WHEN a US drone killed Taliban leader Hakeemullah Mehsud, Pakistan’s interior minister proclaimed it had killed the chances of negotiating peace with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

In fact, Pakistani reactions to this event have laid bare the confusion and contradictions within Pakistan on policy towards the TTP and security policy in general.

The TTP is an umbrella group of jihadist organisations with elements of the Mehsud tribe at its core. It is credited with the killing of hundreds of Pakistani soldiers and thousands of civilians.

By all accounts, Hakeemullah Mehsud was a particularly vicious killer, resorting to gruesome beheadings of Pakistani security personnel and attacks that slaughtered men, women and children indiscriminately.

The TTP is involved in all forms of criminal activity: drugs, kidnapping, extortion.

Notably, its shock troops are Uzbeks and Chechens. Hakeemullah Mehsud’s relative was recently caught by US forces in Afghanistan plotting with Afghan intelligence to escalate terrorist operations against Pakistan. Could Indian intelligence have been far behind?

Thus, while the government’s pro forma protest against US violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty was de rigeur, Pakistani leaders should have been pleased with the elimination of this vicious enemy of the state. Instead, we witnessed the interior minister’s outburst, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) leader’s threat to close US transit through Pakistan, and the call by one of his party members to shoot down US drones. The defence ministry, on the other hand, reported that, incredulously, there had been no civilian casualties from recent US drone strikes.

There could be various explanations for these incoherent responses: playing to the popular hostility towards the US; avoiding being outflanked by political rivals; fear of the TTP’s revenge; a genuine, if naive, belief that negotiations with the TTP can lead to peace.

Negotiating peace with the TTP will be nigh impossible within the present parameters.

Firstly, the TTP’s demands — for (Sunni) Sharia rule in Pakistan and the creation of an Islamic Emirate in Pakistan and Afghanistan — are not negotiable. We had a glimpse of such rule when the TTP controlled Swat. Even partial acceptance of the TTP’s demands would negate the basis on which Pakistan was created. It would prevent Pakistan from emerging as a modern country.

Second, the experience of negotiating with the TTP has not been a happy one. Accords with the Mehsuds in South Waziristan and with Mullah Fazlullah in Swat were failures. Each such arrangement resulted in emboldening the extremists.

In Swat, the torture inflicted by the TTP was so abhorrent that public sentiment called for intervention by the armed forces. Many lives, soldiers and civilians, had to be sacrificed in the subsequent military operations to undo the ‘peace’ negotiated with Fazlullah. Doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results is one definition of madness.

Third, Mullah Fazlullah, upon assuming the mantle of the TTP’s leadership, has rejected negotiations. The last elected Awami National Party government in Peshawar pressed for negotiations and its leaders lived (or rather, died) to rue their decision.

Finally, negotiations cannot succeed unless they are pursued from a position of strength. The TTP’s response to appeals for negotiations from the governments in Islamabad and Peshawar has been to escalate attacks, including the murder of PTI leaders, a church bombing and the assassination of a general. Lessons should be learned from some recent examples of successful counter-insurgency operations, such as in Sri Lanka and Colombia.

The present elected leadership should evolve a coherent counter-insurgency and counterterrorism strategy, perhaps within the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. This strategy should incorporate what I would call, the six Ds for success.

One, dictation. The government should set out the parameters for negotiations, including: acceptance of the Constitution, surrender of all heavy arms, expulsion of foreigners within the TTP, end to collaboration with external powers. It should not allow the TTP to set the agenda.

Two, defeat. The TTP must be put on the defensive. Unlike the foreign forces in Afghanistan, the Pakistan Army has the numbers and capability to conduct multiple and simultaneous operations to kill or capture TTP militants in Fata, Swat, Peshawar and Karachi. It should be authorised by the civilian government to do so. Three, division. The TTP is an association of extremist groups. Under military pressure, and with appropriate incentives and disincentives, some of these groups or elements within them will accept the government’s terms. It will be easier to deal with the smaller number of insurgents.

Four, decapitation. Groups depend on leadership. Charismatic leaders are not easy to replace. Those TTP leaders who remain recalcitrant would be legitimate targets for elimination. Pakistan’s security forces should acquire the capabilities to conduct such operations. We can then stop complaining about US intervention.

Five, demotivation. The TTP’s rank and file and some of its leaders can be persuaded by ‘carrots and sticks’ to disengage from their violent course. The state has vast reserves of both.

Six, deradicalisation. Now that Pakistan’s military ‘alliance’ with the US is ending, there is no ideological justification for the attacks on the Pakistani state. Over the longer term, many of those amenable to the TTP’s brand of extremism can be turned to more positive paths through education, jobs and other opportunities. This has been tried with some success elsewhere.

There is, of course, an external dimension which must be addressed. Islamabad will have to convince Kabul to end its collaboration with TTP elements. In turn, Pakistan will need to cooperate more actively to promote reconciliation between Afghanistans fighting factions, including the Afghan Taliban.

If the present elected leaders in Pakistan are able to execute such a coherent and effective security policy, it will open the doors to foreign and domestic investment, economic growth and employment generation. It will reinforce democracy.

If it fails, extremism, violence and terrorism will spread further in Pakistan, turning it into an Iraq or Syria and, ultimately, either an Egypt or Somalia. This is a moment for rational determination; not hyperbole and hysteria.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.