The general’s final chance

THE events of the past few months, especially the judicial crisis, the tragic developments of May 12 in Karachi resulting in the death of nearly 50 people, the carnage associated with the mishandling of the Lal Masjid affair by the government, and the subsequent spate of suicide attacks leading to a huge loss of life in the tribal areas, Swat, Islamabad and Hub have brought home the sheer incompetence of the Musharraf government to ensure law and order in the country and provide security to the citizens.

On the external front, the aggravating crisis in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and the veiled US threats of military action against Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan have shown the weakness of the regime’s foreign policy.

These developments have conclusively proved once again that the present fragile and narrowly-based military-led political dispensation lacks the ingredients necessary for restoring internal peace and stability, and for overcoming the grave external challenges facing Pakistan.

The fundamental weakness of the Musharraf regime lies in its non-representative character compounded by questions about its legitimacy because of the manner in which it came into power by overthrowing a democratically elected government on October 12, 1999. The landmark judgment of the Supreme Court reinstating the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, and setting aside the presidential reference against him has robbed the present regime of the moral authority to rule the country.

One would have assumed that in the face of the grave challenges facing his regime, General Musharraf would take steps to give a modicum of political legitimacy to his rule. Nothing of the sort has happened. In fact, what one sees is continued defiance on the part of Gen Musharraf and his minions of the will of the people of Pakistan who want to rule themselves through their chosen representatives.

At a meeting with newspaper editors and senior journalists on July 18, General Musharraf once again trotted out the stale doctrine of “unity of command”, which is a cover for his authoritarianism and concentration of all powers in his own hands.In a democratic set-up, there is reliance instead on separation of powers and a system of checks and balances to prevent any organ of the state from exceeding the limits of its legitimate authority.

But then, these concepts are beyond the comprehension of a military man used to issuing orders rather than holding political negotiations to resolve difficult political issues through consensus-building at the national level. The fact that the general has learnt nothing from the events of the recent past is also apparent from his stated intention to seek election to the post of the president from the present assemblies without taking off his uniform.

The country is faced right now with a confrontation between the forces of democracy and those of dictatorship who want to deny the people of Pakistan their right to govern themselves. The forces of dictatorship consider the people to be incapable of taking destiny in their own hands, and find justification for various forms of “guided democracy” as a solution.

It has been the misfortune of the country to be ruled by the proponents of this point of view in the form of overt or disguised military rule during most of its history. General Musharraf’s rule undoubtedly belongs to this category despite the trappings of democracy attached to it.

It is ironical that General Musharraf and his supporters justify the new local government system as a form of empowering people at the local level, but are reluctant to allow the same people to govern their affairs at the national level through elected representatives.

This is symptomatic of the thinking of the colonial power and the system of diarchy during the pre-independence days in which the people had a share in the running of local affairs but the larger issues of security, war, peace, administration and development were fully under the control of the colonial power.

It is time our rulers got rid of this colonial thinking and the self-serving notions of their indispensability. The people of Pakistan who established this country through the exercise of their vote under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam deserve better.There is no denying the fact that the country also faces a tussle between the forces of extremism, obscurantism and retrogression and those of moderation, enlightenment and progress.

It is equally true that Pakistan’s salvation, and, indeed, the salvation of the entire Muslim world, lies in adopting the path of moderation and enlightenment. But this path cannot be adopted in a system of dictatorship and in a climate of tyranny and oppression. In fact, genuine democracy in the modern world, and at this juncture in human history, is an indispensable condition for progress and enlightenment.

Therefore, those of our leaders who are trying to reach a deal with the current military government in the hope of coming to power are making a grave mistake for which they will have to pay a heavy political price. They compound their mistake when they try to strengthen their claim to return to power on the basis of support by the US and the UK. There cannot be anything more insulting for the people of Pakistan.

