IN India’s states, the office of the governor as constitutional head of state has been reduced to an utter wreck. India’s constitution is partly responsible for it, but greater blame lies on politicians in power at the centre.

The constitution confers on the president (ie the central government) unfettered power to appoint and sack governors. Judgements by the Supreme Court of India can curb abuse only up to a point — only a constitutional amendment can help. The central government, which wields a majority in parliament, will not promote any amendment that curbs its own powers.

Article 155 of the constitution says that “the governor shall be appointed by the president…” Article 156 adds, “The governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the president,” who acts on the advice of the prime minister.

India’s centre uses its states’ governors as political tools.

The president is elected by a special procedure that, in effect, requires consent not only from parliament but also from a significant number of states. He holds office for a fixed term of five years and can be removed by impeachment “for violation of the constitution”.

In glaring contrast, the governor cannot be removed for even the gravest constitutional violation provided that he enjoys the confidence of his masters in New Delhi.

Those masters act through their agent, the governor, who is immune to accountability for violating the constitution. They will not give him the security of a fixed term lest he grow too big for his boots. For the same reason, precise grounds for removal cannot be specified either. It is best to keep him on a tight leash and at their ‘pleasure’. This warps democratic governance in the country.

One safeguard was mooted. In May 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru told the constituent assembly that “he must be acceptable to the government of the province and yet he must not be known to be a part of the party machine of that province [...] But on the whole it probably would be desirable to have people from outside; eminent people, sometimes people who have not taken too great a part in politics.

“Politicians would probably like a more active domain for their activities but there may be an eminent educationist or persons eminent in other walks of life, who would naturally, while cooperating fully with the Government and carrying out the policy of the government, at any rate helping in every way ... he would nevertheless represent before the public sometime slightly above the party and thereby in fact, help that government more than if he was considered as part of the party machine”.

But no provision was made in the text for consulting the chief minister, let alone securing his consent even though he was to act on the chief minister’s advice.

The supreme court ruled repeatedly that “his office is not subordinate or subservient to the government of India. He is not amenable to the directions of the government of India, nor is he accountable to them for the manner in which he carries out his functions and duties.

“He is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the government of India. He is constitutionally the head of the state in whom is vested the executive power of the state and without whose assent there can be no legislation in exercise of the legislative power of the state.”

The reality was quite different. In 1988, a commission on centre-state relations timidly suggested: “It is desirable that a politician from the ruling party at the Union is not appointed as governor of a state which is being run by some other party or a combination of parties”. A fortnight after the report was published, governors were appoi­nted in five states — in direct violation of the commission’s recom­men­dations.

From 1977 to 2014, every change at the centre was followed by sacking of governors appointed by the previous regime and their replacement by those who could not be accommodated in the cabinet.

They considered their job to be continuously pestering and publicly criticising the chief minister, who belonged to an opposition party.

Judicial pronouncements are of no avail. The latest, this July, was when Arunachal Pradesh’s governor was criticised for exceeding constitutional limits and governors’ status was affirmed. The governor, J.P. Rajkhowa, a former civil servant from the Indian Administrative Service, had been appointed by the BJP government in June 2015.

The centre, displeased with him for its own reasons, asked him to quit, citing ‘health reasons’. He refused. He was sacked on Sept 12.

How can the court’s ruling in July help a governor if he can be thrown out of office any time by New Delhi?

The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.

Published in Dawn, October 8th, 2016