Is Iran the next target?

“The desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all others”.

— Henry Kissinger in “A World Restored”.

WILL the war of words between Washington and Tehran turn out to be a prelude to military action against Iran, as was the case with Iraq? Emboldened by the quick collapse of Iraqi resistance, US hardliners are now setting their sights on regime change in Iran.

A high-level, though unofficial, dialogue between the two countries over Iraq, Afghanistan and other issues has been abruptly broken off by Washington. There are clear signals that the US is now adopting a confrontational stance vis-a-vis Iran that may lead to include covert attempts to destabilize the Iranian government.

Senator Pat Roberts, the Republican chairman of the Senate intelligence panel, has urged the US government to “send a strong signal” to Tehran that Washington was supporting “ a regime change in Iran.” A well-known Christian right ally of neo-conservatives in the Pentagon and the State Department, Senator Sam Brownback has introduced the “Iran Democracy Act” that sets as US policy the goal of “an internationally monitored referendum to allow the Iranian people to peacefully change their system of government”. Regime change, it may be observed, is a crucial implication of the National Security Strategy that has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine.

The fact that the United States has a tortured history of involvement in Iranian affairs has further underlined the seriousness of the situation Tehran is faced with. It may be recalled that the US Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated the 1953 coup that ousted prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh and brought back Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Until the Islamic revolution that took place 24 years ago, the United States supported and armed the increasingly despotic regime of the Shah of Iran. The American support for the late Shah precipitated the hostage crisis at the US embassy, sanctions against Iran, breaking of diplomatic relations between the two countries and two decades of unconcealed hostility.

A number of accusations have been levelled against Iran. President Bush has included it in “the axis of evil”, though little proof has been provided of state-sponsored terrorism or of Tehran’s nuclear programme being military-oriented.

Some of the recent accusations against Tehran are as follows:

* The United States alleges Iranian-trained agents have crossed into southern Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime and are working to advance Iranian interests. Tehran is being accused of orchestrating unrest among Iraq’s Shia population. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has, however, made it clear that the United States will not allow a pro-Iranian government to be established in Iraq.

* The US has accused Iran of hiding Al Qaeda operators following a series of suicide bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia in which 34 people, including nine Americans, were killed. The Americans have even accused Tehran of doing nothing to crack down on “terrorists” within its borders.

* A far more serious allegation relates to Iran’s nuclear programme. Washington has charged that Tehran has a secret nuclear weapons programme. Russia’s technology sales to Iran and the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station have been major irritants in US-Russian relations. The Iranian government maintains that it is pursuing a nuclear programme solely for meeting the rapidly rising demand for electricity. But the US deputy defence secretary, John Wolf, asserts that Iran has an “alarming, clandestine programme” to produce nuclear weapons. “Iran is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq,” he further argues. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is due to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme this month and if it rules that Tehran has violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran may find itself in trouble.

The hawks in Washington are arguing that in the case of Iran the combination of religious extremism and weapons of mass destruction is a deadly combination for the world. Even a cursory look at the above accusations will show that almost the same arguments were advanced against the regime of Saddam Hussein before building up public opinion for military action against Iraq.

How to deal with the US threat appears to have become a point of contention between the conservatives and the reformists in Iran. Iran’s supreme leader, the Rahbar, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei has ruled out any compromise with the United States, accusing Washington of seeking to strip the Islamic Republic of its values through a campaign of intimidation. “Some are prescribing surrender to the US adventurers, but surrender to the enemy is no remedy,” he observed recently. Khamenei made his remarks after 153 Majlis deputies had signed an open letter calling for normal relations between Iran and the United States.

Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has suggested a mechanism to resume ties with the United States by putting the future of US-Iran relations to a referendum, backed by a decision on the thorny issue by Tehran’s top echelon. Alarmed by talk of “regime change” in some influential US circles, moderate conservatives, said to be close to Rafsanjani, are offering to address Washington’s concerns on nuclear weapons and terrorism. But in return they want the US to recognize Iran as a major regional player, playing a conspicuous role in security in the region, and to be left free to run its domestic affairs.

As in Iran, American thinking also appears to be split between the doves and the hawks. The latter, known as the neo-conservatives, want to pursue a get-tough policy to destabilize the regime in Tehran; but the dovish State Department wants to continue the dialogue with the reformists in Iran so that the mounting US-Iran tensions may be defused peacefully. The doves recall Iran’s limited cooperation during the American-led campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, allowing disabled US planes to land in Iran, for instance.

