TWO days of talks — not peace talks, but akin to exploratory talks — between representatives of the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban facilitated by Qatar and the Pugwash Conferences have yielded at least some positive headlines on Afghanistan.

This is a relief considering that news from that country has been, of late, dominated by the spring offensive of the Taliban and a deteriorating security situation. There are at least three points to be made here.

First, as ever, the signs from the Taliban camp are mixed. That the talks took place at all suggests that there are at least some in the camp who wish to at least consider what can be offered to them at the negotiating table.

Know more: Afghan representatives agree on reopening Taliban political office

Hence the reiteration that “the delisting of blacklisted Taliban would facilitate the peace process. Political prisoners should be released”, in the official Pugwash report.

There is also an oblique mention in the report of the possibility of revisiting the “structure of the political system (and the constitution of Afghanistan)”. In terms of possible concessions by the Afghan Taliban, there is mention of the “value of education for both men and women”.

However, it does appear that there remains within the Taliban a significant group that is opposed to the very idea of negotiations. “Everybody agreed that foreign forces have to leave Afghanistan soon” is effectively code for representing the views of the hardliners among the Taliban, who have long argued that they can achieve total victory and once again establish their version of an Islamic caliphate.

It remains to be seen how the debate between the hardliners and the moderates among the Taliban is resolved. Second, there is a growing sense that Pakistan does not have — or will not use — leverage with the Afghan Taliban in order to nudge them towards the negotiating table.

The view offered from Pakistan is increasingly a more cautious one: what the world, the Afghan government and the US in particular, expected of Pakistan, the latter never really had to offer to begin with.

The view from outside Pakistan, and particularly in Kabul, is likely to be far more sceptical, with the suspicion remaining that Pakistan continues to ally itself with the strategic goals of the Afghan Taliban. The truth likely lies somewhere in between.

Third, there is the question of modalities: if talks ever advance to the stage where peace can be negotiated, what would a power-sharing agreement in the south and northeast — strongholds of the Taliban and its allies — look like?

Tinkering with the constitution would only resolve the legal aspects of it. On the ground, in practice, could a government in Kabul and the Afghan Taliban find a way of carving out separate zones of influence under the banner of a united Afghanistan? Further talks expected to take place next week may provide more answers.

Published in Dawn, May 6th, 2015

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