THE sudden downfall and disappearance of Viktor Yanukovych late last week served as a kind of climax in the unfolding Ukrainian drama. Plenty of scope remains, though, for an extended, quite possibly confusing and potentially fractious denouement.

Inevitably, there are competing narratives. The events of recent days are widely being characterised as a revolution propelled by months of popular protests, but some are inclined to view them as a coup induced by mob rule. Both sides have accused each other of fascist tendencies. And there are those who see Ukraine’s future as a stark choice between a tighter alliance with Russia and closer association with the European Union (EU).

The protests in Kiev’s central Maidan, or Independence Square, were triggered last November by Yanukovych’s decision to backtrack on a pledge to sign an agreement with the EU. He evidently did so under pressure from Vladimir Putin, who sees Ukraine as a key component of the Eurasian customs union Moscow intends to launch next year.

The economic angle, though, cannot be viewed in isolation from the bigger political picture, which in turn incorporates a historical perspective that stretches far beyond the lifespan of the Soviet Union. For instance, much of modern Ukraine’s territory was commonly called Malaya Rus — Little Russia — until the late 19th century. The Ukrainian and Russian languages are closely related, and Kiev is considered the birthplace of Russian culture.

None of this ought to serve as an argument for undermining Ukraine’s independence, obviously. There has been much talk, though, of the conceptual divide between western and eastern Ukraine, with the latter disinclined to pull away from Russia whereas the former favours greater integration with Europe.

While talk of a possible partition is more common outside Ukraine than within the country, the considerable Russian presence in the southeast — notably in the Crimean region — can hardly be ignored.

Ethnicity and linguistic affinity are not the only significant factors, though. It is all too easy to forget that during the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of its Eastern European sphere of influence, the West broadly sought to assuage Moscow’s fear that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation would sooner or later swallow up the buffer states. It has signally failed to live up to that promise.

Nato and the EU are not identical, of course, but the symbiotic relationship between the two is not merely a product of the Russian imagination. Back in the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev was eager to promote the idea of a common European home, but in the post-Soviet scenario Russia has only ever been invited to be a compliant neighbour rather than a part of the family.

That is understandable in some respects, but it is hardly surprising for Moscow to be less than thrilled at the idea of its cousins signing up to enter what it views, not entirely without cause, as a hostile camp.

Sure, the post-Second World War settlement, which entailed spheres of influence — and effectively permitted Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not to mention CIA-led anti-democratic initiatives in Greece and Italy, for instance — isn’t seriously defensible in retrospective.

The same verdict could be extended, though, to the Versailles agreement 95 years ago, whereby the isolation and humiliation of Germany set the stage for the triumph of Nazism.

Notwithstanding Putin’s deplorable tendencies towards authoritarianism, Russia has not gone Germany’s way. Yet.

The argument against pushing it too far has been reinforced by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s reaction this week to the events in Kiev.

It is interesting, though, that Medvedev, who has been very much in the shadows since swapping seats with Putin, has been dragooned into spouting the Kremlin’s reservations about the developments in Ukraine. Putin, fresh from the triumph of the largely trouble-free Winter Olympics in Sochi, has been keeping his powder dry. Metaphorically speaking, hopefully.

For Ukraine, there’s no getting away from Russia. At the same time, there is no reason why close ties with Moscow must necessarily be sacrificed in the interests of a closer relationship with the EU. It should be able to have it both ways without splitting up or being forced to choose between Putin’s dictates and those of the IMF — although the latter may come as a bigger shock.

Whether the presidential election now scheduled for May will provide the scenario for a happy ending to Ukraine’s travails remains to be seen. The potential exists, despite the far-right involvement in the protests of the past few months. However, a hands-off approach by not just Russia but the EU and the US may yield the least undesirable result.

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