The fact that Z. A. Bhutto was a man of many divergent talents cannot be disputed but not all the decisions he made were wise. Some in fact, came back to haunt him, damaging his career and putting his life at risk. The declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims was one such decision which he implemented at the insistence of the rightist elements. The only thing this gained was the Ahmadi community’s opposition.
After the National Assembly passed the bill on the issue on September 6, 1974, Bhutto called some of his close acquaintances including Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Rafi Raza and asked them about the possible implications of the decision. As mentioned by Maulana Niazi later in February 1987, Bhutto thought that the Ahmadi decision would satisfy clerics who had been demanding such action. Perhaps he wanted to score a point on this account and thought that holding snap elections would attract the rightist elements to his side.
The discussion lengthened; perhaps Bhutto wanted a clear suggestion about holding the polls immediately which, he presumed, would prove fruitful for him. According to Maulana Niazi, he opposed the move but Hafiz Pirzada supported Bhutto and considered it the right step, which made Bhutto happy. The session ended with the agreement to not hold the elections immediately but Bhutto was still keen to hold the elections ahead of schedule.
The cabinet continued its routine work but Bhutto seemed preoccupied with the elections scheme despite the fact that there were critical issues to be dealt with such as cultivating Pakistan’s ties with the world, arranging funds for various projects and rearming the country’s armed forces with arms and newer technologies.
After the Arab-Israeli war, October 6, 1973, tension between the Muslim world and the United States had increased. The Arab oil exporting nations decided to use the power of oil as a way to retaliate against the US’ continued policy of supporting Israel. Arab oil production had been cut by 5pc which caused a rise in petroleum prices from four dollars to $12 per barrel. The industrial nations that thrived on Arab oil were marooned and began thinking of finding alternative resources.
Iran’s Shah too, felt quite uneasy about the next move. The western world shared his anxiety regarding the security of oil supplies. To ensure secured oil supplies the US planned to build its ‘Rapid Deployment Force’, a mobile strike force comprising units from all their armed forces that could strike anywhere, at any time.
The Pakistani population expressed their condemnation of Israeli and US action and supported the Arab world. Some of the parties demanded that the Arab nations use oil as weapon to support the Palestinian right of existence. Bhutto had to be very calculated in his reaction to what had happened in the Middle East. While he supported the Arab world, he called for an end to the “No war, No peace” option being followed by the world powers.
During the post-embargo situation Bhutto pledged all support for the Arab cause not because Arabs were Muslims but because the Palestinians had a just cause. Soon the world community realised the serious nature of the Middle East conflict and moved to detach the warring parties, yet the issue remained as explosive as ever.
Bhutto wanted to play his part in whatever manner he could, but Pakistan suffered a loss when on March 25, 1975, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated, and was succeeded by King Khalid. King Khalid paid a visit to Pakistan in 1976 during which the issue of Middle East and Palestine came up but did not move further as the US had begun a policy of brokering peace with Arab states separately.































