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THE title of this piece is a bit misleading. There is no substantive debate on the subject of mainstreaming militants. This lack of substance is because actual decision-makers are mostly quiet. Parliament is silent on the matter out of ignorance or expediency. The government either appears to have little clue or is not in the mood to share. Only the military has vaguely alluded to it in a recent statement.
Therefore, whatever discussion does take place is based on a series of assumptions. The first, now partially confirmed by the ISPR news conference, is that there is indeed a purposeful strategy to encourage particular militants or hard-line ideologues to contest elections. Meaning that what happened in the NA-120 by-poll was not an autonomous decision taken by a particular Islamist organisation and its leadership. Instead, it was the outcome of state officials exercising their influence over the said organisation and its leadership.
The second assumption is that this is being done as purposeful strategy, ie it is a way to resolve a pressing problem. Finally, the third assumption, one held largely by the optimists, is that the problem being addressed is the issue of rising militancy, proliferation of non-state pockets of authority and deepening intolerance.
Are these groups, who’ve long remained at the beck and call of the Pakistani state, tired of playing second fiddle?
Given these three assumptions, mainstreaming on the surface appears to be a potentially useful strategy. The logic of its utility goes something like this: when ideologically motivated actors seek to gain power through electoral contestation, they have to broaden their appeal. What we subsequently end up with is a dilution of sorts, where the less-palatable and polarising ideas are shelved, and a new ‘middle-ground’ is reached.
A textbook case of this is leftists making peace with social democracy to win power in Western Europe. Another is Turkey’s old religious parties reconciling consumerism and market fundamentalism with personal spirituality, and (partially) giving up the quest to make the state more Islamic.
Local proponents of mainstreaming violent or violence-propagating groups give a few examples to prove its utility. The Sinn Fein and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) are cited as a case of successful decommissioning. Others mentioned include the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the ETA in Spain, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines.
While on the surface these cases may seem persuasive, they fall short as suitable analogies. In all such instances, the target group was driven by territorial aims, rather than purely ideological ones. They sought either independence for a land mass, or greater autonomy in local government. What our local Islamists propagate, on the other hand, is the takeover of an existing state and the ideological transformation of its legal and political system, somewhat similar to leftist groups from the 20th century.
Pakistan’s proposed case appears to be unique in another major way. In contrast to many examples across history, the particular groups purportedly being mainstreamed are not currently opposed to the Pakistani state. Jamaatud Dawa and other Hafiz Saeed affiliates are considered patriotic organisations by many, including dim-witted local celebrities. They frequently carry out rallies in favour of the biggest symbol of the Pakistani state, its military. They see themselves as defenders of aspects of the status quo, and as proponents of the military’s national security framework. While their ideological agenda has no doubt created regressive social tendencies and recruits for anti-state militant groups, their leadership has not yet openly asked for people to pick up arms against the Pakistani state.
The fact that such organisations exist, collect charity, run schools, hospitals and madressahs shows that they are already fairly mainstream. What purpose then is encouraging them to contest elections going to achieve? Are we at some tipping-point, with full-on anti-state jihad just around the corner? Are these groups, who’ve long remained at the beck and call of the Pakistani state, tired of playing second fiddle and want a shot at running the entire show? Akin to opting for a quick pressure release to prevent an explosion, is this a concession of sorts to keep relations between the state and particular Islamists cordial?
If this is indeed the case, the assumption that this is being done for some long-term positive objective goes out the window. A prerequisite of mainstreaming is an agreement on certain inviolable principles, ideally negotiated from a position of strength. So far, we appear to be fixated on the most rudimentary one: elections as the only legitimate path to power.
What about the end-goal of state power, such as protecting basic civil liberties, and the rights and status of minority groups? What about aspiring for a more peaceful engagement with the wider world? After decades of mobilisation by activist groups, we’re finally seeing some progress on pro-women legislation and a consensus within mainstream political parties on improving gender rights in the country. Under siege and held hostage by electorally weak Islamist parties already, what will happen to the middle ground in the conversation on tolerance and pluralism once even more regressive actors jump into the fray?
The analysis here lends itself to some sinister conclusions. If this is a concessionary move to relieve short-term pressure or prevent a tipping point, then we’re in for more trouble than we imagined. It means that the threat of a full-on jihadi implosion has not only been deemed credible, it has forced the state towards an outcome that hasn’t been thought through.
On the other hand, if there is no such existential threat, then a number of other theories come into play. The most popular of which is that this is the purposeful cultivation of a useful political stooge, partially as a riposte to the anti-Pakistan chauvinism of Hindu nationalists next door, and partially as a way to undercut a disliked mainstream party.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
Twitter: @umairjav
Published in Dawn, October 9th, 2017
