IS the peace deal between the Afghan government and former warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar a template for future peace agreements or a one-off affair that comes down to the savvy of Mr Hekmatyar and Kabul’s desperation? With the lifting of UN sanctions and the likely release of some of Mr Hekmatyar’s allies, the Hezb-i-Islami leader is expected to come out of hiding and enter Kabul as a rehabilitated public figure of Afghanistan. While some power centres in Kabul may regard Mr Hekmatyar as a potential ally in the complicated and ever-worsening political balancing acts in the Afghan capital, the greater value may be in the Hezb leader showing the way for those among the Afghan Taliban who may be interested in knowing the possibilities of life in Afghanistan if they strike a deal with the government. But it will not be easy. The deal has been facilitated by the reality that both sides had something to offer the other: Mr Hekmatyar is a relatively marginal opposition, militant figure who appears to have been looking for political relevance in Kabul again; the Hezb-i-Islami is small enough for Kabul to not need to make massive concessions.

With the Taliban, the calculations are necessarily different. The group may not be in a position to overrun government strongholds, but neither is the government in a position to wrest back Taliban strongholds. To that years-old position, the annual spring uncertainty is about to be introduced: will the end of winter and the start of the fighting season cause a tipping point this year? For at least two external reasons, the Taliban may feel more emboldened than usual this spring. First, the new US administration appears focused on the militant Islamic State group and does not, at least for now, appear interested in significantly expanding the US military mission in Afghanistan. Second, Russia has upped its interest in Afghanistan in a manner that may favour the Taliban in the short term — the fear of IS spreading inside Afghanistan and to regional countries may release some of the military and diplomatic pressure on the Taliban to work towards a peace settlement. But for Pakistan, the policy must remain focused on a peace settlement. It is the only guarantee of long-term regional peace and stability. Short-term interests should not cloud the greater good. Quiet but determined diplomacy towards a peace settlement should continue to be the approach.

Published in Dawn, February 10th, 2017