As the struggle for a free and independent judiciary leading to the reinstatement of the Chief Justice of Pakistan shows, the people of Pakistan are quite capable of taking their destiny in their own hands and overcoming the barriers on their way. What they need is well-motivated leadership to guide their energies in the right direction.

The legal fraternity provided this leadership during the judicial crisis when the generals tried unsuccessfully to browbeat the Chief Justice. The CJP’s rejection of the demand for his resignation goes to his credit, especially as he could not have had any expectation of the resolute challenge later mounted by the lawyers against this attempt on the part of the executive to subdue the judiciary.

The fact that the legal fraternity rose to the occasion, thus adding a new and welcome chapter in the history of Pakistan’s political development, is a matter of which it can be justly proud.

It again goes to the credit of the legal community that they have vowed to continue their struggle for the independence of the judiciary, the restoration of genuine democracy and the return of the armed forces to the barracks to focus on their professional duties in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

Unfortunately, the political parties have collectively lagged far behind the lawyers. The declaration adopted by the APC in London was a step in the right direction although the reports of differences at the conference weakened its impact. It remains to be seen whether the political parties can now put their act together and launch an effective movement for the restoration of genuine democracy in the country.

In the wake of the landmark judgment by the Supreme Court reinstating the Chief Justice, the country is poised to make a clean break from its past that has been marked by military rule and political instability, and make a new beginning distinguished by genuine and undiluted democracy, supremacy of the law and the Constitution, justice, progress and enlightenment.

Only a government that comes into power through free and fair elections in a genuine democratic framework and therefore enjoys popular support can overcome the grave challenges facing the country internally and externally.

President Musharraf is now confronted with stark strategic choices. He can either stay the course as has been his wont in the past and continue to make tactical adjustments in the face of a situation which demands strategic decisions. This is a sure way to prolong the nation’s agony and go down in history as his other military predecessors have. He can rest assured that historians will have few kind words to write about him if he chooses this course.

The other strategic choice before him is that of initiating a process of national reconciliation with a view to restoring a genuine democratic order in the country. This is also the demand of moderation and enlightenment.

If he chooses this path, he should immediately convene a conference of all political leaders including those abroad to reach a consensus on the restoration of the 1973 Constitution with those changes on which a consensus can be reached among the political parties, empowerment of the election commission and the holding of free and fair elections to be followed by the election of a president without the uniform.

The armed forces under the new set-up would perform their professional duties under the command of the federal government and refrain from any involvement in political activities as required by the Constitution. The political parties will also have to follow the rules of the game as is the practice in other democratic countries.

This is General Musharraf’s final chance to redeem himself. Let us see whether he has the wisdom and the courage to make the right choice at this defining moment in our history.

The writer is a former ambassador.
E-mail: javid_husain@yahoo.com

Coming to grips with domestic problems

IT can be hard but we should not demonise. We demonised democracy because of bad prime ministers; we demonised madressahs because of deviant maulvis; and we are in some danger of demonising the military: because of?

Of course, the army has no business (and less ability) to be in politics. But just as we would like to make the distinction that it is prime ministers who are deficient and not democracy itself it would be wrong to denigrate the army just because it has had some rather appalling chiefs.

In the context of regional uncertainties, with an expansive atomic neighbour that is mostly hostile or gloating, an affirmative relationship between the civilian and the soldier is crucial.

Pakistan cannot afford a military that is institutionally enfeebled because its ‘sajeelay jawans’ are becoming isolated and alienated from the rest of the body politic or are perceived to be at odds with it. And this is happening only because the army is everywhere that it is not supposed to be. Civil society and function demand re-admittance.

A dictator with comprehensive power becomes an all-embracing point of reference for the polity: its locus. Pakistan’s polity is even more gravely ill than in 1999, and how has our dictator contributed?

At the time of the ‘counter-coup’ the indignity and lack of form in the prime minister’s dismissal of the COAS incurred popular censure: No way to treat the head of such an institution! Moreover, the prime minister’s replacement of the army chief was regarded as serving personal preference rather than any objective cause.

