BIG decisions are unlikely to come from a single Cabinet Committee on National Security meeting. But Tuesday’s meeting was significant because it was the first since a new military leadership was installed late last month. Unhappily, the old tradition of saying little of substance after national security discussions and leaving everyone to guess as to what was debated and decided has continued with the new CCNS. So the official statement released after the meeting had to be parsed for clues about the state of civil-military relations, how the known differences in approach to dealing with the TTP were squared or resolved and what to expect next on the India, Afghanistan and Fata/KP fronts. At least the clues that can be gleaned are positive.

The reiteration of the government’s talks-first approach to dealing with the TTP was unsurprising. But there is a sense that — with the TTP routinely rejecting the possibility of dialogue and the government’s talks strategy stuck in limbo — for the first time some attention was paid to the possibility that if the talks-first approach fails, the state would have to consider other steps to deal with the TTP threat. In that regard, the reaching out to India after the CCNS gathering in the shape of seeking the much-delayed meeting between the two countries’ DGMOs and mentioning the need to focus on the security of Fata while beefing up the checks on cross-border movement suggest an impending military focus anew on the Fata region. While the words ‘military operation’ may be anathema to the government at the moment, hoping for the best and preparing for the best are not a viable strategy alternative.

Problematic as ever is the government’s articulation of its talks-first approach: now the country has learned that the state is reaching out to multiple groups at the same time instead of just focusing on the umbrella TTP network and its leadership. The government may even argue that putting out feelers on multiple fronts will help bring down violence inside Pakistan quickly — but does that in fact aid or impede a long-term settlement? If ending militant violence is the aim of talks as the government claims, how will a number of micro deals be policed and enforced? Which brings the issue back to the CCNS. Having a formal structure for debating and formulating national security policy is definitely a step in the right direction, but the process will yield little unless the ideas being discussed are well-thought-out and based on reality. The government has yet to convince the country of the theoretical soundness and practicality of its strategy against militancy.