Going by the recent Al Qaeda attack on a jail in Al Mukalla, a major city in the Hadramaut coastal region in Yemen, it is amply clear who will be the main beneficiary of a protracted crisis in the country. The Al Qaeda fighters freed hundreds of inmates including scrores of militants as well as one of their main leaders.

The militant organisation calling itself the Islamic State (IS) had already registered its presence in the capital of Yemen by orchestrating large-scale suicide attacks on Shia mosques in Sana’a last month.

Once regarded as a successful counterterrorism model, Yemen has been transformed into a crisis state in no time. The situation has activated diverse destabilising factors which will certainly wipe out all that has been invested in countering terrorism in the country.

Read: Al Qaeda frees 300 inmates in Yemen jailbreak

Against this background, some may argue that the state’s socio-political stability is more important as compared to ideological balancing. However, in case of failure to achieve either, non-state actors are the main beneficiaries, whether they are religiously, ethnically or politically motivated. And a range of non-state actors exist in Yemen.

The Middle East situation will compound the problems on Pakistan’s internal security front.

The religiously motivated non-state actors, including Al Qaeda and the IS, have not yet displayed their full potential in the rapidly deteriorating situation. But experts believe that these actors had been waiting for this moment of Sunni-Shia confrontation in the country for a long time. They knew that sectarian tensions would open up space for them to flourish and operate. Now they will be more than ready to encroach upon the space that the ongoing war in Yemen will create. Yemen’s case could be even worse than that of Syria where Bashar al-Assad’s forces are still offering resistance to non-state actors.

It is a valid argument that the US-led invasion of Iraq and intervention in Syria created situations of chaos which non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and IS have effectively exploited.

These violent actors have attracted Islamist extremists from across the world. Through playing the sectarian card, such groups create strategic space for themselves. Arab analysts had already predicted that terrorist groups in Yemen would exploit the Saudi-led intervention as an excuse to go after the Shia Houthis.

A major advantage that non-state actors have over external forces and their militaries is the former’s presence on the ground and an extensive outreach in conflict zones.

To exploit this advantage, intervening forces sometimes try to reconcile with certain non-state actors. This helps the former build a ground response against their main adversary. The interventionists choose their allies among non-state actors on the basis of the latter’s religious, ethnic and political affinities, but focus on their strategic purpose.

The heads of the Arab League countries have agreed to establish a joint Arab military force to counter terrorism and conventional security threats. This goal will certainly take some time to achieve. and there is the likelihood that the Saudi-led coalition might want to use certain non-state actors against their adversaries in Yemen.

If that happens, it will not only hurt that country but also trigger a tide of unrest across the Muslim world. A strategic use of sectarianism by states or non-state actors not only deepens but prolongs the conflict.

After engaging non-state actors, intervening states usually fall victim to the fallacy that the former have become their proxies and will obey their orders. When non-state actors are perceived as proxies, it becomes difficult to treat them as rational actors. That means they are seen as only following others’ plans and do not enjoy the freedom to pursue their own objectives.

Also read: OIC’s role to be sought for ending Yemen conflict

At a certain point, the interventionists’ dependence on non-state actors or militants increases to such an extent that even when the latter are no more willing to serve as proxies, the former continue to treat them as if they are. While there may be instances where non-state actors follow others’ plans, at other times they can even influence their partnering states and force the latter to amend their strategic designs.

The militants have already made a few gains in the current Yemeni crisis. The focus of Muslim societies is shifting from issues of extremism to more conventional threats, which has eased pressure on the religious extremist forces.

Non-violent radicals and conventional militant groups such as Jamaatud Dawa and the banned Sipah-i-Sahaba etc are major beneficiaries of the debate and are aligning themselves with the Saudi position and trying to influence policymakers. The Shia parties are doing the same in favour of Iran and the Houthi forces in Yemen.

Pakistan’s ongoing military offensive has successfully scattered the terrorist networks, but the psychological impact of the Yemen crisis can provide relief to the terrorists and ease the pressure of military operations. New militant forces like IS can also get a chance to expand their influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Any gains by IS and Al Qaeda in Yemen will boost the confidence of the militant forces in our region. The peace process between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul, which has already been slow, can suffer further. The changing situation will compound the problems on Pakistan’s internal security front where sectarian militant groups could intensify their operations.

In the aftermath of the Yemen crisis, sectarian tensions can emerge as a real challenge for Muslim countries, most of which are not good at managing such problems. Countries such as Pakistan where violent sectarian groups are a significant part of the militant landscape would be more vulnerable to the dangers. Pakistan’s clergy is already divided over the issue on sectarian lines. Moderate scholars will have little space available to intervene.

Ultimately, it is the state which has to decide the future of its citizens. One should expect it not to create or leave any space for the militants to exploit.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, April 5th, 2015

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