WHEN the South Korean foreign minister, Ban Ki-moon, succeeds Kofi Annan as the secretary-general of the United Nations on January 1, it is likely that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will still be near the top of the UN’s agenda. As a candidate for what is arguably the most prestigious diplomatic post in the world, Ban was keen to emphasise his experience in negotiations with Pyongyang.

One can only wonder whether that is much of a qualification, given that the Security Council’s decision to back Ban early last week more or less coincided with North Korea’s announcement that it had successfully tested a nuclear device. The proximity of the two events may not have been coincidental; as its missile tests on July 4 demonstrated, the enigmatic regime in Pyongyang has an acute sense of symbolism.

Whereas Ban’s elevation to the topmost tier of the UN was greeted with unenthusiastic acquiescence, the North Korean nuclear test prompted a noisy chorus of condemnation, with China and Russia joining the United States and Japan in unequivocally denouncing what Pyongyang described as a “happy bomb”. Several commentators, meanwhile, perceived a degree of irony in Pakistan’s castigatory comment, on the grounds that Islamabad behaved in much the same fashion only eight years ago. Besides, North Korea’s nuclear programme is believed to have benefited from centrifuges supplied by the A.Q. Khan network.

There are also suspicions that the North Koreans may have been emboldened by the example of Pakistan, which faced condemnation and sanctions in the wake of its 1998 nuclear tests, but not for very long. There is, of course, a huge difference: Pakistan opted in its infancy to become a camp-follower of the US and has never strayed far from that path, whereas North Korea has, since its inception in 1948, steadily attracted Washington’s hostility while relying on Beijing and Moscow for support and, at times, sustenance.

Last week, as the UN Security Council debated a US-drafted resolution in response to the Korean nuclear test, it was once more Russia and China that prevented the threat of military force from being deployed as a coercive instrument; their powers of persuasion also meant that a proposed ban on trade in any sort of weaponry was watered down to cover only heavy armaments and armour. The two of them reluctantly gave way in the face of US and Japanese insistence on the inspection of North Korean cargo shipments, but China’s UN ambassador, Wang Guangya, made it clear that his country was unlikely to act on this particular clause. This declaration was deemed unacceptable by John Bolton, the studiously undiplomatic, toupee-wearing jester who represents Washington at the UN. “I can’t believe that China won’t adhere to obligations that the Security Council has imposed,” he pronounced. A little while earlier he had also managed to get up the nose of his Russian counterpart by comparing North Korean ambassador Pak Gil-yon’s walkout from the Security Council with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s shoe-pounding protest in the General Assembly more than four decades ago. That was “an inappropriate analogy”, noted Vitaly Churkin, even for someone in Bolton’s “emotional state”.

The fact that president George W. Bush has lately been hailing the UN’s “swift and tough” action does not necessarily mean that his administration has changed its stance towards the organisation, which is seen as useful only so long as it assists in advancing US foreign policy goals. Before the aggression against Iraq, when the US was seeking a clear mandate for the use of force, Bush told the UN it would render itself irrelevant if it refused to fulfil that particular American wish.

The UN refused to buckle at that point (although subsequently it rather lamely acquiesced in the occupation of Iraq, notwithstanding Annan’s admission of the war’s illegality). The fact that it is no longer being threatened with irrelevance adds up to a tacit admission that things in Iraq have gone horribly awry.

Bush declared last week that the use of force against North Korea would be premature because “diplomacy hasn’t run its course”. He said: “I believe the commander-in-chief must try all diplomatic measures before we commit our military. I’ll ask myself a follow-up. ‘If that is the case, why did you use military action in Iraq?’ And the reason why is because we tried the diplomacy.”

That, of course, is a blatant untruth. Four years ago there was a determined effort to brush aside diplomacy. North Korea continues to be offered incentives for abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iraq was simply ordered to own up to secret stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and a nuclear weapons programme. It told the truth and was greeted with “shock and awe”. Had it lied, it would have been attacked nonetheless. By no stretch of the imagination can the prelude to that incredibly stupid war — which is thus far believed to have cost an estimated 650,000 lives — be described as “diplomacy”.

