Extremism: the unfinished war
ALTHOUGH the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan represent two contrasting shades of religiously inspired violent extremism in Pakistan, they share at least one characteristic: both soft and coercive measures have failed to work against them.
The TTP, aligned with the Afghan Taliban and global terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, fully exploited the government’s attempts at mainstreaming them and used the process to restructure and expand its network inside the country. On the other hand, the TLP, once a banned extremist organisation, exploits the state and violates its writ whenever it feels the need to mobilise its workers and bring them onto the streets.
While the TTP is a terrorist group directly confronting the state and its security forces, the TLP is an adversary of the state and society in disguise. It operates through narratives that weaken state authority, create diplomatic friction and damage Pakistan’s international standing. The group has already caused such strains in the past, particularly vis-à-vis European countries, most notably France. It has now announced a march on the US embassy in Islamabad at a time when Pakistan-US relations are stabilising after two decades of mistrust.
Any protest targeting the US diplomatic mission inevitably evokes memories among American and Pakistani security officials of the incident in November 1979, when the Islami Jamiat Talaba (IJT), the radical student movement of the time, attacked the US embassy in Islamabad following false rumours that the US was involved in the assault on Masjid al-Haram in Makkah. A decade later, in February 1989, the IJT again resorted to violent protest, this time against a controversial novel.
The TLP carries the same menacing potential that the IJT once possessed. Both enjoyed, in their respective times, a degree of patronage from state institutions, a factor that encouraged them to push far beyond the limits set by their patrons, believing themselves to be autonomous and emboldened by their perceived bargaining power with the state.
The state now intends to eliminate the threat through coercive means, whatever the cost.
The state’s calculus has remained tricky. It remains puzzling why it so often surrenders to extremists under the pretext of maintaining peace and order through non-violent means. In certain instances, particularly during periods of political turmoil, the state has even allowed such groups the freedom to act, or worse, subtly encouraged them to do so. The purpose seems nothing more than to suppress political opponents.
Though the state institutions regard the TTP as an enemy, in the past, they have tried to deal with it in much the same way as they have handled the TLP in Punjab and Karachi, alternating between appeasement and accommodation. For now, however, the state has completely abandoned its earlier approach and intends to eliminate the threat through coercive means, whatever the cost.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif recently warned Kabul to choose between supporting Pakistan or siding with the outlawed TTP, accusing militants of crossing from Afghanistan to carry out deadly attacks. He issued this warning during a visit to Bannu, where he was accompanied by Field Marshal Asim Munir and Peshawar Corps Commander Lt-Gen Omer Bukhari, following clashes in which 19 soldiers were martyred and 45 militants killed in KP.
Pakistan has, in recent months, pursued a calibrated strategy to pressure the Afghan Taliban to curb support for anti-Pakistan militant groups such as the TTP, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, and Baloch insurgent leaders. This effort has combined diplomatic engagement with public exposure of cross-border militant activity.
The recent aerial strikes reportedly inside Afghanistan on TTP hideouts and moving targets, conducted during Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Muttaqi’s visit to India, are seen as a message, both to the TTP, underscoring Pakistan’s zero tolerance for terrorism within its borders, and the Taliban leadership, reminding it that it cannot bypass Pakistan and must address its concerns. These developments have also reinforced the view within Pakistan’s security institutions that the TTP continues to receive backing from India.
The TTP problem becomes more complex because of its deep-rooted ties with the Afghan Taliban. The latter are unwilling to entirely abandon the TTP, as they view it in much the same way as the Pakistan establishment once viewed the Afghan Taliban — potential proxies in a complicated border security environment.
A segment within the Taliban leadership believes that if they sever ties with the TTP, Pakistan will become more assertive towards Afghanistan, particularly on issues of trade, border management and, most importantly, the long-standing border demarcation dispute. They continue to regard the Durand Line as a contested boundary between the two countries.
In this context, Pakistan’s options are limited, and the quickest course may be to rely on coercive measures, a choice that could provoke anger in Afghanistan. Islamabad already lacks a favourable public opinion there, particularly since the large-scale repatriation of Afghan refugees began.
Obviously, the TLP is not an armed militia like the TTP and therefore requires a different approach. Yet, its potential to harm national harmony, disrupt law and order, and create chaos has enormous consequences, clearly detrimental to the economy, political stability and the image Pakistan needs to project to attract foreign investment.
The TLP issue can be managed through a mix of measures: re-imposing the ban if necessary, taking control of its madressahs and mosques, as was done with the banned Jamaatud Dawa’s assets under UN Security Council and FATF pressure, and, most importantly, appointing moderate imams in its affiliated mosques.
However, this would pose a significant challenge for the state. The religious radicalism it has nurtured over the past four or more decades has produced very few moderate or reasonable religious scholars. Many of those who do exist have already left the country, while others are preparing to do so.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, October 12th, 2025
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