IN Pakistan, supposedly 'proscribed' organisations not only kill in cold blood and repeatedly get away with it, they also appear to be free to hold rallies and organise meetings — even in the country's largest city — where their leaders can express their views. Two events that occurred on Friday amply back up this claim. The first was an early morning attack in Quetta in which some members of the Shia Hazara community were killed and a large number injured. A spokesman for the shadowy sectarian terror outfit Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claimed responsibility for the attack. The other event was a rally taken out in Karachi after Friday prayers. Organised to eulogise Osama bin Laden and to “show solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”, the rally made news when it was disrupted by gunfire. The gathering, organised by Jamaatud Dawa, considered a front for the banned Lashkar-i-Taiba, was attended by leaders and supporters of a number of sectarian and jihadi outfits, including the Ahl-i-Sunnat Wal Jamaat, the working title of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan which is also blacklisted.

The above are among the most recent examples of the ease with which banned outfits can function in the country with their leaders operating freely. The problems religious militancy has caused in this country have been enumerated countless times. Yet the bans and the action taken by the state against these concerns have been cosmetic and ineffective. Action is taken by the authorities only when there is external or internal pressure, usually following a major act of terrorism. Despite the bans, which date back to the Musharraf regime, the organisations resurface with new names and carry on as usual; this exercise fools no one.

If the state — specifi-cally the security establishment — is interested in rooting out militancy, it must do several things. The camps where extre-mists are trained must be dismantled while the militants' sources of funding, whether foreign or local, must be identified so that their access to funds can be cut off. The government must also plug legal loopholes to bring militant leaders to justice; at present, cases are either not registered or the state shows little motivation in pursuing them. Though tracking down each and every member of a sectarian or jihadi outfit is not possible, we feel that successfully prosecuting militant leaders and ideologues may go a long way towards compromising their ability to spread havoc. The twin ogres of sectarianism and jihadi militancy have done enough harm to Pakistan. It is time the state took serious steps to put these violent concerns permanently out of business, instead of merely 'banning' them on paper.