Former Democratic senator Sam Nunn came closer to the mark when he noted that North Korea’s nuclear achievement shows that the US “started at the wrong end of the ‘axis of evil’. We started with the least dangerous of the countries, Iraq, and we knew it at the time.”

The prospect of a reversion to diplomacy is nonetheless to be welcomed. Iraq was chosen as a target because, inter alia, it possessed no weapons of mass destruction. North Korea’s suspected nuclear status appears to have served as a deterrent (although the absence of oil wells is also difficult to ignore). Last week’s explosion was remarkably small by nuclear-testing standards and took a week to verify. The device that was tested was apparently one-tenth the size of the Hiroshima bomb; experts believe that Pyongyang is still several years from producing an effective nuclear-tipped missile.

It does not necessarily follow that the current crisis is an entirely manufactured one, although the main causes for concern may lie in the less obvious areas. It is nothing short of an obscenity that North Korea has devoted so many resources to advanced weaponry when such a large proportion of its citizens reportedly face penury and starvation. The same argument applies, of course, to Pakistan and India — and could be stretched to cover, to some extent, all members of the nuclear club.

There is concern, meanwhile, that Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear status could spur an arms race in East Asia. South Korea, which has over the past couple of decades evolved into a functioning democracy after long stretches of US-sponsored military rule, may well be tempted to go down the nuclear path itself. And even Japan — despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki — is not entirely immune to the attraction of the ultimate weapon. Although Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a strident nationalist, last week reiterated his nation’s devotion to pacifism, he has in the past raised the prospect of renewed Japanese militarism.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Mohammed ElBaradei noted this week that up to 30 countries “have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short time span”. Nuclear proliferation is indubitably an international menace, but one cannot ignore the context in which it is occurring. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was never aimed exclusively at preventing non-nuclear nations from acquiring the deadly technology: it was once widely accepted that this aim would be feasible only in the context of the existing nuclear powers agreeing to whittle down their arsenals, with the eventual aim of complete disarmament. Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan nearly pulled off an agreement on this score in Reykjavik 20 years ago. But then, the US insisted on persisting with its outlandish (and thus far unsuccessful) Star Wars missile defence programme, which the Soviets refused to countenance.

In recent years, the US has been working on developing a new generation of nukes that could, it says, be deployed in a war theatre. In such circumstances, the five oldest nuclear powers hardly have a leg to stand on: their demand that others keep their hands off the technology reeks of apartheid. Sure, it can be argued that Pyongyang’s known and suspected idiosyncrasies make it a particularly dangerous nuclear power. But then, it isn’t the only such country with a president prone to irrational behaviour. Accounts of Kim Jong-il’s true nature tend to be contradictory, but he has shown no signs of seeking to violate the sovereignty of faraway nations.

If, as some observers suspect, North Korea’s militaristic antics are essentially a cry for help, the crisis could possibly be resolved through an overdose of carrots rather than sticks — as almost happened during Bill Clinton’s tenure. While Pyongyang has signalled its desire to continue with the six-party talks involving China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US, it’s keenness on a bilateral track with America could hold the key to rapid progress. Unfortunately, the Bush administration appears unlikely to take up the challenge. Condoleezza Rice and negotiator Christopher Hill are doing the East Asian rounds this week, but neither of them plans to visit Pyongyang.

Consequently, tensions in East Asia are likely to persist for some time and precipitate action by either side could provoke a considerably more serious crisis. Let’s hope cool heads prevail. Let’s hope John Bolton stays out of the picture. Let’s hope Ban Ki-moon turns out to be a great persuader who can coax Pyongyang away from the precipice. Meanwhile, it’s easy to share Bush’s dream of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. However, one can’t help but wonder why this privilege should be restricted to that corner of the world.

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