September 11th's tremors were felt throughout the world but nowhere more strongly than in distant Pakistan. A country geographically so far removed from the epicentre of that earthquake. Yet, in so many ways, so near.

Why? Because all the connecting strands somehow touched Pakistan. No sooner had the immediate shock waves subsided than the White House and the Pentagon were pointing a finger of blame at the shadowy figure of Osama bin Laden. Where was Osama's refuge? Afghanistan. Who was giving him protection? The Taliban rulers of Afghanistan. Which country was the principal prop of the Taliban? Pakistan. The line of fire was direct as was the presumed trail of responsibility.

To deflect American wrath Pakistan had to act quickly. The US wanted blood and a visible target to hit. It needed to assuage a quickly rising sense of vengeance. President Bush had to be seen to be acting as the commander-in-chief.

General Musharraf acted quickly, some might say a bit too quickly. Coming on television he denounced terrorism and declared his support to the United States. It is the received wisdom that he succumbed to American pressure. The truth perhaps is a bit more complicated. What little evidence is available suggests that he had already made up his mind. When Colin Powell made his famous "with us or against us" telephone call, he needed recourse to neither threat nor persuasion. He was talking to the already converted.

Moreover, to someone who was his own master and not under the necessity of consulting anything broader than his inner coterie. No wonder, in a crunch the US has always preferred dealing with dictators.

A closed shop, however, has its own limitations. In the first flush of enthusiasm Pakistan agreed to most American demands. What would be the quid pro quo? This was left vague out of the curious belief that nations should behave like gentlemen. And gentlemen don't put a price, or at least not too obvious a price, on their cooperation. From which juvenile thinking has flowed Pakistan's remarkable talent to undersell its services.

Other considerations too were at work. India, in Arundhati Roy's memorable words, was "furiously gyrating its hips" in a bid to outsmart Pakistan and capture US attention. Pakistan caught in an Indo-American nutcracker: for India this was a dream coming true. There was only one problem, however. For reasons of geography that India could do nothing about, Pakistan was vital for any assault on Afghanistan in a manner India could never hope to be.

Appearing on television again, a sombre-faced Musharraf explained why Pakistan was siding with the US. Apart from the usual homilies against terrorism, he said Pakistan was protecting its "core interests": nuclear 'assets' and Kashmir policy. In the same breath he warned India to "lay off". In the reference to nuclear assets lay concealed a curious irony. Pakistan's nuclear programme had always been touted as the last line of national defence. In a vulnerable moment it stood exposed as the nation's greatest liability.

Joining the American coalition had wider consequences as well. It meant ditching the Taliban and giving up the ISI's favourite theory of a friendly Afghanistan providing 'strategic depth' to Pakistan. For close to a quarter of a century this fallacy had held the military mind in thrall. Now under the pressure of external circumstances, Pakistan's military rulers were abandoning a sacred policy overnight, something, it bears remembering, they were never inclined to do on their own.

The support-Taliban policy was an albatross round Pakistan's neck, leading it up the path of folly and besmirching its image worldwide. Regardless of how it happened, getting rid of this burden was a blessing for Pakistan.

The U-turn on Afghanistan shattered the alliance between the army and the religious parties, an alliance forged in the heat of the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. When American bombers started streaming over Afghanistan the religious parties took to the streets to denounce the US. To their dismay, these protests remained confined to their own narrow circle, the Pakistani public preferring to remain aloof.

Very soon it transpired that the only 'strategic depth' Afghanistan had provided was to sectarian terrorism in Pakistan. With Afghanistan no longer available as a base of operations, the outfits involved in this dangerous game found themselves isolated

Soon after September 11 Islamabad became the stamping ground of the world's elect, visited by prime ministers and foreign ministers from across the globe. Visibly elated, President Musharraf basked in the glow of this new-found attention.

Things also brightened up on the economic front. Money wasn't exactly flooding in but debt rescheduling and a 600 million dollar grant from the US eased the country's immediate economic problems. The mood in Islamabad was optimistic, even perhaps wildly optimistic, with officials intoning the mantra that unlike in the past this time round the alliance with the US would rest on enduring foundations.

A fundamental contradiction, however, lay at the heart of Pakistan's change of course on Afghanistan. This now came to the fore. How could anything that was unacceptable in Afghanistan be acceptable in Kashmir? Pakistan's leaders hadn't thought this one through. In the new international climate no one had any patience for the word 'jihad'. When Pakistan's military rulers threw in their lot with the US they thought that, among other things, they had taken care of India. They were in for a rude awakening.

When a group of Kashmiri gunmen attacked the Indian parliament in December last year, India went on a diplomatic offensive, charging Pakistan with the flavour of the moment, "cross-border terrorism". For good measure it put its troops on a war footing, raising the spectre of a nuclear conflict in the subcontinent.

To Pakistan's chagrin, instead of admonishing India the US sided with it. Pakistan came under pressure to take urgent steps to allay Indian concerns. For a country which had just rendered vital services in Afghanistan this was mortifying, all the more so when Pakistani troops were still fighting America's war against Al Qaeda in the volatile tribal belt adjacent to the Afghan border.

In response to this pressure President Musharraf, in a much-awaited speech delivered in January, declared war against religious extremism. In coded language he also made it clear that Pakistan was ending support to 'jihadi' elements in Kashmir.

India had compelling domestic reasons to look tough against Pakistan. The ruling BJP faced a tough state election in Uttar Pradesh (one which it eventually lost). Then came the genocide of Muslims in Gujarat from which all the sabre-rattling was a welcome diversion.

This should have been pointed out but Pakistan was batting on a weak wicket and once again when the US administration swung into action it was Pakistan which came under pressure. From Islamabad the US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, carried the assurance to Delhi that Pakistan would help put a permanent stop to 'cross-border infiltration'

It is thus clear, or should be even to doubting Thomases, that the Afghan turnaround has been matched by another one in Kashmir. A 20-year old saga with jihad as its central theme has come to an end.

What are Musharraf's prospects then? He faces a jihadi backlash but no widespread unrest. This for two reasons: the jihadi organizations lack a popular base and most Pakistanis are suffering from jihadi fatigue. In any event, jihad was an aspect of military policy and was backed by an extremist fringe. It was never something backed by a popular consensus or popular involvement.

What is Musharraf's profit-and-loss account in all this turbulence? Far from being weakened, the U-turns on Afghanistan and Kashmir have worked to his advantage. He may face a jihadi threat but, given its narrow base, this is bound to peter out in time. To offset this he enjoys the West's solid, if at times carping, support, President Bush's remarks that "President Musharraf is still tight with us" in the fight against terrorism being the latest testimonial in this regard.

Moreover, for external flexibility (another name for U-turns) Pakistan's military ruler has exchanged internal rigidity. The political game plan unfolding in Pakistan is taking place much on his terms. In the new set-up that will emerge from the October elections he will remain the commanding figure - Pakistan's president, army chief and head of the new National Security Council all rolled into one. Faustian bargain, will someone say? From his point of view it has not been a bad exchange.