WASHINGTON, April 19: President Pervez Musharraf has been engaged in secret negotiations on a power-sharing deal with the People’s Party Parliamentarians and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), says a US Congressional report released recently. The report by the Congressional Research Service, which provides policy papers to members of the US Congress, says that under ‘the rumoured deal’, Gen Musharraf would remain president at least until 2007 but he would give up his position as chief of the army staff.

The report says that former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have been involved in the negotiations.

“Questions about President Musharraf’s ability to control events appear to be underscored by the rumours,” the CRS says while pointing out that his ‘current Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal allies’ also wanted him to leave the army and rule the country as a civilian president.

The CRS says that a deal between the president and the mainstream political parties would ‘likely be viewed as a positive step towards democratization’ but a decision to end his alliance with the MMA could provoke a new political crisis.’

Moreover, the fact that rumours had appeared about the arrangement raises questions about Pakistan’s stability, the report claims.

The CRS says that the United States also has concerns about the stability of the Musharraf government, his commitment to the war against terror and his tackling of the Khan network of nuclear proliferators.

It believes that despite these concerns, the United States appears to have little choice but to support the Musharraf government, but “the degree of US support matters greatly.”

The CRS refers to a recent report by the 9/11 Commission which argues that President Musharraf is ‘the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan’ and an advocate of ‘enlightened moderation’.

The commission has recommended that ‘as the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises that it is prepared to keep for years,’ provided ‘Pakistan’s leaders are prepared to make difficult choices of their own.’

The CRS then examines the pros and cons of ‘supporting Pakistan fully, conditioned only on continued cooperation in the counter-terrorism effort.’

Looking at the advantages of this option, the CRS says that it reduces Pakistani suspicion that, in the words of the 9/11 Commission Report, the United States views Pakistan as an ‘ally of convenience.’ “The underlying rationale for this option is that more confidence President Musharraf has in the US commitment to Pakistan, more ready he will be to confront terrorism.”

The CRS warns that for several reasons the risks of this option may be high. “This option does not fully address the limits of Gen Musharraf’s authority, and it ties Pakistan’s ‘hard choices’ to the fight against extremists, not its ‘nuclear behaviour’.

The CRS claims that despite its strong support for the Musharraf government, the Bush Administration has not yet obtained full Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

“If President Musharraf should adopt a zero-tolerance policy of shutting down all terrorist networks, he risks a possibly fatal backlash both from the ISI and militants carrying out an insurgency in held Kashmir, as well as the loss of support from his political allies among the Islamist parties,” the report says.

“Even if Gen Musharraf or a comparable military successor continues to maintain political dominance for the next few years, there is no absolute guarantee that Pakistan will continue its ‘front line’ status against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the CRS argues.

“Much could depend on Pakistan’s volatile political situation. Already, the Islamist political forces are impatient with President Musharraf’s vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic state and measures, however incomplete, to suppress domestic jihadis in Balochistan and the NWFP and terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.”

The report claims that even now, some in the Pakistani hierarchy are not prepared to support the US policy to the point of compromising, in their view, Pakistan’s long-term fundamental interests.

The CRS says that a radical political change may be unlikely under present circumstances but a violent Islamist campaign against the government or an internal coup cannot be completely ruled out.