The problem confronting the US policy-makers is that the reformists in Iran do not control the country’s defence and foreign policy. Indeed, it is not completely clear who does it. In any case, the reformists don’t. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , the Rahbar, ex-president Hashemi Rafsanjani, security chief Hassan Rohani and the military and intelligence agencies, all have a say on important policy issues. That is perhaps the reason why Iran’s policies sometimes appear contradictory.

Tehran is faced with a serious dilemma: should it defy the US as Saddam Hussein did or should it follow a conciliatory policy to appease the Americans? Should it cancel its nuclear power contracts with Moscow or at least agree to tougher UN nuclear safeguards and give up its dream of possessing nuclear weapons? Should it abandon Hezbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups as Washington demands? The other option, fraught with grave dangers, is to seek to build and deploy nuclear weapons and missiles to pre-empt America’s regime-toppling designs.

The threat to Iran is far from being unreal. The unmatchable US military machine is besieging Iran’s borders. Also, it is no longer a secret that the Pentagon is sponsoring the Iraq-based Iranian rebel group, Mujahideen-e-Khalq, long dedicated to the overthrow of the regime in Tehran. Israel is warning the US that unless something changes soon, Iran is likely to acquire the nuclear bomb earlier than is generally believed.

The pace of events in the coming weeks will depend on the assessment made by the American and Israeli intelligence on Tehran’s intentions. The US may press Iran for more reforms and turn diplomatic and economic screws to achieve its objectives. In case of failure, Washington may resort to limited air strikes aimed at crippling Iran’s strategic military installations, oil facilities, nuclear infrastructure and a paralyzing of financial system. In either case, Pakistan will be watching these developments with ominous concern.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Ups and downs in Bangladesh

DHAKA has wiped off some pockmarks of poverty from its face by banning the cycle rickshaws in the areas where the five-star hotels and posh localities are spread out. Some two lakh rickshaws have been removed from the gaze of the affluent. But poverty, more so disparities, is too glaring to be tucked away like this.

Still Bangladesh has come a long way. It may not be the promised land its people had dreamt of when they fought for liberation. But it gives point to the biblical prophecy that the meek will inherit the earth. The traffic in Dhaka, already crowded with huge buses and long-tail cars, is heavy and almost unmanageable. Narrow roads can never match the burgeoning capital of a 130-million-people country.

One thing that immediately hits the eye is that no driver fears the police, let alone bother about them. In Delhi, despite everyone dropping the name of some VIP or other, the police do come to enforce the traffic rules sometimes. But drivers in Dhaka just ignore the police whistle. The police do not have motorbikes to chase the errant drivers.

The defiance of authority is partly a legacy of the liberation struggle. Any method was then justified to defeat the West Pakistanis, who ruled with a strong hand. Partly, it is also the fallout from the hartal culture of the country. Both political rivals, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), bring people on the streets to settle scores, sometimes personal, because the two main rivals — BNP leader and Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and opposition leader AL’s Sheikh Hasina — are always at loggerheads.

This smouldering enmity is the bane of the country’s politics. It has divided the nation vertically — lawyers, doctors, journalists, civil servants and businessmen. There is not a segment of activity which has remained undivided. It reflects the schism between those who liberated Bangladesh and those who were in the way. Bangladesh was liberated in December 1971. By now, the edges of division should have lost their sharpness.

The BNP continues to give the impression that it would rather gloss over the entire episode of the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, founder of Bangladesh, than pursue the guilty to the hilt. Two of the civil servants, punished by the court, have been reinstated with retrospective effect on the finding of the Administrative Tribunal. The government did not even go over the exercise of considering an appeal against the verdict. The family of one of Mujib’s killers, who escaped the law and settled abroad, has been given pension. Such instances only heighten the AL’s suspicion that the BNP is on the side of the assassins.

The BNP’s coalition with the Jamaat-i-Islami has created doubts about its liberal credentials. Since its takeover two years ago, Islamization has gained ground in Bangladesh. Many men have begun to wear long kurtas like the Arabs.

More public buildings have Arabic written on their exteriors.

The international airport has the name of Khaleda’s husband, Zia, emblazoned in Arabic. In daily parlance, the phrase “khuda hafiz” (May God be your protector), has been replaced by “Allah (the Almighty) hafiz.” They probably think that “Allah” is a more Muslim term than “Khuda.”

