THE Islamabad MOU may have lost its meaning but Pakistan remains relevant. Sooner or later, peace will return to the Gulf and Pakistan will have a place in it. The exceptional quality of Pakistan’s diplomacy, statesmanship and peacemaking efforts, evident from its mediation efforts and earlier impressive military performance in the 2025 conflict against India, have left a mark on the Middle East.

There’s some expectancy in Pakistan that post-war Middle East will unlock opportunities for the country’s strategic rise, economic resurgence and greater diplomatic space. This euphoria must be checked to avoid rash policy choices. Let’s see what opportunities the emerging Middle East might offer and sift the feasible from the possible, the desirable from the avoidable, and reality from hype.

The war has exposed the vulnerabilities of the US-centric, Israeli-backed and Iran-targeted security architecture that Arab monarchies had built for their political survival, economic stability and peace in the region. Caught between defending their own economic and security interests, and those of the Gulf allies, the US prioritised its own and Israel’s interests. There is a regional realisation that a new security order is needed.

The Gulf countries may need a web of overlapping alliances. The US connection will remain indispensable but no longer exclusive: Washington will have to share the diplomatic space with Beijing. On that pedestal might be built other bilateral alliances by regional countries — such as, between Qatar and Turkiye, and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These will likely be boosted by regional groupings — such as the R4 (Pakistan Turkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia). Analysts also talk of a larger grouping comprising the R4, the Gulf Arab countries, and Iran. No security architecture will be viable that excludes Iran and doesn’t resolve differences among the Gulf states. But talk of an ‘Islamic Nato’ is fantastical.

Pakistan must temper post-war expectations.

Islamabad thus would have not only allies but also rivals and competitors whose ambitions could clash with its own. Iran and Turkiye, in particular, have projected their power and assertive diplomacy across the Middle East. Pakistan, too, risks getting entangled in intra-Arab rivalries and caught in the Arab-Iran crossfire. It is a tough balancing act.

The US is likely to view any security arrangement built around Iran-GCC reconciliation and backed by a nuclear Pakistan as targeted against Israel. Obviously, the Gulf countries wouldn’t want a system that provoked Iranian hostility to be replaced with one that incites US-Israeli hostility. Its mandate will have to be carefully crafted to be neither provocative nor ineffective.

No guarantees should be offered to the Gulf countries that could extend Pakistan’s security parameters to Israel — a red line, especially in view of the burgeoning India-Israeli relations. Pakistan, instead, must focus on defence export and joint defence production of drones, missiles and fighter aircraft by putting to good use its military-industrial capabilities.

Yes, the new Middle East may throw up opportunities for economic gain. And Pakistan indeed has the unique advantage of geography as highlighted by the war. It has geopolitical importance and geo-economic salience as it sits atop critical sea lanes and energy corridors, and is a pivotal hub for transshipment, potentially putting the country at the centre of multi-directional connectivity plans. But their optimal utilisation will need qualitative improvement in the internal security situat­i­on, domestic pol­itical tensions and governance.

FDI prospects need similar prerequisites. Pros­p­ective areas of investments could include oil refining, storage etc. to guard against future Hormuz closures. Mining, IT and corporate farming are other emerging areas, not to mention the possibility of enhanced Saudi investments in Reko Diq and Saindak projects. Pakistan could ask for a waiver for the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline but it will have no immediate bearing. Iran gas prices are high, availability is uncertain as the gas needs to be developed for export, and Pakistan isn’t in a position to build the pipeline.

Hence, for now, Pakistan may only be able to use its goodwill and political influence to get enhanced job opportunities/ quotas for its workers and more construction contracts for Pakistani firms in Iran and the GCC countries independently or as an adjunct to Chinese companies.

Briefly, with internal security challenges, hostilities on the Afghan border and an economy dependent on external assistance, Pakistan can derive only limited benefits from economic opportunities and projecting power in the ‘new’ Middle East.

The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor, Georgetown University.

Published in Dawn, July 22nd, 2026