A landmark event

THE start of negotiations on Turkey’s membership of the European Union this week is a landmark event with important strategic and global implications. By keeping its pledge to launch entry talks with Turkey on October 3 and accepting that a Muslim country — albeit one with a secular constitution — can join its ranks, the EU has sent a powerful message of diversity, renewal and self-confidence which can only impress both friends and foes. For its part, by staying the course of reform and patiently knocking on EU doors for over 40 years, Turkey has shown it is seriously committed to further modernization and change. It is unfortunate that the start of the historic negotiations was chaotic, confused and marred by unseemly, last-minute EU squabbles and unexpected delays. For weeks, EU ambassadors bickered over how best to encourage a normalization of Turkey’s troubled relations with Cyprus. Once that issue was settled, Austria made last-minute demands that Turkey be offered a privileged partnership instead of full membership. As Vienna flexed its muscles at the last-ditch EU crisis talks in Luxembourg — and other EU states watched anxiously from the sidelines — the rift in Europe over the merits and disadvantages of Turkish membership was laid bare in front of a watching world. On one side of the divide stand the old guard politicians of Europe who continue to believe that opening the doors to a Muslim nation will destroy Europe’s traditions and culture and end up wrecking the process of EU integration.

More forward-looking European policy-makers, however, reject such prophecies of doom and believe Turkish accession will invigorate and strengthen the EU. The EU stands to benefit generously by embracing Turkey. Europe’s global reputation will certainly secure a much-needed fillip and relations with other Muslim nations in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood are bound to improve. Also, by reaching out to Turkey, EU governments have sent a message of reassurance to about 20 million Muslims who remain unsure about their future in Europe. After this summer’s rejection of the new EU treaty by French and Dutch voters, the start of Turkish entry talks is also badly-needed proof that the Union is still able to take decisive action. Turkey also comes out a winner. Ankara’s 42-year-old campaign to join the Union has been marked by rapid political and economic reforms. The process of change is likely to speed up even further during the accession negotiations. Economic benefits include a boost in trade, more investments flowing in and a feel-good factor likely to further bolster the national economy.

The road ahead is going to be difficult, however. Turkey will not get an easy ride. Opposition to Ankara’s EU accession remains rife in many parts of Europe, with politicians of all hue and colour still insisting that Turkey is simply too big, too poor and too Muslim to become a full-fledged EU member. Many ordinary Europeans also fear Turkey’s entry will lead to the “Islamization” of Europe and make Muslims in Europe even more assertive in making demands on their host country governments. The negotiations themselves will be gruelling and technical and may last for 10 to 15 years. During this painful process, there is a danger that anti-EU feeling may grow in Turkey as Brussels steps up demands for unpopular reforms. But while difficulties undoubtedly lie ahead, this is the moment to celebrate a rare EU success story — and equally rare proof that the divide between cultures, traditions and religions can be overcome.

Lowering of GDP estimate

The lower estimate of Pakistan’s estimated economic growth for 2005-06 by the Asian Development Bank will hopefully be noted with some concern by policymakers in Islamabad. The ADB has specifically cited the record high oil prices as one of the primary reasons for the slowdown in economic growth. Domestically, the oil price spiral could further fuel inflation, offsetting the government’s objective of containing it through a tightening of monetary policy as evidenced in the recent raising of interest rates. The impact of higher oil prices in the world market means that expenditure on oil imports will rise, widening the trade deficit. Imports are estimated to rise by a substantial 18 per cent but this is not all that bad since part of the reason for this is increased GDP growth. More machinery and other inputs are being imported, meaning that productive capacity is at least being enhanced and that should help sustain future growth.

Key to containing inflation, which at its current level means that real GDP growth is almost zero, is the balancing act the government will have to perform with regard to oil prices. Besides, the ADB’s analysis does not take into account other consequences of high oil prices such as a significant lowering of real earnings of the low- and middle-income segments of the population. While the government has quite sensibly embarked on a plan to explore alternative sources of energy and to promote CNG use in the country, the effects, if any, on overall oil imports are unlikely to emerge in the short term. The other issue of concern is the budget deficit. Tax revenues are estimated to increase by about 17 per cent but a large part of the budget goes into administrative costs and defence spending. If some fiscal space can be created, perhaps by an austerity drive in government and by lowering defence spending, the resources freed could fund much-needed socio-economic development.

