that regular law enforcers like the police and Rangers have? Will there be curfew, arbitrary detentions, house-to-house searches? In fact, previous army interventions have resulted in political groups alleging human rights violations. Against this backdrop it is difficult to see how administrative measures and policing by the army can give peace to Karachi.