The tragic showdown at Lal Masjid
By Irshad Abdul Kadir
THE implications of the showdown at the Lal Masjid are tragic, bewildering, shameful and utterly outrageous. They are symptomatic of our general state of affairs. That this particular incident came to pass when warning signals were discernible earlier this year denotes culpable negligence if not mala fides.
The primary responsibility for the disaster lies with the party best able to control the outcome – that is the regime headed by President General Musharraf, who is facing the most difficult year of his rule, followed by smooth-toned Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and a special team, including the ubiquitous trouble-shooter, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, ministers Aftab Sherpao, Muhammad Ali Durrani, Tariq Azeem and the Minister for Religious Affairs, Ejazul Haq. This colourful crew is monitored by a matrix – a shadowy cabal of sorts – structured on the three special agencies, the ISI, the MI and the IB and the Corps Commanders.
The setting up of the Lal Masjid and its associated institutions on state land has since the dark age of Ziaul Haq been aided and abetted by the matrix, while the activities of its clerics were honed to propagate Talibanism and to counter political developments likely to threaten the dominance of the incumbent stakeholders. The truth is that the Lal Masjid could not have become what Ejazul Haq calls “the hub of militant extremism for the whole region” – a terrorist sanctuary and a bristling armoury for jihadis without the acquiescence of the matrix.
In view of the matrix’s omnipotence, the fallout of the Lal Masjid transgressions visited on the hapless citizens of Islamabad earlier this year should have been nipped in the bud. Instead, the matter was allowed to simmer either because of weakkneed indecisiveness or for countering the impact of the Chief Justice’s challenge or for ensuring western support for the Musharraf regime, or for neutralising the significance of the London-based All Parties Conference (APC). Whatever the reason, since the matter was not scotched in time, it came full circle to bite the hand that fed it.
The government’s ineptitude in handling the situation was exacerbated by lapses, all of which came to roost in the Lal Masjid crisis. For instance, the failure of successive administrations to provide countrywide public schooling has left the underprivileged children with no option for education other than the madressas. Additionally, failure to control madressa proliferation during the last two decades has led to the proliferation of seedbeds of terrorism.
Inaction in imposing a broader education programme on the madressahs (until recently) has facilitated the dissemination of extremist Salafi teachings and militant propaganda. Treating the clergy as nobility has given rise to a new class with vested interests. Handling charlatans posing as bonafide ulema with kid gloves has contributed to the criminality displayed in the Lal Masjid scenario.
When the government moved decisively – laying siege to the Lal Masjid and subsequently, storming the complex – such moves have been viewed as steps in the right direction, even though they were knee-jerk reactions to the kidnapping of the Chinese masseuses by the seminarians in the former instance, and the breakdown of negotiations after the expiry of the deadline for surrender in the latter case. Despite such reservations, these measures were well supported by the general public, even though their overall impact was muted by indecisiveness.
By letting diverse parties jump into the Lal Masjid fray with proposals for resolving the crisis, and allowing unrestricted media coverage of such deliberations, the administration externalised what should have been an exclusively government concern. It trivialised the cowardice and hypocrisy of Maulana Abdul Aziz, chief cleric of the Lal Masjid, by telecasting a re-enactment of his attempted escape from the mosque in which he appears bedecked in a burqa.
It sent mixed signals by TV coverage showing. Ejazul Haq embracing the Maulana at the police station where he was detained after the aborted escape.
It prolonged the siege of the Lal Masjid by not cutting off electricity, gas and water supplied to the complex, and by failing to check telephone contact between Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi (the principal challenger of the writ of the state) and the world outside, it enabled him to thumb his nose at the administration by declaring his terms for surrender and for the release of hostages, by putting forth his justification for the transgressions.
Even the final assault was launched without foreknowledge of elements present within the complex resulting in several deaths that could have been avoided. Confusion has prevailed on facts triggering the assault, on whether the crackdown was warranted and on the accuracy of the official post-assault data on destruction, raising doubts about the veracity of such reports.
As catalysts of the crisis that held the country at bay for eight days, the Ghazi brothers are responsible for precipitating a national disaster. Their intransigence cloaked in religiosity formed the basis of an anti-state agenda. They are culpable on several counts, including running the so-called “hub of militant extremism for the whole region,” unauthorised stockpiling of weapons, networking with other jihadi outposts, propagating a literalist Salafi doctrine that demonises other Islamic sects, raising student cadres of militants and suicide bombers, and so on.
Like the Kharajites of yore, they have harmed the cause of Islam. Moreover, they have dishonoured the academic tradition of the madressah and made a mockery of the burqa. Their obduracy was the principal cause of the loss of lives and bloodshed occasioned during the crisis.
The clerical fraternity and the Islamist parties have also played a negative role in the Lal Masjid showdown. The former could have influenced the direction of events at the preliminary stage by means of persuasion supplemented by the active intervention of Muslim personages from Pakistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world instead of standing in the wings and letting the tragedy unfold.
A correct approach called for applauding what was right and denouncing what was wrong, especially when the stakes pertained to matters of greater concern than mere politics. The Lal Masjid clerics may not have heeded the call of the Islamist parties, but at least they could not have been faulted for lacking moral probity in adopting the correct approach.
The secular parties too have been somewhat equivocal in their approach to the Lal Masjid issue. With their attention largely taken up by matters such as the Chief Justice imbroglio, the unresolved questions concerning the elections, and the APC, they paid scant attention to the Lal Masjid saga. While the crisis was brewing, party spokespersons muttered about it being a diversionary ploy of the Musharraf regime for drawing attention away from the Chief Justice’s campaign. For their inability to gauge the significance of the crisis and for not initiating steps for defusing the crisis, they also defaulted.
The media’s role represented by the TV networks that provided countrywide coverage on a minute-to-minute basis as events unfolded has been creditable, despite some lapses. The networks also deserve to be commended for raising the red alert when the Lal Masjid affair first surfaced. We were forewarned.
For ignoring several such warnings over the years, and for abjuring our responsibility to protect the interests of the state, we are also culpable. If there is truth in the cliche that people get the government they deserve, then let us strive for betterment in ourselves and in governance, otherwise successive Lal Masjids heralding death, destruction and darkness with await us.
The writer is a barrister and lecturer in legal studies.