Army circles, already disgruntled by pressures preceding the retirement of the former chief, General Jehangir Karamat, rallied to protect the institution. But in appropriating civil political management they overlooked the lesson of Kargil where the reality of a prime minister with a famously heavy mandate diverted responsibility from the army for the misadventure and also devised a way out of the mess. The same cannot be said of mishaps today.

Today, it is the army-based government that precipitated the judicial and constitutional crisis and that left itself no choice but to witness the carnage at Lal Masjid. It calibrates controversial responses to the global alliance’s needs along the Afghan border.

Spin, damage control, compromise, ultimatum, action, inaction, responsibility, blame and credit all revert to the army because it leads and represents in the person of the COAS and president. This makes disaffection with the government of the day ominously more than disaffection with a party in power or its leader in a pluralist context.

General Musharraf was good news internationally post 9/11; possibly because when it comes to U-turns civilian politicians are more sinuous. General Musharraf embarked on his U-turn in the spirit of a forward march and got badly stuck in the loop. He became identified with unquestioning compliance with the Bush administration policy.

Placed on the defensive at home he said — in what has become another famous phrase — there was no choice. Whether Pakistanis believed this or not America seems to have taken it to heart for he is repeatedly asked to re-authenticate his good faith. At present, it is threatening to neutralise suspected safe havens and terrorist-abetment around Fata especially.

To America how far the Pakistani general commands support at home is only relevant insofar as it affects the discharge of its requirements.

Naturally, it would rather that Pakistan supply the human fodder for the exercise while it assists with the materials. Every Pakistani trooper guarding the Afghan border from his side means a Nato trooper spared the trouble on the other. But how long is this workable for Pakistanis?

General Musharraf’s more extreme domestic critics feel he has mortgaged the country’s ethos and resources to a neo-con policy. Even those who do not identify with fundamentalist critiques of a changed madressah policy do not see why the essential de-Ziaification of Pakistan should take the form that it can’t be helped if primitive or reactionary Pakistanis get bombed while authorities look for Osama or weed out the Taliban.

The Bush administration’s (and Nato’s) compunctions about de-terrorising Afghanistan centre crudely on whether to continue relying on the rank and file in Pakistan’s army or move themselves at their own will.

In any case, the Pakistani army is virtually reduced — whether in reformatory, punitive or spectator mode — to viewing some of its own people as targets in special ops. The phenomenon is intensifying. Massive demoralisation is bound to ensue.

Bloodshed in remoter regions does not make the same horribly visible stain as at Lal Masjid in the capital. However, Pathans who share ethnicity with tribesmen along the porous border with Afghanistan, are distributed all over Pakistan. Sectarian and ethnic rancour and a revenge motif are in increasing evidence.

Internal security phobia and resultant tensions will inevitably strain Pakistan further. Included in the hierarchy of old violence are diverse political party militants, secular and non-secular.

In essential efforts at law enforcement, civil and military polarisation, mirroring fractured images of political and cultural conflict could make it merely semantic to debate the distinction between martial law and civil war.

General Musharraf may or may not be able to bring America wisdom. But he can certainly avert a worst-case scenario for the country and people he presides over. All he has to do is to recognise and facilitate the rational content in opposition to his regime. Undeniably, this entails an element of personal sacrifice. But it should be enough consolation that it is indeed in the supreme national interest.

Two versions of history

When Israel's education ministry announced that history textbooks for third-graders would now include a heretofore unmentionable truth — that the creation of a homeland for Jews in 1948 resulted in the exile of 700,000 Palestinians — it seemed an enlightened step.

“History is written by the victors,” as Winston Churchill said, and for the last 59 years, Israeli elementary school textbooks have taught only the Jewish version of events: the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war was justifiable because of Jews’ historic roots in the Holy Land and their need for a permanent refuge from persecution. The Palestinian exodus from Israel, called the Nakba (catastrophe) by Arabs, was nowhere to be found.

