Ad hocism plus

THE provincial governments are again rushing changes in institutions of governance apparently without due deliberation.

It seems our administration experts are determined not to grow out of their infatuation with ad hocism. The targets are the executive hierarchy in the provinces, the local government system and the police organisation.

The Frontier and Punjab governments recently started appointing regional coordination officers to discharge some of the functions the divisional commissioners used to perform till their posts were abolished under the devolution scheme of 2001. Now in Punjab the Land Revenue Act has been amended to restore the provisions regarding commissioners and other divisional officers.

While little is known about the Frontier government’s relapse into the commissionerate system, some explanation is available in Punjab’s case. It is said that the province’s administrative mechanism had been undermined by the abolition of the posts of commissioners and other divisional functionaries, that a commissioner could oversee the district revenue officers’ work and that he formed a useful bridge between the district and the provincial administrations.

It is obvious that after the restoration of commissioners the provincial heads of some departments will have their workload reduced and it will also be possible to increase the number of posts senior bureaucrats covet. But it is necessary to provide answers to a few basic questions.

Is the finding that the disappearance of the division-level executives had weakened the administrative mechanisms based on intra-executive deliberations or were any opinions from outside also solicited? Even if this finding is valid, is revival of the pre-2001 colonial design the only way out? Was any study done on the restructuring of the board of revenue after the abolition of land revenue or on its replacement with a less cumbersome system for maintaining land records, disposal of colony lands, regulation of horse-breeding grants, et al.?

Will the administration’s expansion stop at the revival of divisional functionaries or will more posts be added to the already overweight administration? And why can the governments not associate elected representatives with the planning of administrative reform instead of seeking their endorsement after the event?

Much less clear are plans to change the local government system. The devolution plan crafted by the Musharraf regime has often been criticised. The imposition of a single formula on all provinces, the exclusion of provincial authorities from the planning process, lack of effective means to regulate the windfalls of district governments, and local governments’ dependence on federal largesse while they have little power to raise their own resources — these have been some of the main grounds of attack.

Also known is the fact that the provincial governments will fight devolution of power to the district level more stubbornly than the centre’s resistance to demands for surrendering some of its powers to the provinces. Further, politicians are wary of a system all military dictators have used to block democratic governance.

While the need to meet these objections is manifest equally obvious should be the need to avoid replacing an arbitrarily devised plan with a similarly conceived alternative. Regardless of authoritarian rulers’ reasons for favouring them, the local government institutions have a pivotal role in raising the edifice of good governance.

The two-tier (federal and provincial) system of governance can answer the demands of neither efficiency nor democracy. Just as the provinces have an irresistible case for the decentralisation of the federation’s powers they will have to accept local governments as a duly defined third tier of constitutional authority. The provinces will do good to themselves and also to the people by approaching the question of local government through public debate and a careful assessment of possibilities of reform and of pitfalls on the way.

Similarly the suggestions being made for changes in the Police Order 2002 should be critically examined. This Order was designed to meet the long-felt need to replace the Police Act of 1861 with a more humane and adequately effective legislation. It was also conceived within the context of the devolution plan. The foundation of provincial governments’ hostility to this measure too was laid in the sponsors’ arrogance in denying them opportunity to be heard during the deliberations for reforms, despite the fact that policing fell within the provinces’ jurisdiction. They were unable to secure changes in the draft of the alternative legislation during the extended public debate on it.

However, the Police Order ran into rough weather soon after its enforcement. The federal authority’s love for its brainchild started waning quite early and it delayed the formation of the Central Public Safety Commission, which was needed to keep a check on the autonomous functioning of the police force, and the provincial governments started nibbling at some of the Order’s healthier provisions. While it was not possible to prevent the inspectors general of police, quite unnecessarily designated as provincial police officers, from supplanting home secretaries as secretaries to provincial governments the chief ministers succeeded in getting their right to superintendence, directly or through chief/home secretaries, recognised.

The police chiefs’ security of tenure, about which the authors of the Order had waxed a great deal, was also abandoned. It can safely be argued that the federal authority considerably weakened its case by failing to ensure the Order’s enforcement with the vigour and earnestness it warranted.

The provinces are now reported to be pressing for undoing the separation of the prosecution branch from the investigation wing. There are also reports of a move to merge the investigation and registration branches. The creation of separate branches for prosecution, investigation and registration functions of the police had been suggested by a number of expert bodies much before the National Reconstruction Bureau’s birth. These suggestions had grown out of many rounds of public debate and addressed the problems of inefficiency and corruption both. It is difficult to endorse the move for restoration of status quo ante in the absence of a cogent and convincing statement of objectives.

