ABOUT 22 per cent of Pakistanis live below the national poverty line, with estimates jumping to 40pc if we consider the global lower-middle-income poverty rate. Similarly, 40pc of Pakistan suffers from multidimensional poverty. There are about 25 million out-of-school children, while 40pc of children under the age of five in Pakistan are stunted. In the smaller provinces, these numbers are far worse. This article’s title could be referring to any of these millions of impoverished Pakistanis, and as a nation we ought to be doing better to help them. However, while these people suffer because of the state’s neglect, there is another group, the internally displaced persons belonging to the merged areas, whose suffering is a direct consequence of state action. The IDPs’ continuing struggle for their rights also highlights the state’s indifference.

At the height of the conflict in 2014, about 2m people had been displaced from their homes in Fata (now the merged areas). Over the course of the last two decades, people from all seven districts of the merged areas have been IDPs at some point. In total, as per official government data, about 4.5m people from the merged areas became IDPs. Given the 2017 Pakistan census numbers of 5m people in the merged areas, that’s 90pc of the total population of the area. While some tribes were only temporarily displaced, there are those that, after more than a decade since being forced to leave their homes, are still unable to go back. Although official records show that most of these IDPs have now returned to their areas, with about 18,000 families still displaced, the reality on the ground is different.

There are broadly three reasons why the repatriation hasn’t happened. First, IDPs who settled in more developed parts of Pakistan became accustomed to better basic services, like more than four hours of electricity a day, running tap water, access to functioning health and education systems, and job opportunities. With such basic necessities still very much a luxury in the merged areas, some have decided not to return. Second, there are areas where in official government documents the return process has taken place and IDPs are ‘free’ to go back, but in actuality these areas are still cordoned off by check posts and there is very restricted movement allowed, if at all. Places like Mamozai in Orakzai and many villages of the Mehsud belt in South Wazirsitan fall in this category. However, the majority of IDPs not returning to their homes fall into a third category: those who are unable to return due to the massive level of destruction.

As part of the anti-militancy drive, there were large parts of the merged areas where homes, businesses, bazaars, schools, hospitals, the road network, electricity, and drinking water supply infrastructure were completely destroyed. This includes most parts of the South and North Waziristan districts, the upper tehsil of district Orakzai, Tirah region in district Khyber, and large parts of the central tehsil in district Kurram. When the tribes here were made to leave their homes, they did so with two promises made to them. First, that this would be a temporary dislocation during which they would be looked after as IDPs by the government. Second, that their hometowns would be cleared of all militants and rebuilt so that they could return home to continue living their lives safely.

The IDPs’ continuing struggle for their rights also highlights the state’s indifference.

In actuality, as IDPs, there has been very little support from the state, except for perhaps the ultra poor who were forced to live in refugee camps. As for the length of stay, for all practical purposes, many still live as IDPs. The rehabilitation and reconstruction process has been a story of even more despair. The government decided on a meagre rate of Rs400,000 for fully demolished homes and Rs160,000 for partially damaged homes. Contrary to popular belief based on experiences in villages in the rest of Pakistan, homes in the tribal areas are more like compounds, with living spaces for multiple families and thick walls for protection, rather than simple mud houses. The amount allocated for reconstruction for these homes by the government isn’t even enough to clear out the debris, let alone reconstruct those homes. Even so, many people are still waiting to receive their compensation money; their wait might have become indefinite with the government closing the programme in the 2022-2023 budget.

Although the reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and road infrastructure began with good speed, similar to housing compensation, funding for that has also dried up since 2022, with many buildings still lying in ruins. An amount of Rs17 billion was allocated in the budget under the heading of TDP (temporarily displaced persons) support, which was used for rehabilitation and reconstruction, but this line has been removed from the budget. It has been estimated that an additional Rs60bn will be needed to complete the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. For markets and businesses, except for a couple of towns in North Waziristan, it appears that residents of no other district have been compensated for the businesses and markets they lost.

Humanitarian motivations should be enough for mainstream Pakistan to care about the continued plight of IDPs, but that has seldom been enough for governments to take action. So let me make a more egocentric argument for why the government and mainstream Pakistanis should be concerned. Militancy is again on the rise. With the deep sense of betrayal felt by merged area locals towards the state, they may not be willing to relocate this time, given their previous experiences. This will make fighting militancy a lot costlier and riskier. The reality is, militant groups have proven themselves adept at exploiting local frustrations and government neglect to entrench themselves in these areas. If militants are able to make inroads in this region, it will spread to the rest of Pakistan, like the last time.

The writer is a development practitioner and a former parliamentarian.

X: @GhaziGJ

Published in Dawn, March 5th, 2025