The education ministry's apparent openness, however, is deceptive. For the new, balanced textbooks will be printed only in Arabic and distributed only to Arab classrooms. Hebrew editions of “Living Together in Israel” won't be revised. Some education officials sought to amend Jews’ textbooks too, but they were overruled by those who said Jewish third-graders cannot understand divergent interpretations of history.

Education Minister Yuli Tamir says the new books will help Arab children reconcile the history they learn at home with the history they are taught in school. But Jewish children, who are less likely to hear the Palestinian version of events in their homes, need this information even more than their Arab peers, who at least may have the personal experiences of family and friends to educate them. If Israel acknowledges the fact of the Palestinian exodus, then it should be taught to all children. Instead, the ministry seeks to placate Palestinians without standing up to hard-line Jewish conservatives, who oppose the revisions even for Arab classrooms.

History is continually being revised. Although written first by the victors, over time the voices of the defeated and disregarded demand inclusion. China and Korea insist that Japan acknowledge wartime atrocities; Native Americans, that their 4,000-year history become a part of this country's founding narrative; and women, that their deeds get equal scrutiny as those of men.

Whether most Palestinians fled their homes voluntarily or through coercion and force, and whether they have a right to return, will likely be argued until the end of time. But that thousands did flee and have spent subsequent decades living in refugee camps — the United Nations says that descendants have swelled the number of refugees to four million today — is not at issue. Why not teach that truth?

— The Los Angeles Times

Erdogan’s third triumph

THE AKP’s second victory in Turkey’s general election is Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s third major political triumph. His first political victory was astonishing: he ended the indefatigable Necmettin Erbakan’s political career by capturing the Islamists’ leadership.

Erbakan’s political skills should not be underestimated. He formed party after party, undeterred by the frequent banning of his parties, and succeeded in creating cadres who would later commit themselves to the task of resisting the military, Turkey’s self-appointed guardians of Ataturk’s secular creed. This way, while he himself demonstrated both courage and ingenuity, the philosophy he espoused showed resilience.

He first broke with Suleyman Demirel’s Justice Party, which was seen by a majority of the Turkish people as a continuation of Adnan Menderes’s Democratic Party, for the JP was voted to power in the first election held after Menderes’s execution. Breaking with the JP in 1968, Erbakan formed a party of his own — National Order Party.

It was banned in 1971. In 1973, he formed the National Salvation Party and managed to secure enough seats in parliament to form a coalition government with Bulent Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party. In 1974, he threatened to bring the Ecevit government down unless he invaded Cyprus — which Ecevit did.

Following widespread acts of terrorism and the deterioration in economic conditions, army chief Gen Kenan Evren seized power in 1980 and banned all parties. When political activity was resumed, Erbakan formed Refah (Welfare) Party in 1983, and in 1995 astounded all by capturing 21.3 per cent of the votes.

In a multiparty system, this was a strong position and he became prime minister. However, he fell out with the generals, who, without staging a coup, pressured him into resigning as prime minister. In 1998, a constitutional court banned his party, but the indomitable Erbakan now formed another party, the Virtue Party. This, too, was banned and he formed the Felicity Party. This one was also outlawed in 2001. This was perhaps too much for his followers, especially Erdogan, a former Istanbul mayor.

Along with Abdullah Gul, he came to the conclusion that Erbakan’s direct conflict with the generals had not served the Islamic cause, and that if the generals had to be put in their place and Turkey’s Islamic identity asserted, a new approach was needed in a state where secularism had been in power and well entrenched in all political institutions since 1924.

The result was a party revolt against Erbakan and the founding of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In the November 2002 general election, Erdogan led his party to a stunning victory, capturing 363 seats in a House of 550, four seats short of a two-thirds majority that can amend the constitution in a unicameral parliament. For the first time in a decade, thus, Turkey had a government that was not a coalition.