One relieving development is that instances of persecution of the minorities have come down in the last few months. The police now entertain FIRs against the fundamentalists. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, there was widespread retaliation. But after the Gujarat carnage, the government saw to it that the minority community, roughly one crore, was not harmed. Government employees from the minority community now feel less discrimination in matters of appointment or promotion.

The change in the government’s attitude may well be due to the pressure by the donor nations (Bangladesh Development Forum) which cover 40 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange needs. At its meeting at Dhaka a few weeks ago, they raised the question of treatment meted out to the minorities. The donors also criticized corruption. Bangladesh beats India in this field.

What actually scares the BNP is the odium of fundamentalism. After the fall of Iraq, Dhaka wants to give the impression of being liberal and pluralistic. Washington’s perceived likes and dislikes do influence the BNP government. Too much of Islam is apparently one of Washington’s “dislikes.”

Prime Minister Khaleda took away last month the portfolio of agriculture from the Jamaat minister because he was reportedly establishing a network of his party’s offices in the countryside. The AL did not latch on to this point because its leader Hasina was out of the country.

Whether the parties have come up because of the two leaders or whether the two leaders have given cohesion to the parties is a moot point. But there is no doubting of the two-party system emerging in the country. General Ershad, once the martial law administrator, believes that his Bangladesh Jatiya Party may provide an alternative to the people who, no doubt, are sick of the running battle between the BNP and the AL.

But there is little chance of Ershad gaining ground. He did nothing spectacular during his one-man rule for five years. And his party has already split three times. True, there is disenchantment over the BNP rule. Khaleda’s son, Tariq, is the Sanjay Gandhi of Bangladesh. He interferes in the affairs of the government and many ministers owe their appointment to him.

The BNP government’s minus points go in favour of the AL. It has already won over people sitting on the fence because the law and order situation was better when Hasina was at the helm of affairs. Hasina also used the army to suppress the criminals. But they are creeping back after its withdrawal.

The BNP’s biggest worry is its relations with India. New Delhi is lately less rhetorical in its charge that the Bangladeshis are crossing the border in hordes. Dhaka too does not indulge in countercharge of India “pushing in their Indian Muslims as Bangladeshis.” But there is greater realization in Dhaka that Bangladesh has to make up with India “sooner or later.” Anti-India feeling is still there, although the shops are full of Indian goods.

Khaleda does not take even a second to say that she has no plans to visit India. “I shall be going to Pakistan in the next few months,” she says almost in the same breath. President General Musharraf regretted during his visit to Bangladesh a few months ago that the Muslims of one country had got divided, not that East Pakistan had seceded from West Pakistan.

In reply to a question Khaleda said: “We do not have gas to spare” while referring to the study which is being done to find out if Bangladesh can export gas to India. The strain was visible. People in Bangladesh are a strange combination. I find signs of strain and poverty but also pride.

Every face seems to say: “I have done it.” They mean liberation.

The writer is a leading columnist bused in New Delhi.

The Bush audience

PRESIDENT Bush was giving the most important speech of his campaign at the Round Hole in a Square Peg Co.

He was doing it in the private plane hanger of the RHSP to 15,000 cheering employees.

Off to the side was a Secret Service man code-named “Raw Meat,” and a White House aide, code-named “Blowfish.”

They both had binoculars and were scouting the crowd. President Bush was attacking Congress for not passing his tax cut plan and the audience cheered and applauded.

Suddenly Blowfish said into his walkie-talkie, “Behind the president — in the third row — there is a guy wearing a baseball cap and he isn’t applauding. Everyone watching on TV can see him during the entire presidential speech.”

Raw Meat said, “I see him now. He’s the guy wearing a T-shirt that says, ‘Give Peace a Chance.”’

Blowfish said, “How did he ever get in the VIP section?”

At this moment Bush was saying he wouldn’t be satisfied until every man, woman and child has a job.

“Look,” said Blowfish, “he’s sticking his tongue out at the president. What does he think he’s doing?”

Raw Meat got on his two-way radio. “Raw Meat One to Raw Meat Two, there is an agitator in the third row behind the prez. Take a picture of him and then get a profile from Homeland Security. Over and out.”

The president continued, “I am not responsible for the recession. President Clinton is responsible,” Loud cheering.

The man in the third row gave Bush the finger.

