EVENTS this week in North Waziristan have underlined a central truth in the fight against militancy: the civilians don’t understand the true nature of the threat and the military is yet to understand how to fight it effectively. After a suicide bombing on and an ambush of military personnel earlier this week, the army responded by attacking militants — attacks that have allegedly claimed the lives of many civilians or at least non-combatants, though the army denies this. Whatever the true facts behind the events — and they will perhaps never be established independently because the area is virtually sealed off to outsiders — it is clear that this was in retaliation to a specific set of incidents, not the start of a military operation in the region. Army chief Gen Raheel Sharif confirmed as much with his statement yesterday that “terrorist attacks will not be tolerated and will be responded [to] effectively”.

That a military operation in North Waziristan was necessary years ago is indisputable. Quite why that has not happened or whether one is now likely is in dispute however. The problem, originally, appears to be Gen Kayani’s reluctance to launch an operation in North Waziristan. Whether it was because of a genuine need to obtain political assent and backing for an operation (other than South Waziristan, the army has launched operations in all tribal agencies without specific approval from the political leadership) that would be more complicated and, presumably, fiercer than all other operations or because Gen Kayani believed an operation would undercut the army’s other strategic policies is not clear to this day. But it is undeniable that the space for militants in North Waziristan has grown unacceptably large over recent years to the point that it genuinely threatens the stability of much of Pakistan proper. Virtually every major attack in Pakistan’s provinces in recent years has been traced back to the tribal agency.

Also undeniable is that the army’s policy of cutting deals with some militant groups — the good Taliban/bad Taliban approach — has helped expand the space for militants in North Waziristan, including the ruthless foreign militants aligned with Al Qaeda. North Waziristan today has not become the single greatest threat to the security and stability of Pakistan by accident. A refusal to make hard choices when the problem first arose; an inability and unwillingness to break from failed policies of the past; a false pretence that containment of the problem was akin to solving it; and a tendency to pass the buck — all contributed to the creation of the explosive and lethal cocktail of militancy present in the tribal area today. Ultimately, though, apportioning blame for past mistakes will not deal with the problem in the present. If the security establishment’s mistakes contributed to the creation of the terrifying reality in North Waziristan today, the political leadership is compounding those errors by failing to provide the right leadership, even as the army appears to have come around to understanding its mistakes.

The government’s policy of dialogue with militants is both theoretically and in practice riddled with holes. All that can be discerned up till now is that the government wants dialogue as the first option and is content with bemoaning the lack of progress in talks — a non-strategy strategy if ever there was one. And the government itself accepts that talks are ultimately a way of isolating the true ideologues and hardliners among militants who will then be dealt with as necessary. The question for the government is, who are the militants in North Waziristan if not the true hardliners? And where is the planning for dealing with militant groups who refuse to talk or accept the supremacy and legitimacy of the Constitution and state as presently configured? A new government, a powerful prime minister, a handpicked army chief — surely, together they can offer more in terms of national leadership than what is on display at the moment. It is not enough to pledge that militant attacks will not be tolerated and will be responded to on an incident-to-incident basis. The country needs more from its political and security leadership.