Erdogan himself was absent from the House, because he had been convicted on a charge of sedition, and that prohibited him from taking part in elections. The sedition charge stemmed from a poem he composed which spoke of mosques’ domes as the people’s helmets and minarets as rifles.

Abdullah Gul became prime minister, but made way for Erdogan, when the AKP leader won a constitutional petition against his conviction, fought and won a by-election and returned to parliament. But once in power, Erdogan eschewed the kind of rhetoric that was typical of Erbakan.

The former prime minister used to call the European Union a Christian club and spoke of a new world rising from Kazakhstan to Morocco. Erdogan, on the other hand, pledged not to undermine Turkey’s secular constitution, made it clear he would pursue the bid for Turkey’s membership of the European Union, and agreed to introduce the reforms in conformity with the Copenhagen criteria. The wide-ranging reforms included the abolition of the death penalty, amendments to laws affecting free speech and giving the Kurds their cultural rights.

More important was his economic success. Foreign investment soared, unemployment fell, and the rate of inflation went down to one digit, the target for 2007 being four per cent.

Unlike Erbakan, Erdogan handled the generals intelligently. When he came to power, the National Security Council was dominated by the army and its decisions were binding on the government. By virtue of the so-called seventh reform package passed by parliament in July 2003, the military has lost its control of the NSC. The reforms have turned the NSC into an advisory body whose recommendations concern only military and security matters, and since August 2004 it has been headed by a civilian.

In spite of the AKP’s Islamic roots, Erdogan has done nothing to alter the constitution’s secular character, made it clear that Turkey’s orientation will remain European and finally succeeded when the EU opened entry negotiations with Turkey in 2005.

However, despite his government’s pro-western orientation and the close alliance with the US, Erdogan refused to toe the American line on the Iraqi war, and in spite of the cordial relations and military cooperation with Israel, he has denounced Israel’s actions in the occupied territories as state terrorism.

Commanding an absolute majority in parliament and heading a government which is anything but a shaky coalition, Erdogan has acted with caution. Where progress in pursuit of his ideals has not been possible, he chose to wait and compromise rather than precipitate a crisis and lose.

On the question of Abdullah Gul’s election as president, Erdogan showed pragmatism in the face of tough opposition from the generals and the secular parties. When the constitutional court stayed the presidential election, Erdogan advanced the general election. The gamble paid off, and he is in power again with a comfortable majority, securing 46.4 per cent votes as against 34 in 2002.

He has now hinted that he will introduce changes in the constitution to provide for a direct vote for the president. On the question of headscarves, he has compromised and women wearing scarves are still not allowed to enter universities and government institutions. For that reason, his wife Emine has to stay out of all official functions.

During the election campaign, Erdogan soft-pedalled the EU membership issue, knowing that his people, whether secular or Islamist, were getting angry over the delay in the entry and the EU’s humiliating conditions for membership. Erdogan has also refused to link Cyprus to the entry question, and has still not given in on Brussels’s demands for abolishing Article 301 which jails people accused of “insulting Turkishness”. The wrath of this law fell on Nobel prize winner Orhan Pamuk and novelist Elif Shafak.

The AKP leadership’s behaviour is in sharp contrast with the situation in Pakistan where religious elements are utterly indifferent to the country’s economic development. The AKP has demonstrated how in a society sharply polarised, it can pursue dynamic and realistic policies without inviting chaos.

Regrettably, some EU governments are not helping the cause of democracy by creating difficulties in the way of Turkey’s membership. What some EU leaders, including French President Nicolas Sarkozy, do not realise is that a setback to the AKP will mean encouragement for the generals.

The AKP may be an Islamist party, but it is also pursuing a liberal reforms agenda, and it would be a pity if the EU were to be guided by the AKP’s Islamic label and ignore its democratic record that has not hurt Turkey’s secularism.