AM still in Washington. My health is recovering, but at the speed of a camel's measured plod. Nevertheless, it still seems, or appears, that my recovery is immeasurably speedier than that of the health of our nation.

Over here, the concern of this country is firmly centered around the question of who will be the next president of the US of A. Former secretary of state and master of diplomacy Henry Kissinger's sights are set on the future as is evident from an article of his that has just been published entitled 'The Next President's First Obligation'. Others who have played similar or lesser roles in the political life of the country are following suit. Little thought is given to whether Bill Clinton visits Pakistan or not. It is of no apparent consequence.

Should Clinton's hesitation be caused by his apprehension of a meeting with President R. A. Tarar, or of making an overnight stop in Islamabad, we must excuse him. If he does not descend from the clouds and spend a few hours in our sanitized capital, the heavens will not fall, but he should perhaps take a chance, stop over, meet General Pervez Musharraf and assess for himself the leadership qualities he possesses. Does he present himself as a fundo or not? Is he likely to be an extremist or not? Will he be able to deliver or not?

As for Kissinger, at this time, and taking into account the present rickety state of Pakistan's relationship with the US, we might do well to cast our minds back to the days when pastmaster Kissinger, on behalf of his president, was playing footsie with an earlier military dictator of the Republic of Pakistan, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan.

Firstly, to quote : "Ever since it had come into being, Pakistan had sought a sustained legitimacy. No government after the death of the founder of the state had served out its term. Every change had occurred through some sort of coup; military and civilian governments alternated, with the military dominant." No, this was not written in February of the year 2000. Such was the state of Pakistan in 1970, as observed by Kissinger in his 'White House Years'. What has changed?

Neither has there been much change in US attitudes towards Pakistan. The military alliances formed way back in the days of the Eisenhower administration and Washington's interest in Pakistan cooled noticeably after 1961 when verbal assurances of protection were substituted for military hardware. After the 1965 war, the US stopped the supply of military equipment to both Pakistan and India. When President Johnson became aware of the one-sidedness (since India received arms from its own armouries and from its links with Communist nations) all he did was to promise to transfer some obsolescent American tanks to Pakistan through a third party, and even that transaction was not completed.

In 1970, Kissinger records: "Pakistan's leaders already felt discriminated against because a Harvard professor had been assigned as ambassador to New Delhi while Islamabad rated 'only' a career appointment." However, Richard Nixon was one American president who found the bluff, direct military chiefs of Pakistan, such as General Yahya Khan, far more congenial than the Indian leaders. But amongst the opinion-making groups in the US Pakistan had never found the sympathy that India enjoyed. There were also then, as there are now, hardheaded reasons for the priority attached to US relations with India. Nevertheless, the US did not balk then at using Pakistan for expedient purposes, as it also did not in the 1980s when Afghanistan was a problem, and surely would not balk at doing so again in the 21st century.

In September 1970, Nixon granted an interview to 'Time' magazine. In it he touched upon China, its assumption of a future world role, and how he would like to be a part of it: "If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China, If I don't, I want my children to."

This was the era of Pakistan's budding flirtation with The Middle Kingdom. In October 1970, General Yahya Khan met Nixon in Washington shortly prior to a visit to Beijing. Nixon asked him to convey to China that the US regarded Sino-American rapprochement as essential and that he was ready to send a secret emissary to Beijing, mentioning Kissinger as a possible envoy.

General Yahya went to Beijing in November and three weeks after his return Pakistan's ambassador in Washington, Agha Hilaly, met Kissinger and produced a handwritten missive which he declared could not be handed over but could only be read out. It was a personal message for Nixon from Zhou Enlai who observed that though many messages had been received from the US via various sources, this was the first one to come "from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message." A personal representative of the president was invited to Beijing.

A reply was drafted by Kissinger and handed over to Hilaly on December 16. It made it clear that the US was prepared for high-level talks in China. The Pakistani channel was not activated again until April 27, 1971, when Hilaly delivered to Nixon a handwritten message from Zhou Enlai in which he expressed his gratitude to Yahya and informed Kissinger that the Chinese government was ready to receive publicly in Beijing a special envoy of the US president, or even the president himself should he consider the time ripe, and that proper arrangements were to be made "through the good offices of President General Yahya Khan."

A formal reply to Zhou from Nixon was handed over to Hilaly on May 10 in which he proposed a preliminary secret meeting between Kissinger and Zhou on any date from June 15 onwards. This first meeting was to be 'strictly secret' and would prepare the ground for Nixon's visit to Beijing. In a subsequent exchange of messages it was agreed that Kissinger would fly from Islamabad in a Pakistani Boeing to a Chinese airport not open to the public. The dates fixed were July 9 to July 11.

On the morning of July 8, 1971, Kissinger arrived in Islamabad after visits to Saigon, Bangkok and New Delhi. He lunched with Joseph Farland, the US ambassador, and dined with General Yahya, making much mention of a bad stomach. General Yahya suggested a trip to Nathiagali, away from the heat of Islamabad, where he could recover over the next couple of days, and Kissinger gratefully agreed.

At 0430 on July 9 Kissinger took off from Chaklala in a PIA 707 piloted by General Yahya's personal pilot. At 0800 a dummy motorcade proceeded from Islamabad to Nathiagali. The next day, Kissinger's aides announced that he needed an extra day's rest in the hills and his onward flight schedule was rearranged. Kissinger flew back into Chaklala at 1500 on July 11, drove via a circuitous route on to the Murree Road and thence back to Islamabad as though returning from Nathiagali. By 1800 he was in his own plane heading for Teheran.

Kissinger writes how "boyishly ecstatic" General Yahya Khan was at having pulled off the secret operation. He had personally reviewed each detail of the clandestine departure and arrival and put the full facilities of the Pakistan government at Kissinger's disposal. He asked nothing in return, contrary to media claims at the time; "he performed a great service for our country and it must be recorded that he dealt with us honourably." Nixon thereafter "adopted a somewhat warmer tone toward Pakistan. He and I were profoundly grateful for Pakistan's role as the channel to China. It was a service for which Pakistan's leaders, to their lasting honour, never sought any reciprocity or special consideration." But then "our relations with Pakistan were marked by a superficial friendliness that had little concrete content."

The superficial, as opposed to the concrete, in our particular case at this particular time, still reigns supreme. General Pervez Musharraf must realize that we have few, very few, friends and that nothing can be achieved by isolation.