TWO months after the fall of Kunduz reverberated around the region and internationally, another Afghan province is in trouble. Parts of Helmand province are virtually under the control of the Afghan Taliban and it appears only a matter of time before a major district falls.

The fighting appears to be following a familiar pattern. The Afghan state has been unable to prevent incremental gains by the Taliban, making the area vulnerable to a seemingly sudden and spectacular collapse. The reasons too appear to be familiar.

Afghan security forces are under-resourced and low on morale, while the assistance of the foreign fighting forces is too small to prevent a Taliban takeover. If provincial collapse or the fall of key districts does happen, the response may also look familiar: global alarm will lead to the government in Kabul, with the assistance of the US, assembling a force strong enough to beat back the Taliban, at least temporarily.

But Helmand is not Kunduz. It is in the heart of the Taliban-influenced south Afghanistan, and not the distant north. Helmand also shares a border with Pakistan and as such could cause fresh tensions in the Pak-Afghan relationship.

Also read: President Ghani urged to save Helmand from falling to Taliban

Curiously, the fighting in Helmand, and thus the continuing of the so-called fighting season deep into December, does not appear to have dampened talk of an early resumption of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Nor does continuing uncertainty over the unity and cohesion of the Taliban appear to have impacted the insurgency; indeed, it seems to have grown only stronger and more potent. Talk and fight — or perhaps, more accurately, fight and talk — appears to be the new Taliban strategy, borrowed directly from the pages of the strategy that the US has been trying to get the Afghan government to implement in recent times.

It must surely be worrying for the administration of President Ashraf Ghani, and his partners and supporters inside and outside Afghanistan that the Taliban are mimicking state strategy better than the state itself is able to perform. The continuing Taliban onslaught will also likely further strain intra-administration and inter-institutional tensions in Afghanistan.

One half of the national unity government is quite openly opposed to the other half’s preference for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and outreach to Pakistan. Meanwhile, the intelligence apparatus, even after the recent resignation of the NDS chief, remains deeply suspicious of and hostile towards both the Taliban and Pakistan.

For Pakistan, the unfolding events in Helmand should be yet another reason to continue pursuing the twin approach of keeping the lines of communication with Kabul open while nudging the Taliban to the negotiating table.

If Pakistan does both on a sustained basis, it may help address many of the suspicions of true state policy. The twin approach is also the right and sensible thing to do.

Published in Dawn, December 22nd, 2015