PAKISTAN is receiving an object lesson in military efficiency and foresight. What should have been done at the dawn of this dispensation is being attempted now, after almost a year and a half of unrelieved drift and muddle: winning political allies and putting democratic makeup on naked military features.

Anyone could be forgiven for thinking that GHQ would be adept at this ritual. Or that in its inner sanctuary there would be a ready primer for all would-be national saviours: Ten Steps (or less) to Civilianisation. Something on these lines. After all, we are speaking of an event which has acquired all the overtones of a spiritual ceremony: the military marching into the political arena and then, after a suitable interval, seeking a 'democratic' transition. Only now are General Musharraf and his colleagues understanding the necessity of these initiation rites for all budding redeemers.

The efforts afoot to remake the Muslim League so that once again it fulfils its historic role of nanny to a military order are part of this intellectual awakening. The Muslim League, to give it its due, was ready to play this role right after the October Revolution. Given the right signals it would have made short work of the Sharifs. But prey to their own illusions, the generals had other ideas. Thinking they stood in no need of political support, they let the moment pass, thus allowing Kulsoom Nawaz to step into her imprisoned husband's shoes. The remaking of the Muslim League was stalled. It has only now gathered pace with Nawaz Sharif's exit to the Holy Land and the onset of some measure of realism among Musharraf and his knights of the round table.

The switch in Punjab is already done. In other places, including the centre, it should soon follow. Mian Azhar and his 'like-minded' group were reviled as turncoats not long ago. As they begin to straddle the political field they are increasingly seen as winners. Thus do fortunes swing in politics. True, many Muslim Leaguers are still testing the wind and making a virtue of fence-sitting. But they will know which way to jump when the outlines of the emerging game plan become clearer.

One thing though is for sure. Nawaz Sharif is history, this being the inescapable logic of his escape to the Holy Land. Exile and the kingdom: with such exiles kingdoms are not restored. Consider how his fortunes have already diminished. The red-carpet welcome he received was read by simpletons at home as testimony to his continued political relevance. As the days of his exile lengthen, the possibility of a political comeback by him recedes into the distance. Allowing Nawaz Sharif to go and thus burn his boats was the smartest move made so far by the military government. Its dividends in the shape of the Muslim League's remaking can now be seen in a clearer light.

Justice Qayyum or no, Benazir Bhutto too is history. It is not simply that Musharraf and his generals have ordained the expulsion of Benazir or Sharif from politics. Their doom is a consequence of the hubris they displayed when in power. Benazir continues to shout her innocence, her articles and statements being models of prevarication in this regard. It is to no avail. Not only did she and her husband cover themselves deeply in corruption and misrule. They were also blind to the consequences of their actions. Such heedlessness does not go unpunished.

The same holds true of Sharif. Talk of an elective monarchy: that is what, to all intents and purposes, he was aiming at. Not content to have his brother in Punjab and a family favourite in the presidency, he wanted his own man, someone personally loyal to him, as chief of the army. This was his undoing: just a step too far. Returning to power (as in 1997) when the umbrella of democracy still held is one thing, staging a comeback when the rules of the game have changed is different.

To emphasize the eclipse of both these super-democrats is not to revel in their discomfiture or drive more stakes into the heart of the political class. It is to draw attention to an enduring characteristic of military rule in Pakistan. Political parties can fight amongst themselves, they cannot fight the army. One would think this was elementary wisdom except that whenever a military intervention occurs elements in the political class are swept by the illusion that sooner or later military rule will give way before the pressure of objective circumstances. It never happens this way.

Shedding its trappings and acquiring democratic symbols, military rule, after a suitable interval during which there is much talk of reform and renewal, acquires a political colouring. In the two models we have before us--the Ayub and Zia regimes--this is what happened. Barring miracles or acts of God, it promises to be the same again.

Seen in this perspective, Mian Azhar and other veterans of the Muslim League are on the right side of history. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, not to mention his nominee Javed Hashmi, are on the wrong side. Granted that this has been a confused and bumbling government. It could have done things differently, it could have done them better. But bowing to the dictates of necessity, it is finally doing what other military governments before it have done.

That in the process accountability has lost its lustre and is being used as a selective weapon to attain political ends is only natural. When Musharraf seized power only the hopelessly naive thought that accountability would be the chosen instrument of wholesale national cleansing. Khomeini-like accountability beloved of such armchair revolutionaries can only happen in a setting where one class overthrows another, not in the kind of chocolate coups which are the staple of change in Pakistan. Yet there are people who profess feeling betrayed over the course taken by the Musharraf revolution. Simplemindedness of this sort is touching and incurable.

There is also another aspect to this situation. The romantic phase of Pakistani politics is over. There was a time when genuine faith was put in the prospect of change. Great things were expected of Benazir in 1986. Wonders were expected of Sharif in 1997. More dyed-in-the-wool optimists saw the outlines of another Ataturk in Musharraf. Different prophets and redeemers having been tried in quick succession, the national mood is one of resignation.

The atmosphere is thus propitious for any number of political innovations: the retooling of the Muslim League; the dining out of His Holiness the President; the 'election', to popular acclaim, of the Generalissimo as President; the Supreme Court concurring solemnly with the assertion that its deadline has been met and democracy restored.

The religious parties are not an option. They never were. The temper of the Pakistani masses allows only for swimming in the political mainstream, not anywhere near the banks. Zia's rule saw an artificial importance being given to the religious parties. But that was an aberration and things are now returning to normal.

There is no rolling back the October Revolution. The only realistic possibility is to transform it so that its more comic aspects are curtailed. The futility of army monitoring (a bizarre innovation), the demoralization of the bureaucracy as a result, the corps commanders as regional satraps, the multiplying of lines of authority, the army trying to run everything and in the process becoming the butt of popular anger and ridicule: such absurdities cannot be continued indefinitely.

President Musharraf, Prime Minister Muhammad Azhar, His Holiness the Pope back from where he came, to the sound of bugles a change of guard at GHQ, the Muslim League getting a new coat of paint and declaring that it has won back democracy, Benazir getting to be a regular newspaper columnist, Nawaz Sharif wanly weighing the costs of Saudi hospitality: not such a bad scenario. In any event, a vast improvement on the stagnant ditch-water which characterizes the state of the nation today.