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The murder of Nawab Ahmed Khan Kasuri haunted Z.A. Bhutto for quite some time, thanks to the repeated accusations of his son Ahmad Raza Kasuri. The federal government appointed Justice Shafiur Rahman to hold a judicial inquiry into the matter, who, after the inquiry, declared Bhutto innocent.
It was found that 7.62mm calibre guns were used in the firing; these weapons had been imported from China to be used by the FSF (Federal Security Force). Despite the discovery of empty shells from the place of ambush, no firm conclusion could be reached regarding the assailant.
Despite his engagements in the capital, Bhutto continued to explore the possibility of achieving nuclear capability. But the most important question in this regard was the availability of nuclear material and its accessories. In March 1974, a few months before Kasuri’s murder, Dr Munir Ahmad Khan of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) along with a small team of scientists was busy in exploring the chances of preparing a nuclear device through conventional methods. They were stationed at Wah Cantt near the army headquarters, Rawalpindi. In the meantime, Pakistan continued its efforts to convince France regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy and finally in April 1974 entered into an agreement for the provision of a reprocessing plant. The plant was proposed to be installed at Chashma on the banks of River Indus.
After India conducted a nuclear blast with ‘Smiling Buddha’ on May 18, 1974, Bhutto expedited his efforts for acquiring nuclear technology, be it from anywhere. The next day (May 19) he declared that Pakistan would never fall victim to Indian nuclear blackmail. The US had already been alerted by some indications that Pakistan was trying to achieve nuclear capability. Pakistan’s efforts were evident from the fact that Bhutto had convened a meeting of scientists immediately after taking over as president. On September 4, 1974, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicted in a secret report that Pakistan would require 10 years to develop nuclear weapons.
The same month brought good news for Bhutto. On September 17, 1974, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan sent a letter through diplomatic mail to Bhutto breaking the news of his achievement at URENCO, the consortium working on the ultracentrifuge technology, and offered his services to Pakistan for utilising his expertise in centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology. He advised Bhutto to “take the uranium route to a nuclear weapons programme”. A very happy Bhutto responded in a very encouraging way and asked Dr Munir Ahmad to call on Dr Qadeer. At the same time the US showed its disinclination to resume arms shipment to Pakistan, which was criticised by Bhutto who wanted to allay US fears about Pakistan’s efforts to make a bomb. Bhutto immediately responded that Pakistan did not want to spend its limited resources on developing nuclear bombs.
At the end of the year Dr Qadeer joined the Pakistani team and began work on developing a uranium enrichment project based on the ultracentrifuge system. As progress was achieved Libya joined Pakistan and entered into a 10-year agreement for creating what the West called the “Islamic Bomb”. Pakistan had contacted France to provide a uranium enrichment plant, which, due to political pressure from the US, refused to fulfil the commitments made earlier even though the money had already been paid. The Jimmy Carter administration did great harm to Pakistan.
Even after that when Pakistani scientists did not stop their work, in early 1976, the then US secretary of state Henry Kissinger tried to dissuade Bhutto from acquiring nuclear technology. Later in August 1976, Kissinger again came to Pakistan with the sole purpose of deterring Pakistan from achieving nuclear capability. Bhutto flatly refused. Apparently an annoyed Kissinger said that it was offensive to the US intelligence when Bhutto insisted that Pakistan needed the reprocessing plant for its energy needs. Bhutto also told Kissinger that the US should not insist that Pakistan give up the reprocessing plant.
Right from the very beginning the US was sure that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was aimed towards making a bomb. Later, in the final round, when the elections of 1977 were being hotly manoeuvred, Kissinger made it clear that if Bhutto did not desist he would make a horrible example of him. Despite all this Pakistan continued with its work; it is yet not known whether it was the bomb which led to Bhutto’s downfall or something else.
Qadeer and his team successfully used the centrifuge system to accomplish the task and on May 28, 1998, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests. By then, Bhutto had gone, Ziaul Haq had died and it was Nawaz Sharif who broke the good news to the nation. A year later he was ousted by General Pervez Musharraf.