The sighting suspense

ON Tuesday evening, millions of the faithful lingered on in mosques even after the Isha prayers were over, because they did not know whether to offer Taraveeh. It was only when PTV announced in its 9 pm news bulletin that the Ramazan moon had not been sighted that people left the mosques. The suspense continued until nine at night when the chairman of the Ruet-i-Hilal Committee (RHC) finally made the committee’s decision known to the people. The RHC bases its decision on eyewitnesses accounts. The witnesses must be reliable according to the Islamic standards of piety. If the horizon is cloudy and no reliable witness reports sighting the moon, the RHC makes a decision. The sighting of the moon with the naked eye has been the practice since the early days of Islam when modern technology for observing the movement of heavenly bodies was not available. Today, technology has reached a stage where sunset and sunrise, solar and lunar eclipses, and the movement of planets can be predicted with astounding accuracy. Yet it is a measure of the Muslim world’s approach to such things that it still considers eyewitnesses as the best way to determine whether a new lunar month has begun.

For starting the month of Ramazan, the Holy Quran itself prescribes no procedure. It says: “The month of Ramadan in which was revealed the Quran, a guidance for mankind, and clear proofs of the guidance, and the Criterion (of right and wrong). And whosoever of you is present, let him fast for the month....” (Al Baqra: 180). The contradiction, however, is that those insisting on “sighting” observe all iftar, sehri and prayer timings by astronomical calculations. In fact, printed charts of prayer, iftar and sehri timings are to be found in most mosques and many homes. It is time the OIC addressed this issue and tried to develop a consensus with the help of the ulema.

Hard facts about the Durand Line

CLOSE on the heels of the Pakistani proposal to fence the mountainous and rugged border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the recent statement of the governor of the Frontier province, Mr Khalilur Rehman, that after one hundred years the Durand line border agreement between Pakistan and the erstwhile British Indian government had expired in 1993 has baffled many. As usual there has been a cryptic denial.

It is not for the first time that the question of Durand Line has come to public attention. In fact, Afghan rulers repeatedly raised this issue whenever it suited their interests. However, the discussion has always reflected a partisan attitude. The Durand agreement should be examined in the light of the available facts; the interested parties point of view, and the legal position on the subject.

After successfully negotiating a border agreement with the Russians, Amir Abdur Rehman wrote in March 1891 to the viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, that he thought steps should be initiated to open negotiations for the demarcation of the boundary between British India and Afghanistan, and requested that a high-ranking official be sent to Kabul for preliminary discussions. The two sides agreed on Sir Mortimer Durand who was foreign secretary for India in the Delhi government. After negotiations spread over more than two months, a border agreement known as the Durand agreement was signed on November 12, 1893.

The agreement has seven clauses. The first pertains to the territorial limits of the agreement, while the second specifies the obligations of the two sides, stipulating that the British government “will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.”

Clause three refers to territorial adjustments, the British agreeing to the Amir retaining Samara and the valley above it and the Birmal tract and the Amir agreeing that he will not interfere in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral valley and relinquishing his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar and Chageh. Clause four refers to the functions of the joint commission that will demarcate the boundary, and clause five to the demarcation of the boundary in parts of Balochistan. Clause six refers to the mechanism to be adopted in case of any differences regarding the demarcation. The final clause refers to the increase in subsidy of the Amir and the British government having no objection to the Amir’s purchasing and importing arms and ammunition, in fact promising help.

It is evident that the agreement took care of all matters, which were a source of disagreement between the two countries, particularly in relation to the sphere of influence that each side exercised in the tribal belt. Amir Abdur Rehman in his biography expresses his full satisfaction about the agreement.

Many experts on the subject consider the Durand agreement as one of the best, encompassing all problems and issues confronting the two contracting parties at the time of its signing. However, some aspects of the agreement have to be kept in mind while analysing it. For instance, the agreement is silent on its duration. Would it be operative for 10 years, 20, 50 or 100 years? Similarly, it does not provide any mechanism for amending, revising or revoking it. The inevitable conclusion is that the agreement is in perpetuity and can be renegotiated or revoked only with the mutual consent of the two contracting parties.

The one aspect of the agreement which created many problems in subsequent years and which compels one to conclude that enough attention was not paid to essential details was that the agreement divided the same tribe in an unnatural and perhaps arbitrary manner, giving the control of a section of a tribe to one country and the other to another. In some cases half a dwelling was in Afghanistan and the other half in British India.

