RECENTLY China has announced construction of the world’s largest dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet. India has criticised Beijing’s initiative due to potential downstream impacts. This isn’t the only dam in the region facing opposition from a lower riparian state.
India is advancing several large-scale hydropower projects, such as Tipaimukh dam on the Barak River, which is opposed by Bangladesh. Ratle, Pakal Dul, Kishanganga, Salma dam (also known as Afghanistan-India Friendship dam), Shahtoot dam and Kamal Khan dam have also raised serious concerns of lower riparian states, ie Pakistan and Iran.
As per international law, states can construct dams within their defined territories to utilise water for various purposes. Construction of dams is an internal matter of states to support economic development because they provide a reliable source of hydroelectric power, which is a renewable and cost-effective energy alternative, crucial for powering industries and households.
However, in this part of the world, construction of dams is a major source of tensions between upper and lower riparian states. Due to several reasons, construction of dams is not viewed as a positive development; rather, lower riparian states question ‘geopolitical motives’ behind construction of dams by upper riparian states.
First, the historic baggage of armed clashes and unresolved boundary disputes have plagued bilateral relationships. In case of Sino-India relations, strategic competition and border dispute have added fuel to the fire. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran have similar border-related disputes and a history of troubled relations, which adds mistrust with regard to the respective upper riparian state’s intentions.
Pakistan is reluctant to engage India for revision of the IWT.
For instance, Bangladesh and Pakistan do not view floods as the result of their weak water infrastructure; rather, both countries often blame India for flooding. Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan face growing concerns over water scarcity, worsened by climate change, frequent droughts, and rising populations, which have reduced water availability for lower riparian states.
Second, the absence of a comprehensive water-sharing agreement between upper and lower riparian states is one of the major reasons for the construction of these dams. This also allows upper riparian states more freedom to take unilateral actions without consulting lower riparian states. Further, technological advancements and abundant economic resources have increased the ability of upper riparian states to construct big dams to control water flows. This is why upper riparian states reject calls to modify their projects to address concerns of lower riparian states.
Third, the changing world order and weakening of existing international norms has also ramped up the confidence of upper riparian countries. Upper riparian states view this evolving world order as an opportunity for maximisation of their interests with least accountability at global institutions. Thus, threats or attempts to restrict water flow to lower riparian countries have become a norm in international relations. This trend could be viewed in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the only beacon of hope that has managed water-sharing issues between Pakistan and India since 1960. Yet this treaty too is currently under significant duress. With India sending two formal notices to Pakistan (in January 2023 and September 2024) seeking modifications to the treaty, coupled with aggressive statements from Indian leadership such as “blood and water cannot flow together,” concerns have been expressed by Islamabad that India might attempt to take ‘unilateral’ steps or may divert water flow from the western rivers allocated to Pakistan.
Climate change and growing water scarcity are two primary factors that necessitate revision of the treaty. However, Islamabad is reluctant to engage with New Delhi for revision of the agreement. Political instability, economic turmoil, weak water management of existing resources and lack of expertise in water-related diplomacy are key drivers of Pakistan’s reluctance to engage with India for revision of the IWT.
On the contrary, New Delhi today is politically confident, economically stable, and diplomatically assertive as compared to 1960. Hence, Islamabad does not view it as the right time to renegotiate the treaty. Resultantly, Pakistan’s reluctance and India’s push to revise the treaty have put the IWT’s future in doubt.
Recent trends suggest that dams with geopolitical motives will further mar bilateral relationships between upper and lower riparian states. The 2023 Iran-Afghanistan clash, which killed one Taliban fighter and two Iranian guards, shows water disputes can lead to border conflicts, if left unresolved.
The writer is director of the India Study Centre at ISSI.
Published in Dawn, April 10th, 2025
