WASHINGTON: Pakistan finds itself at the crossroads of war, diplomacy, and regional power shifts — a position shaped as much by geography and timing as by the personal ties its leaders have cultivated at the highest levels, US media note.

“The US is working to arrange a meeting in Pakistan to discuss an off-ramp,” two administration officials said according to CNN. In other words, Washington is actively exploring Islamabad as a venue for de-escalation.

NBC News reported in its bulletin that two regional sources and a US official confirmed a 15-point US plan to end the war had been delivered to Iranian officials through Pakistan.

The BBC quoted two Pakistani officials as saying the proposal addressed sanctions relief, a rollback of Iran’s nuclear programme, limits on missiles, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil is shipped.

Meanwhile, Iran has issued its own plan via state TV, which calls for a halt to killings of its officials, guarantees against further attacks, reparations for the war, an end to hostilities, and Iran’s “exercise of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz”.

However, several major US outlets also cited President Trump, who at a Republican fundraiser on Wednesday night claimed that Iran was holding talks with the US but was reluctant to acknowledge it publicly due to potential repercussions.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters that the talks “are productive … and they continue to be.”

Tehran’s public message could not be more different. Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf wrote on X: “No negotiations have been held with the US … Fake news is used to manipulate financial and oil markets and to escape the quagmire in which the US and Israel are trapped.”

This is not merely a disagreement over facts; it reflects two very different political environments. In Washington, projecting that negotiations are underway serves multiple purposes: reassuring markets, signaling control, and presenting diplomacy as an alternative to escalation. In Tehran, denying talks reinforces resistance and avoids the appearance of yielding under pressure.

Yet the more important development may not be what Tehran says publicly — it may be who is consolidating power behind the scenes.

Washington-based Iranian scholar Vali Nasr has argued that while attention has focused on Qalibaf, “the appointment of former IRGC General Zolqadr deserves more attention.”

He explained: “Ghalibaf may be the hot ticket for the White House, but Zolqadr is the reality on the ground.”

Nasr added, “Zolqadr is Mojtaba’s man, and his selection shows that Mojtaba is in charge.”

He noted that Israel’s campaign has not moderated Tehran but hardened it: “All Israel’s decapitation has achieved is transferring power in Tehran to the most hawkish part of the IRGC. Zolqadr comes from that wing.”

He further observed that Zolqadr “had a hand in suppressing protesters in 1999 and 2009 and was instrumental in Ahmadinejad’s elections to the presidency.” His elevation, Nasr concluded, “does not suggest there will be talks with the US, but rather a much more aggressive Iranian posture.”

If Nasr’s interpretation is correct, it complicates Washington’s optimism. Even if backchannels exist, the centre of gravity in Tehran may now lie with figures less inclined toward compromise.

There is also a revealing debate unfolding inside the United States about the culture of power itself.

Retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal, speaking to The New York Times, said he was disappointed by what he described as a “bravado” atmosphere being communicated from the top. He recalled serving with elite forces who accomplished extraordinary missions “without boasting about them”. They were not “braggadocious; that simply was not how they behaved.”

He warned that much of today’s force is 18 years old and “highly influenceable”.

“If young service members internalise rhetoric suggesting superiority, they may conclude that this is how they ought to think and behave — that they are inherently superior.”

In reality, he noted, only a small fraction of personnel need to be capable of “kicking down doors”. The vast majority serve in intelligence, communications, and logistics — the enablers who make precision possible. Promoting the idea that “everyone should look like me”, he argued, “would be a disaster”.

McChrystal’s warning speaks to a broader tension: the difference between projecting strength and exercising it with restraint.

For Islamabad, the possible role in facilitating talks is not about spectacle. It is about quiet leverage — geography, access, and timing.

But if Tehran’s internal balance has shifted decisively toward IRGC figures, Pakistan’s diplomatic window may be narrower than Washington’s public confidence suggests.

The contradiction is stark: Washington says talks are “productive”; Tehran says there are none. Analysts warn that power in Iran may now rest with those least inclined toward negotiation.

Pakistan’s relevance, as The New York Times observed, has grown — and so has its exposure. Whether Islamabad becomes the venue for a genuine breakthrough, or merely the stage for competing narratives, will depend on how dynamics unfold in both Washington and Tehran.