Blowfish cried, “Can we get him out of there?”

Raw Meat said, “It would look bad to drag him out bodily while the president is speaking.”

“He is ruining the whole speech,” Blowfish said.

Raw Meat said into his walkie-talkie, “Raw Meat One to Raw Meat Two. What did you find out? Oh my gosh! You say he is a registered Democrat, and he is unemployed?”

Blowfish yelled, “How did that man get his seat? I thought the Secret Service vetted all Democrats from their list. Call the White House legal counsel and find out what the penalty is for a Democrat crashing a Republican rally.”

Raw Meat said, “The lawyer says it doesn’t matter where he sits — he must be given freedom of speech.”

Blowfish said, “Call Attorney General Ashcroft and have him change the law.”

Raw Meat said, “He is now waving an American flag and I can read his lips. He is saying, ‘Anyone but Bush.”’

“I don’t think we should use force unless we have more evidence as to how he’s going to vote.”

Blowfish said, “I want to find the person who handed a jobless Democrat a ticket.”

The Secret Service man said, “I’ll turn it over to the FBI right away.”

Bush was saying, “We have come through some hard times before.”

Blowfish said, “Oh my gosh. The man is mooning the President of the United States. Call out the SWAT team!”— Dawn/Tribune Media Services

Whither devolution?

FAR from the madding political logjam at the centre, an otherwise quiet district in upper Sindh is fast becoming a microcosm of the long-standing conflict between elected public representatives and the state’s bureaucratic apparatus. In rustic Khairpur, the actors are new but the storyline is uncannily familiar. With the direct backing of the provincial authorities, the District Coordination Officer (DCO) is creating every hurdle possible to undermine the authority of the elected zilla nazim.

Khairpur’s Nazima Nafisa Shah comes from a family with traditional loyalties to the PPP — a fatal attribute in today’s Pakistan even if you are avowedly non-partisan in discharging your public responsibilities. Indeed, had the PPP been allowed to exercise its democratic right to form a government in Sindh, the situation would have been altogether different. But then, the military establishment could not have allowed its archrival to take over the province. Since it failed to dent the party’s popular support in interior Sindh, it is now encouraging the party’s political rivals in the provincial government to create problems for pro-PPP nazims.

What is happening in Khairpur and many other districts all over Pakistan is only symptomatic of the wider authoritarian malaise that afflicts our institutional fabric. How can one expect the lower minions of the state to accept the supremacy of elected institutions when the man sitting atop the political system wants to keep the elected parliament under the bayonet? The bureaucracy does what the political masters of the day ask of it. It is only at the behest of higher authorities that many district officers are flouting orders of their elected bosses in the district. The MQM governor in Sindh, for instance, has explicitly instructed many district- and tehsil-level officials to ignore the nazims (mostly linked to the JI) and report to him.

Things were not always as bad as they seem now. Before the countrywide polls in October 2002, the implementation of the devolution plan was far smoother. Initially reluctant, the DMG had by and large reconciled to devolution as a fait accompli. Backed by the military’s coercive powers and matching resources, nazims too were gradually consolidating their new found authority.

Real trouble started when the general elections brought to power those who had boycotted the local government polls — the MQM in Sindh, and the JUI-F in the NWFP and Balochistan. No sooner had elected governments assumed office than political rivalries, forced underground by authoritarian manipulation, resurfaced with a vengeance. As provincial authorities began to reassert their control over the lower tiers of government, civilian bureaucrats too slowly started to regain powers lost to local governments.

Partial revival of the executive magistracy in Punjab began to fuel speculations that the present system would not last long. Of course, nazims loyal to the PML-Q or those with access to ruling party legislators and serving officials could — and often did — exercise effective control over the district administration. But with criticisms of, and demands for, restructuring of the local government system echoing in provincial and central legislatures, doubts about its survival kept growing.

Placing devolution in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, General Musharraf thought he had shielded it from the vagaries of open democratic politics. But such constitutional chicanery is a poor substitute for the mass consent that legitimizes and sustains public institutions. In the policy planning process that led to the adoption of the Local Government Plan (LGP), 2000, the military authorities had completely ignored the mainstream political parties and the bureaucracy — two key stakeholders whose ownership was crucial for successful implementation. The provinces were also bypassed to centralize control over local governments.