That all administrative mechanisms need periodic updating will not be denied. It is also possible that the changes in some key institutions of governance discussed here have been inspired by considerations of public good. But then the way to purgatory is often paved with good intentions. Ad hoc decisions may sometimes prove good but that does not establish a principle.

Sound administrative change must be backed by a considerable body of literature on the subject, a record of broad-based debate, and consultation with the representatives of the people. Pakistan has already suffered much from the tradition of ad hocism. It needs to break away from this style of governance instead of enlarging the scope of ad hocism.

‘Obamania’ and Pakistan

PUBLIC opinion polls, media vibes, and popular sentiment all point to ‘Obamania’ sweeping across America. Barring his becoming the victim of the Bradley effect or dramatic tumult, Barack Hussein Obama is on the verge of history.

The Democratic transition team is already at work for America’s first black president. Thanks to Obama’s widening lead over underdog John McCain, key traditional Republican red states are likely to turn Democratic blue in the country’s most expensive election, costing a staggering $5.3bn. Projections are giving Obama more electoral votes than the magic number of 270 needed to win the White House.

McCain is troubled not just by Obama’s greater appeal on the economy that is expected to be decisive. He has been trying hard to come out of the shadow of George W. Bush. But his biggest political liabilities are turning out to be his own vice-presidential political gamble. All it took to bust the so-called ‘Palin effect’ was two serious television interviews. No wonder, wheels started flying off the Straight Talk Express as McCain’s closest aides openly called Sarah Palin a slow-learning rogue diva who cares only about herself. With Palin’s $150,000 Republican National Committee-funded wardrobe story still scaring away voters, the so-called ‘Palin-McCain strain’ just days before the voting day is nothing short of a disaster.

Besides winning the battleground states, McCain must win the toss-up states — Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, Missouri, Colorado and Nevada — to become the ‘comeback kid’. However, the voter mood seems unfavourable. McCain is either trailing or in a dead heat with Obama in most of these states. Three factors seem to be pushing McCain to defeat — the Bush presidency, the economy and Sarah Palin.

Obama’s slogan of ‘change’ has endeared him to a weary nation caught in the middle of corporate greed and governmental impotency to fix a decadent Wall Street, which has already eaten up tens of billions of dollars of American pension funds. Popular sentiment is that Obama can pull America out of the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression.

In Pakistan, the man on the street could care less about these issues. However, Washington’s foreign policy outlook for the region will remain a focal point for apprehensive Pakistanis. Obama is promising a multi-pronged approach for the region he calls the ‘real front’ of the war on terror.

He is pledging to promote democracy in Pakistan, increase non-military aid to Islamabad, institute greater scrutiny of military aid, strike inside Pakistani territory if and when Islamabad is unwilling or unable to move on actionable intelligence about the presence of high value targets on its soil, send at least two more brigades of US troops to Afghanistan, build pressure on President Hamid Karzai to curb corruption in the Afghan government, control the drug trade, and establish the state’s writ in much of the ungoverned countryside.

He is likely to end the current Karzai-centric US policy for Afghanistan. Obama says the Karzai government has “not gotten out of the bunker” to rebuild the war-torn country.

Obama has repeatedly clarified that he does not support an invasion of Pakistan. However, he is giving broad indications of raising the bar for Islamabad’s ‘performance’ in the war against terror. If Obama’s thinking for Iraq is any indication, he is expected to put greater responsibility on the nations of the region by building their capacity to fight the war in unison with Washington.

America’s 16 intelligence agencies warn that Afghanistan is on a dangerous ‘downward spiral’ and have zeroed in on three major reasons for the worrisome increase in Taliban’s power, namely rampant corruption, the booming heroin trade and increasingly sophisticated attacks from militants based across the border in Pakistan.

As president, Obama would certainly not ignore these findings, and more action against militants and state control over ungoverned territories would be the core demand not just from Pakistan but also Afghanistan. While US pressure would not be new to Pakistan, it could be a bit destabilising for the weak Karzai government. Being the closest US ally, Karzai has rarely been held accountable for letting Afghanistan become the opium capital of the world.

