War is no more than a lethal argument, and, to be worth the fighting, it demands a sane and profitable political end.

- J. F. C. Fuller:

The Second World War

EVER since the fighting in Kargil broke out, a section of the national press, as always happens when the atmosphere heats up, has been beating the drums of chauvinism. But many "responsible" newspapers, and this goes for individual writers too, find themselves caught in an embarrassing situation.

They are being pulled in opposite directions. Their judgment tells them to cry out about the danger of war. Their sense of patriotism tells them to suppress their true feelings and make a virtue of restraint and silence. While this attitude is understandable, the time may have come to speak up because it takes no exceptional intelligence to see that with each passing day we are inching that much closer to a war regarding whose purpose or utility the nation remains wholly in the dark.

To put the most charitable construction on what's going on in the Kargil sector, if this was the opening move in a bid to liberate Kashmir by force, something could be said in its defence. It would be seen as part of a larger scheme of things even if this larger scheme was decried as foolish or foolhardy. But unless there are higher secrets yet to be revealed, the fighting in Kargil appears to stand all by itself.

While it puts in sharp relief the courage and tenacity of the fighters facing the Indian army, it seems unconnected to a larger objective, at least none visible to mortal eyes or none sustainable over a period of time. In other words, what we are seeing is heroism and tactical brilliance as ends in themselves; tactical brilliance not tied to a strategic aim. This is folly of a dangerous kind. While people are dying and war clouds are massed thick on the horizon, few people are in a position to say why this high-risk course is being pursued.

To voice these doubts does not mean that we should hide behindweakness or despair. The people of Pakistan will never shirk the danger of war if they believe the cause to be worthy or the survival of the country to be at stake. It only means that we should keep our feet on the ground and not repeat similar blunders we have made in the past. Indeed it is amazing how the present fighting in Kashmir is eerily reminiscent of the events of 1965. Then too our politico-military command thought that Pakistan could seek military advantage in Kashmir without risking a war in any other theatre. The foolishness of this assumption was quickly exposed. If Pakistan was still able to avert a military disaster, it was because of the grit of its soldiers and junior officers and notthe brilliance of its senior commanders.

Even in the present situation the freedom fighters occupying the Kargil heights are giving a superb account of themselves. It takes some doing for a few hundred irregular commandos to face up to the might of the Indian army. Our soldiers manning the Line of Control too are in high spirits and prepared for the worst. The bravery of an army, however, is of no account when the higher direction of war is faulty or based upon unrealistic assumptions. A war, or even fighting of a limited kind as we are seeing in the Kargil and Drass sectors, must have a political objective if the expenditure of blood and resources is to be justified. What is the political objective of the present fighting?

It cannot be the conquest or liberation of Kashmir because we lack the strength for that. It cannot be the desire to internationalize the Kashmir problem because it is a quixotic venture to risk a war for so paltry an aim. After all, what did we gain when the Kashmir problem was before the UN? A few pieces of paper which have not stood the test of time. The objective cannot be to make India negotiate under duress because if at all we live in the real world we should know this is not a likely undertaking. What then is the purpose of this operation?

Mature nations do not seek unfavourable wars. Nor do they risk life and death for secondary objectives.China does not accept the independence of Taiwan, but aware of the limits of its power, it has not sent the Peoples Liberation Army across the Taiwan Straits. In the midst ofthe First World War Lenin swallowed the humiliation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovskbecause the primary aim before him was the preservation of the Bolshevik Revolution, not the defeat of Germany. Japan claims the four northern islands from Russia and although because of this dispute it has not signed a peace treaty with Russia, it has never contemplated the use of force to wrest the islands back.

We seem to have perfected the art of getting into wars without purpose and without a sense of the dangers involved. In 1965 the road to war was paved with false assumptions. In 1971 political recklessness set the stage for our greatest national humiliation. More recently we got involved in Afghanistan without counting thelong-term costs of that engagement. Given this background, it is only fair to wonder what considerations lie behind the Kargil operation.

That it is putting the country in an awkward position is becoming clearer with each passing day. Our official line is that we have no control over the freedom fighters. That may be so although it will be hard to convince the world that these fighters have fallen from the skies or are being supplied from the heavens. Even otherwise, to go forward - that is, to expand the Kargil operation - looks difficult because it would mean certain war. Stepping back risks a loss of national face besides prompting angry questions as to what the sabre-rattling was all about. How to declare victory, with as straight a face as possible, and defuse the tension is the challenge facing the country's politico-military leadership.

General Jahangir Karamat was right in suggesting a national security council (or call it what you will), incorporating the civilian leadership and the military command, to handle important questions of war and peace. If only Nawaz Sharif and his coterie had had the sense to understand that this suggestion, far from undermining civilian authority, would work to the political leadership's advantage. As it is, nothing in the present crisis looks more forlorn and helpless than the Muslim League's heavy mandate, with the prime minister's immense powers being of little use to him in understanding, much less dealing with, the present situation.

One conclusion most Pakistanis can safely draw. Left to themselves Pakistan's democrats have left nothing undone to prove their incompetence. Left to itself the military command has historically shown itself to be prone to shortsightedness and adventurism. For the foreseeable future there will remain the need to moderate and balance both these dangerous tendencies.