This was nothing new. Military rulers have often instituted local governments as a sop for democratization at the provincial and national levels. The main rationale has rarely ever been to democratize governance or improve service delivery at the local levels but rather to justify military interventions and ensure regime survival. Local governments have invariably been used to depoliticize governance, create a new but dependent local elite, demonstrate the democratic credentials of the regime to domestic and external audiences, and last but not the least, to undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional provisions for provincial autonomy.

While the military’s political engineering exacerbates sub-national frictions along biradari and ethnic lines, local governments fail to endow legitimacy on military rule. Lacking public consent and participation, these institutions remain mired in political controversy and often collapse with the exit of their creators. Ayub bestowed on us “Basic Democracy” (BD) since the Pakistani nation, in his ‘enlightened’ opinion, was not yet ready for full democracy. With his departure, the BD system vanished into thin air. Zia’s local bodies scheme outlasted its creator. But tainted by its association with a brutal military dictatorship, the system never really got off the ground. Elected governments too were hardly sincere in devolving real powers to local governments for fear of losing ground to political opponents. Hence, appointed officials were the preferred means to keep local politics on a tight leash even under ostensibly democratic dispensations.

Despite the introduction of unprecedented administrative innovations (for instance, the scrapping of an outdated and oppressive colonial administrative structure), the real motives behind Musharraf’s devolution plan were no different from those of his predecessors. Apart from gaining external legitimacy for his coup, the primary motivation was to centralize powers by creating extensive local patronage structures dependent on the military for survival. At one point, Musharraf had toyed with the idea of using nazims as an electoral college for legitimizing his presidency.

Cocksure of his public popularity and the military-led government’s ability to obtain favourable results, the general reportedly shunned that thought in favour of a direct referendum. He then utilized the services of district nazims to mobilize the public. Those who refused to comply, including Nafisa, are still bearing the brunt.

Bitterly contested, the devolution plan faces the political and legal ambiguities common to projects in which authoritarian means are deployed to achieve democratic goals. For now, its future is entwined with the deepening political crisis over the LFO. International support and the military’s control over the state apparatus still work in the plan’s favour. In Sindh and Punjab, General Musharraf can perhaps retain the scheme with minor adjustments to assuage provincial concerns. In the NWFP, the looming confrontation between the MMA and the central government casts a dark shadow on the stability of the system. If the MMA comes around on the LFO, the JUI-F’s reservations regarding local governments could well be accommodated both in the frontier and in Balochistan.

The NRB is already in consultation with the provincial government to draft new Rules of Business (RoB) for district governments. If the religious alliance holds its ground, however, the federal government could play several administrative, judicial and political cards before pulling the plug. In that context, the en masse resignations by nazims could become one part of any future charge sheet against the Durrani government’s failures. Either way, the fate of the local government system is linked to the survival of Musharraf’s engineered political order. Which side the pendulum will swing is anyone’s guess.

Power, ever more power

WHEN it passed the USA Patriot Act in October 2001, giving law enforcement agents sweeping new powers, American Congress unleashed a spying free-for-all that shows no sign of abating. Pentagon analysts are even trying to figure out if they can nab terrorists by watching how people walk — “gait recognition,” it’s called.

Now pushing for even broader authority, the Bush administration’s operating principle seems to be if a lot of power is good, a lot more would be better.

Here is what’s on the table now:

“Patriot Act II,” a hush-hush draft that would give the Justice Department more power to snoop and more leverage over suspects. This measure, formally known as the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, seeks to free the FBI from requirements that it get a judge’s OK before prying into a person’s phone, bank or credit records.

It would expand government power to make secret arrests, like those of hundreds of people, mostly Middle Eastern nationals, after Sept. 11, 2001. The Justice Department largely refused to reveal the identities of those suspects, where they were detained or the reasons for their arrest. The draft measure would also allow the attorney general to strip Americans of their citizenship in some cases for donating to what they may have thought were legitimate nonprofit groups.

Although the measure doesn’t officially exist, a copy was leaked this year. Attorney General John Ashcroft has declined to brief Congress on his proposals.

The CIA and the military are asking for authority to peruse phone records, credit card records and e-mail logs of people in the United States. These agencies can ask the FBI for much of this, but the Bush administration believes that giving the CIA and the Pentagon direct authority would be more efficient.

It would also mark an unprecedented expansion in the mission of the CIA and the military. Senate Democrats struck this programme from a larger bill but it probably will return.—Los Angeles Times