Notwithstanding this, the intriguing fact is that neither the Afghans nor the British and not even the affected tribes raised any serious objections or did anything to rectify this anomaly. In fact the two governments confirmed the validity of the agreement in a number of subsequent agreements.

This narrative will be incomplete without analysing the reasons, which compelled the Afghan government to express reservations about the Durand agreement in subsequent years. In fact, between 1893 when the agreement was signed and until the announcement of the partition plan on June 3,1947, Afghanistan had raised no serious objection to the agreement or lamented the so called “miserable plight of the Pushtoons “on the Indian side of the border.

In fact, the first indirect reference was made to the border agreement by the Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Khan in a press interview on June 21, 1947, when he said that “if an independent Pukhtoonistan cannot be established then the Frontier Province should join Afghanistan,” thus trying to nullify the border agreement. Raising this question on the eve of the partition of India the Afghan leadership of the day thought that the nascent state of Pakistan would not be in a position to sustain itself for a long time and that, therefore, it was a good time to stake a claim to the contiguous territory. They were also encouraged by the pronouncements of some leaders belonging to the Frontier Province whose objection to the creation of Pakistan falling on deaf ears had then advanced the idea of an independent entity for the Pushtoons.

The various other reasons given by the Afghan leadership from time to time about the invalidity of the Durand Line were: (a) the agreement was extracted from the Afghan Amir through duress; (b) the tribal areas were never a part of the Indian empire so how could the British decide about their fate; (c) the Pushtoons were a separate entity from other Pakistanis with a distinct culture, language, customs and traditions, and had more affinity with the people on the other side of the Durand Line, the Durand Line was an arbitrary line, which divided tribes and people in an unnatural way and therefore had no sanctity and (e) the Durand Line had lapsed with the departure of the British from the subcontinent

One of these objections that the agreement was extracted as a result of duress and that it lapsed with the exit of the British from the Indian subcontinent, should be debated. That the agreement was signed as a result of coercion or duress is not borne by facts, as it was the Amir himself who had asked the viceroy of India to negotiate the border agreement. The subsequent confirmation of the agreement by successive rulers of Afghanistan is a testimony to the fact that the rulers of Afghanistan were satisfied with the agreement and considered it as beneficial for their country.

The agreement of 1905 has this to say about the Durand Agreement: “His Majesty does hereby agree to this that in the principles and in matters of subsidiary importance of the treaty regarding internal and external affairs and of the engagements which His Highness my late father concluded and acted upon with the exalted British government, I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and compact and I will not contravene them or any dealing or any promise.”

Article 5 of the 1919 states as follows, “The Afghan government accepts the Indo-Afghan Frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation, by a British commission, of the undemarcated portion of the line west of Khyber and to accept such boundary as the British may lay down.” The treaty, ratified on February 6, 1922, (signed on November 22, 1921) at the time of Amir Amanullah Khan who had secured complete independence for Afghanistan after the third Afghan war, in Article 2 states as follows, “The two high contracting parties mutually accept the Anglo- Afghan Frontier as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article 5 of the treaty concluded on 8th August in Rawalpindi.

Thus it is crystal clear that successive Afghan governments accepted the Durand agreement willingly and without any reservations.. Even King Zahir Shah who ruled Afghanistan for 40 years did not refer to the Durand Line when on May 30, 1947, only four days before the announcement of the partition plan, he announced that his government was considering the revision of its boundary with the Soviet Union.

On the second point international law is very clear. According to the principal of ‘res transit cum suo onere,’ treaties of the extinct states concerning boundary lines remain valid and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve upon the absorbing state. Regarding the establishment of an independent state for the Pushtoons, it would have assumed some credibility if the Afghan rulers had included the southern and eastern regions of their country in the contemplated state. The fact that the Line has divided tribes, though valid, has been fully exploited by the shrewd tribesmen who on the plea of affinity travel freely to both sides of the border with minimum formalities.

A convincing explanation about international borders has been offered by Sir Fraser-Tytler, a consummate diplomat and the author of a widely acclaimed book on Afghanistan in the following words “The recognition of the existence, sanctity, and the permanence of frontiers is one of the foundations on which the law of nations has been built. Frontiers are a real fact of international law; once negotiated and laid down, they cannot be denounced and torn up. They are there on the ground, ascertainable at any time by geographical surveys, and unalterable save by mutual agreement or by force majeure”. In the case of the Durand Line also, only one of these two options is available to the parties.

The writer is a former ambassador.