THE $46 billion investment tag being associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor could be transformational. But its ulti­mate fate will depend on whether Pakis­tani is able to fulfil its side of the bargain.

This is going to be a tall order. The corridor will involve a series of complicated infrastructure and investment projects needing more than political will to execute. The actual ability of government institutions to conceive specific projects, ensure transparency and accountability in their implementation, and alter and introduce federal or provincial rules and routines necessary to removing red tape would be crucial. Current capacities and attitudes won’t do.

We would require additional human re­­source capacity, especially technical expertise in the relevant government departments; resources will have to be realigned to support the parts of government and private-sector entities most involved in the initiative; and our bureaucratic approaches that thrive on hindering processes will need to be turned around.

Pakistan’s track record isn’t encouraging. Even the recent history of engagement with China is poor. President Zardari made somewhat of a habit out of signing MOUs with Chinese companies. The Sharif government hasn’t let off on this either.

But what most don’t realise is that between 2001 and 2011, only 6pc of Chinese pledged aid was actually delivered in terms of projects on the ground. In the majority of cases, it was lack of seriousness, capacity, or resources on the Pakistani side that dissuaded Chinese counterparts from following through.

In implementing CPEC, the current capacities won’t do.

Of course, we have known of the increasing rot within the public sector for some time. In fact, we have also come up with a fairly creative solution, albeit one that sidetracks the real problems by standing up parallel institutions rather than fixing existing ones. The Motorway Police is perhaps the most frequently cited example. But there are others: Nadra; Daanish schools in Punjab, military courts, etc.

The problem is that these institutions do nothing to solve the systemic problems that are hampering overall public-sector performance. In fact, they exacerbate deficiencies by sucking up disproportional amounts of resources and the best human capacity, leaving mainstream institutions and their structural problems unaddressed. As existing capacity issues start to catch up, I can see people making a seemingly convincing argument that the answer to managing the burden of the $46bn investment is to create yet another parallel world.

In this case, it won’t work. The size and scale of the complex web of initiatives envisioned here necessitate a ‘whole of government approach’ where various public- and private-sector entities are able to collaborate seamlessly. There is no way to do this through shadow structures — unless you plan to mirror the whole government in a set of parallel institutions. Thus, if we really want this to succeed, we must take on the daunting task of providing the relevant existing institutions the resources and capacity they need to deliver; and getting our bureaucracy to help rather than hinder the process.

This is a challenge, but it is also a massive opportunity. For years, Pakistan has debated deep institutional reforms and pleaded bold steps involving reorientation of inter-ministry relationships, civil service reforms, progressive trade regimes, overhaul of tax structures, etc. But no government has found the political space to do it. Handled astutely, the corridor can become the catalyst that makes the seemingly impossible happen.

This wouldn’t be a first for countries. Consider the ‘Turkish model’ Prime Minister Sharif seems in awe of. Prime Minister Erdogan’s economic turnaround is often romanticised as strong leadership and bold steps to reform internal structures. But if you looked carefully, you’d find that the answer lies less in any political boldness at home and more in his (and his predecessors’) ability to cleverly use Turkey’s interest in entering the European Union as an excuse.

It was the string of economic and institutional reforms needed to make a strong case for entry into the EU that Erdogan managed to get most Turks behind, and this gave him the space he needed. And he didn’t only do what the EU wanted; while he was at it, he also manoeuvred to make many other forward-leaning reforms that were otherwise politically untenable.

If Prime Minister Sharif is able to think beyond the tactical benefit of setting up parallel universes and recognise the real strategic opportunity to bring about structural changes that can put Pakistan on the path to sustainable progress, the corridor can prove to be Pakistan’s EU moment. In the planning ministry and its minister, his designated lead on the initiative, he has got an institution and individual with a whole of government mandate and approach. Now he needs to empower them and back them on the set of difficult reforms they will inevitably demand.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC.

Published in Dawn, June 9th, 2015

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