Lost opportunity?
EVERY crisis presents opportunities for a better life later. Optimists feel the Covid-19 crisis does so for Pakistan. There is no denying the opportunities. But will the state and society grasp or miss them? To analyse future outcomes properly, one must first list Pakistan’s current problems to see whether the crisis will lessen or enhance them.
The problems in the economic, political and social spheres are clear. Economically, Pakistan has seen slow growth for decades as it has failed to spur industry. Spurts of higher growth during this period were unsustainable, superficial and elitist, as under the Musharraf and recent PML-N eras. External and budget deficits are regular as the country fails to earn enough exports or tax revenues.
Politically, the biggest issues are the lack of civilian supremacy, and the reality that even with it, we would be ruled by corrupt, elitist, dynastic parties that don’t even deliver the progress that such parties do in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. But they still do better than non-democratic options. Socially, the main issues are widespread extremism and irrationality.
What will the crisis do to these problems? The economic view is clear. It will push us into our first recession in decades. This will naturally slow down tax revenue growth. Exports and remittances may fall sharply though reduced imports, and debt repayment may soften the impact on the external balance.
The best chance for the PTI to prove itself is now.
Such huge economic crises do sometimes topple existing elitist power structures. They lead to better governance when the economic crisis damages the hold of existing political elites and reform-minded groups are organised enough to step forward to provide leadership. This happened in some former Soviet states. But there was a third factor in play there. The economic crisis emerged due to the serious defects in their extant politico-economic system. Thus, its basic ideology became discredited, leading to the system’s easier collapse.
Will the economic crisis be severe enough to cripple existing power holders, including the establishment, landed and industrialist elite politicians and religious leaders? This depends on how long it lasts. If the most optimistic scenario of it abating in a few months holds, these groups may retain their powers. But if it persists longer, there would be increasing pressure on them. It will still be softened by two factors. First, the crisis will not be seen popularly as having emerged directly due to the elitist power structures but due to natural phenomenon. Thus, the pressure on existing leaders will be lessened.
The second issue is the presence of an organised group that can step forward to fill the leadership gap. In many states, such groups emerged from segments of the middle class, either the techno-managerial professional one or the civil society-linked middle class rooted in labour and other social movements. In Pakistan’s case, its techno-managerial middle class is already part of the power structure in the shape of the PTI. But it has proved itself even more incompetent and disconnected than traditional parties. It appears to be surviving due to the efforts of elements in the establishment that keep it from collapsing.
Optimistic analysts present the crisis as a second chance for the PTI to prove itself. But there is little to indicate that this is happening. The serious deficit of competence that plagues the PTI and its leadership is not going to disappear magically. The best chance for the PTI to prove itself is obviously now. But so far it has shown itself out of its depth in tackling the crisis. It failed to institute suitable precautions and lockdowns proactively, didn’t bring political parties together, did not mollify the clergy on Ramazan congregations, and announced a construction package catering to the elite. Yet, the bigger problem is not the PTI’s incompetence, but the more structural incompetence of the establishment with its vice-like grip on politics.
The civil-society-linked middle class has good people-oriented ideas but is too small at this stage to step up to fill the void. Thus, if the crisis persists and the current power structure starts to unravel, the gap may actually be filled by extremists and criminal mafias. That would be a worse outcome than the current situation. So, the best that one can hope for from this crisis is a weakening of the elitist power structure led by the establishment so as to provide increasing space for the civil-society-linked middle class to grow and provide leadership over the years. As things stand, opportunities provided by the crisis will likely go abegging again.
The writer is a Fellow with UC Berkeley and heads INSPIRING Pakistan, a progressive policy unit.
Twitter: @NiazMurtaza2
Published in Dawn, April 21st, 2020