Obama’s ability to rebuild America’s image and to boost and bolster alliances at the international level through mere economic tools would be challenged by resource restraints. This dilemma could affect key American allies. Cash-strapped Pakistan will be no exception. Islamabad could see a longer ‘to-do’ list and tougher scrutiny, especially of military aid. Pakistan’s nearly flat economy would make it more vulnerable and susceptible to pressure from an Obama administration.

An economic meltdown in Pakistan would certainly offer a new foothold to the Taliban and Al Qaeda on its territory. Americans know that Pakistan, which like any other Third World country never contributed to the US economic crisis and yet became its victim, would not be expected to win its part of the war on terror with an empty kitty. An Obama administration will have to pull Islamabad out of its current economic morass before expecting more Pakistani input into the war.

An Obama presidency is expected to bring change, and not just in policies. Early indications in this regard abound. A recent international survey found Obama hugely popular in 17 of the 22 countries surveyed. At home, the mood is changing too. For example, when the Republican conservatives tried to portray Obama as a Muslim, it was aimed at making the voters confused and suspicious. But this negative campaign proved counterproductive as the answer came from powerful personalities such as Colin Powell and influential media outlets like CNN.

During the course of his endorsement of Obama, Powell so rightly noted, “[H]e’s not a Muslim; he’s a Christian; he’s always been a Christian. But the really right answer is, ‘What if he is?’ Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer is ‘No, that’s not America.’”

Powell’s powerful articulation of the true American values is the harbinger of the expected — that change is coming to America. Will Obama make it the mother of all changes — the change of mindset? Only time will tell.

The writer is a US-based journalist.

mjehangir@aol.com

The return of religion

THE return of ideology has taken us all by surprise, because no one expected it all to be about religion. Twenty years ago, when the Berlin Wall fell and it seemed reasonable to suppose that all the big questions about how to organise society had been solved by history, if you had asked what could possibly disrupt this progressive consensus, hardly anyone would have supposed that the answer had anything to do with God.

There may have been a few prescient pessimists who thought Islam would be an important and dangerous disruption on the forward march to the future — perhaps important and dangerous enough to need quelling with a few brisk, punitive expeditions — but even such pessimists could hardly have imagined the fiasco that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have turned out to be, nor 9/11 attacks and the widespread fear and loathing they have produced.

Nor could anyone have foreseen the emergence of the religious right as such a dominant force in American politics and its extraordinary takeover of the Republican party.

But now the Reaganite model of capitalism is collapsing around us, liberal democracy is no longer poised to take over the world but worrying about where and how it may survive — and the arguments about religion are back as fiercely as ever, and almost as popular. This is extraordinary. Communism would not have fallen in the way it did were it not for the passionate Roman Catholicism of the Poles, and even in the other countries of Eastern Europe there were Christian groupings at the forefront of the revolutions of 1989.

Sure enough, the Catholic church in Ireland imploded in scandals, and even in Poland lost much of its influence. The slow etiolation of liberal Protestantism continued. The simple message of hedonistic liberalism — there is probably no God; there is nothing to worry about; enjoy yourselves — seemed in the West entirely self-evident.

The wierdos who didn’t know the enjoyment of this life was all one could hope for were clearly dying off and religion was no more than a “licensed insanity”, in the words of John Bowker, then dean of Trinity College, Cambridge.

What changed? What brought us to the contemporary world, where millions of Muslims, Christians, atheists and Hindus understand the existence of infidels and heretics as an existential threat, against which almost any degree of violence is sometimes justified?

The one thing that almost all intellectuals would now agree on is that other people’s theological and philosophical opinions threaten the continuation of human life, a belief unknown since the cold war. Of course, we all disagree about which beliefs are dangerous. Nor is there any accepted way to resolve these disagreements, or even to live with them.

Part of the answer to what changed is obviously Islam. Without the attacks of September 11, and before them the fatwa on Salman Rushdie, the idea that religion might be dangerous as well as wrong would not be nearly so widespread. But it is also, I think, related to a general realisation that, for whatever reason, the welfare states of western Europe have fallen far short of their original promise.

Marx said: “Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people... The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition that needs illusions.”

I agree, but what if we cannot give up the “condition that needs illusions”? What if the demand to give it up is itself as infantile a piece of wish-fulfilment as anything in anyone’s scriptures? The fear of these questions is surely part of the explanation for the hysterical and apocalyptic tone of some atheists.

Asking these questions doesn’t guarantee an answer, but they suddenly seem pressing, which guarantees that religion will continue its resurrection.

The writer is author of The Darwin Wars and editor of the Guardian’s new faith site.

— The Guardian, London