For someone fond of the word 'strategy' (his favourite noun), General Musharraf has shown a surprising gift for getting the larger picture wrong. It is not the fashion nowadays to recall his mistakes but for half of those he has committed, a civilian leader would have been thrown to the wolves long ago.

A general's uniform is his surest protection. In a country where the praetorian tradition overshadows everything else, politicians are vulnerable (not to mention the fact that often they can be their own worst enemies). But generals are well nigh unassailable simply because the institution they command is so powerful. The only threat to them comes from their own mistakes. Then of course destiny takes over but that is another story.

The relevant fact for us is that soldier-presidents don't like stepping out of uniform, a talisman more potent for them than any constitutional protection. Ayub Khan was an exception but only to a superficial extent. He shed his general's uniform only to assume a field marshal's baton and hence turn himself into a supra-army chief, the capacity in which he took the country hurtling into the 1965 war.

Gen Musharraf's role as high priest of military strategy began on the treacherous slopes of Kargil, an adventure no one in the higher reaches of the Pakistani military cares to remember with much enthusiasm, and has now come to rest on a landscape more political than military in outlook. There is no discarding the uniform. In fact the threatening commando uniform is in danger of becoming the national emblem. But the mission statement has changed: militarism is assuming a political face.

The first year of the Musharraf government was consumed not so much in the pursuit of any grand design - sadly, there was none - but in such fruitless endeavours as curbing smuggling, capturing illegal weapons and carrying out a national tax survey. Initiatives proclaimed with great gusto were quietly shelved when the going got rough, the military having to learn the hard way that homework is essential as much in matters civil as military.

Gen Musharraf's performance at Agra was hailed as a big achievement not so much for what that summit accomplished - ending in acrimony, it accomplished little - as for the forceful manner in which he pleaded the Kashmir cause, especially in his breakfast meeting with Indian newspaper editors. This plain speaking played well back home. But if the criterion to judge this performance be the familiar dichotomy of strategy and tactics, this was a minor triumph leaving no enduring marks on the larger picture.

Gen Musharraf, however, has received the most plaudits for the stance he adopted after September 11. In the annals of Pakistani mythology it is held as a self-evident truth that by heeding American warnings and aligning himself so swiftly with the United States, he saved Pakistan from certain destruction if not utter annihilation. This view which raises a monument to pusillanimity is held strongly by many middle-class, newspaper-reading Pakistanis, a class of people often prone to astonishing levels of gullibility.

The counter-view of course is that Pakistan's military leaders panicked quickly, succumbing to American threats without trying to find out what alignment with the US would entail. In other words, they sold Pakistan cheaply, rendering vital services to the American cause without getting much in return.

Enlisting in the American camp has led to another consequence: the nurturing of an attitude which bids Pakistan be silent on such questions as America's designs on Iraq and the continuing Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians. Where we should have been vocal and vociferous, we are largely mute, the routine noises of a timid diplomacy merely confirming the pro-Americanism born in the aftermath of September 11.

But here an interesting paradox interposes itself. Collective impoverishment of spirit is more than matched by individual gain. Having proved himself a loyal American ally, Gen Musharraf's standing in Washington is high. So much so that he is held up as an example of responsible leadership in the Islamic world.

The referendum decision comes against the backdrop of these high ratings. In different circumstances there would have been no end to the lectures we would have heard on democracy. But now all we are hearing are the echoes of an approving silence, reward for good behavior in Afghanistan. Not that the US has any business passing judgment on our internal affairs (that it does so nonetheless of course being another matter). But the double standards that can come into play are revealing.

Coming to home turf, what masterstroke of strategy is the referendum? What purpose will it serve? That teachers, municipal workers and other government servants are being forced to attend Gen Musharraf's rallies, or that private transport is being forcibly hijacked for the same purpose, are not the points at issue. These are time-honored methods resorted to by every government in similar situations.

The main thing is that even when all the votes are counted and a huge victory is announced for Gen Musharraf on the evening of April 30th, no one in his right senses will be converted to the idea of a constitutional presidency. Constitutionality springs from the constitution and not from any false interpretation of it, even if ratified by the Supreme Court (as is likely to happen once again when the referendum petitions are heard).

Every extra-constitutional deviation in Pakistan's history - from Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of the Constituent Assembly in 1953 to Gen Musharraf's takeover in 1999 has been validated by the superior judiciary. Another validation may salve troubled consciences but will not change public perceptions about how governments are made or unmade in Pakistan.

Seeking judicial or parliamentary approval for dictatorial actions is a mug's enterprise anyway, stemming more from imaginary fears than anything more real. The only thing that can justify dictatorship and even outright tyranny is outstanding achievement as in the case of Mao who was a tyrant in many ways but who will be remembered in history as the builder of modern China. So too with other strongmen from ancient times to modern whose enduring achievements push into the shade their weaknesses or failings. Will Maharaja Ranjit Singh be remembered for his mixed harem of both sexes or for his founding of the Sikh kingdom? Ataturk had much the same tastes (no joking) but it is modern Turkey which remains as his epitaph.

It is the modest dictatorship, bereft of genuine accomplishment, which encounters the acutest problems of legitimacy. Nothing to fall back upon, it falls into the clutches of lawyers. References are made to the Supreme Court whose conclusion even a blind man can see. And questionable devices such as the referendum we currently face are foisted upon the nation. Far from settling anything, more dust is raised.

There is also no escaping unintended consequences. Take the lambasting of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif which Gen Musharraf has made the central plank of his referendum campaign. Far from destroying them, this constant criticism is strengthening their image as formidable counterweights to the military government.

Or take the refrain that the referendum is meant to finish the existing uncertainty in the country, uncertainty, according to Gen Musharraf, spawned by the two icons of Pakistan's failed political order. Apart from giving the two more credit than they deserve, this line of argument gives rise to a troubling question: if uncertainty has not been rooted out in two and a half years what has the military government been doing? And what can Gen Musharraf be trusted to deliver over the next five years? A more damning indictment of military rule is hard to imagine.

Prior to the announcement of the referendum there was no uncertainty in the country, only resignation at the prospect of a Musharraf presidency. It is the call to arms which has quickened the nation's political pulse and caused a ripple effect in static waters. While good in itself this surely was not a consequence sought by the regime's political managers.

The question before the country is not whether Gen Musharraf is a good or bad person. With his openness and engaging manner he is a refreshing contrast to some of the previous figures who have led the country. There should also be no hesitation in saying that he has been remarkably tolerant towards criticism and, despite many curbs, has presided over a political dispensation more relaxed than any other since 1958, which is saying a lot.

The question is different: whether, left to its own devices, the military government can lay the foundations of a stable polity. Alas, the answer is no. The military's record in politics has been disastrous. Nothing in the performance of the Musharraf government lends itself to the hope that the outcome can be any different this time.