MORE than a year since Operation Khyber-II was concluded, Operation Khyber-III has begun. Relatively small in scale but focused on harsh terrain in the Tirah region, the operation once completed should help deny militants movement between the Khyber and Kurram agencies. Moreover, it will take the military directly to the border with Afghanistan. Small-scale in this case makes for significant gains. The Tirah region’s recent association with militant groups is well known: from the TTP to sundry foreign militants and from the Mangal Bagh-led Lashkar-i-Islam to the TTP splinter Jamaatul Ahrar, some of the toughest and most tenacious militant groups have operated in the region. Operation Khyber-III then is not just a logical follow-up to Khyber-II; its impact should be felt in Peshawar too, which remains vulnerable to militancy in Khyber because of its proximity to the tribal areas. Border management should also get a boost as having troops physically near the frontier can restrict the militants’ cross-border movement.

Necessary as military operations may have become in Fata, they are no long-term panacea. The various phases of the Khyber operation have followed a relatively clear and coherent plan, but at no point have they been supplemented by necessary civilian measures. And while resettlement of the two Waziristan agencies and Khyber has been a priority, next door Kurram has been seen returning IDPs underserved and unassisted. The interconnectedness of the militancy problem in Fata and beyond — militants displaced from one area have moved to other unsecured, less-governed spaces — has still not been addressed in a systematic way. The military has proved that it has both the skill and the will to clear and hold terrain in counter-insurgency operations and it has done so thanks to the bravery of its solders. But a return to relative normality for the people of insurgency-hit areas is proving elusive.

The problem is not hard to identify, but the solution is not easy. Whether by design or by force of circumstance, the military has displaced a weak civilian-run administration and taken over much of the rebuilding effort. But physically rebuilding an area may not be enough for long-term rehabilitation. Civil and social structures need to be rebuilt too. Well-meaning as the military’s efforts may be, then, they cannot be a replacement for a civilian surge. But the civil-military imbalance makes it hard for the two to work together at the level needed if Fata is to become a stable, post-conflict region. Old problems continue to bedevil new challenges.

Published in Dawn, August 22nd, 2016