THE government’s failure to formulate and announce a counterterrorism policy so far has caused resentment among many who expected that it would take the matter seriously.

Since the formation of a new government after the May elections, there has been a great deal of debate on what direction the country’s security and counterterrorism policies will take.

In particular, the consultation process that the new government started during its first 100 days in office had reflected a seriousness with regard to a proper policy. At present, it seems as if the government no more believes that it needs a certain policy to tackle the menace of terrorism.

There are fears and speculations that the government’s fledgling efforts to formulate a counterterrorism policy would meet a fate similar to that of peace talks with the militants, which proved nothing more than a gimmick.

There is credible evidence to suggest that it was not the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud in the US drone strikes which spoiled the chances of peace talks, but the non-serious attitude of the political leadership and security establishment. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was not willing to initiate a peace process with the government after initial contacts. According to the TTP’s own account, the government was looking for an excuse to launch a military offensive against the Taliban and talks were nothing except a trap.

Initially, optimistic analysts thought that the government would pursue the strategy of economic recovery to achieve security and to counter terrorism. They pinned their hopes on some of the political measures taken by the government that reflected its intentions and future plans.

The first major step was the decision to form a cabinet committee on national security (CCNS) with the goal to institutionalise a consultative process between the civilian and military leaderships and to jointly respond to the critical issues of security, terrorism and foreign policy.

Apart from functioning as a policy forum, the objectives of the proposed CCNS were to:

— Monitor the progress of different institutions on the counterterrorism front, formulate intelligence objectives and keep a check on their implementation by intelligence and security agencies;

— Convert inputs received from intelligence into government policy; — Ensure that federal and provincial resources are harnessed to promote intelligence policy;

— Review and coordinate intelligence policy;

— Deliberate and decide on extra-sensitive national issues which cannot be discussed at any other forum.

If the CCNS materialises and becomes functional, it can strengthen the consultative process between the political government and military provided it operates regularly and the civilians take up security and defence affairs in a more professional manner. However, many of its proposed functions were already suggested for the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (Nacta) set up in 2009 but that body remained dysfunctional because of lack of clarity on its status.

Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali seems more interested in making Nacta functional and is trying to bring it under his control. Some analysts see in this interest the interior ministry’s intention of developing Nacta as a parallel body to the CCNS and maintaining control on internal security affairs.

Former interior minister Rehman Malik had also tried to keep Nacta under his control but Nacta bureaucrats fought to retain its independence as an authority under the prime minister’s control. Apart from power, international contacts and funds are other attractions offered by gaining control of the body.

As far as Nacta’s functions are concerned, it can be effective only for processing information and developing threat assessments. This is an area where law-enforcement agencies lack capacity and Nacta can help fill such gaps. That means Nacta could become functional under the CCNS as a security think tank without any operational role in countering terrorism.

The establishment of a rapid response force and a joint intelligence secretariat was another major promise made by the interior minister in August. In line with the interior ministry’s announcement, the government of Punjab has taken the initiative and finalised the infrastructure for an anti-terrorism force.

It is unfortunate that the most effective counterterrorism department of the province, the counterterrorism department (CTD), is being converted into an anti-terrorism force for the province. The decision was taken at a high-level meeting chaired by the prime minister before he left on his US tour.

The CTD was a specialised counterterrorism department, which was working on threat assessment, identification and the arrest of high-profile terrorists, their supporters and financers whose plans it worked to foil.

On the legislative front, the government has issued the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 to curb hate literature and incitement to violence besides other measures. However, analysts say that such hasty ordinances promulgated without debate in parliament should not be a substitute for an act of parliament. The only way to maintain the critical balance is a public debate and thorough vetting of legislation by parliament.

These measures cannot be considered as a new counterterrorism policy because they are basically a continuation of the previous government initiatives. Lack of connectivity with a broader countering strategy is a major flaw that still persists in the government’s approach.

Apart from what has been envisioned in its proposed security and counterterrorism policy, the government appears to be primarily focusing on countering anti-state militant groups, mainly the TTP and sectarian militant groups such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, to stem the tide of violence.

A question mark continues to hang over how it will deal with the Pakistani militant groups who are not involved in anti-state activities including those dedicated to so-called jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and also the Afghan Taliban. This implies that the current focus is on reducing terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, while other aspects of counterterrorism such as across-the-board dismantling of militant groups, de-radicalisation, and reintegration of militants are out of the question at the moment.

The writer is a security analyst.