Contextualizing Afghan War

THE CNN chief’s advisory to his company to balance footage of civilian casualties in Afghanistan with Taliban terrorism is — mildly stated — shocking. Perhaps he has not seen footage of traumatized children’s faces scarred by bomb shrapnel. Perhaps he has not seen footage of children’s body parts amidst US bomb fragments.

Or, perhaps, he has seen them and identifies them with the terrorists. Or, perhaps, he considers them to be acceptable collateral damage in the pursuit of terrorists. That the US war in Afghanistan is even more unjustified and immoral than the one in Vietnam was apparent. The CNN chief’s cold-blooded advisory confirms the fact. This immoral war deserves to be opposed by every Pakistani without qualification, even if it amounts to — by default — support for the Taliban. There are two compelling reasons for this position. One, this is not a war against terrorism or for the defence of freedom or civilization; rather, it is a war for achieving strategic economic and political objectives for the exclusive benefit of the United States and its western allies. And two, the removal of the Taliban regime through war will have disastrous consequences for Pakistan.

There are two principal protagonists in the war: the US and its allies, on the one hand, and the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and the Pakistani religious parties, on the other. The former has presented the war as a ‘crusade’ against terrorism and a defence of freedom and civilization. The latter have portrayed it as a ‘jihad’ for Islam. Both positions are untenable.

The war has nothing to do with Islam or Christianity. The US government represents the interests of multinational corporations, whose profit motive drives them to exploit and oppress all the people, regardless of their religion. After all, the US bombed the Christian Serbs to save the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. It did so because it served their strategic interests. Moreover, the ulema can hardly claim to represent the interests of the Muslims. After all, during the conflict in Afghanistan during 1979-89, the same religious leaders served the US faithfully and caused over 20 lakh Muslim men, women and children to die or be maimed for life.

The resort to war by the US and the targeting of Afghanistan is totally unjustified. Not a single hijacker in the September 11 attack was an Afghan. Yet, it is Afghanistan that is being made to pay for the crimes of other nationals. The war is not against terrorism or for the defence of freedom. Rather, it is itself an act of terrorism and it is an aggression against the freedom of the people of countries which happen to own vast natural resources. The objective of netting the terrorists could have been achieved by political means. These were never tried. This is because the achievement of strategic objectives required a war.

The US government has no political morality as far as its international conduct is concerned. It does not present a principled opposition to terrorism. It is quite comfortable with terrorism, provided it is directed on its behalf against its opponents. It is only opposed to terrorism if it is directed against itself or against its interests. After all, it is actually guilty of introducing terrorism in our region. If Osama bin Laden is a terrorist today, he was also a terrorist in the 1980s as an ally of the US. If Mulla Omar is guilty of harbouring him, Ronald Reagan was guilty of sponsoring him. Both stand condemned in equal measure.

The US is also quite comfortable with religious fundamentalism if it serves its interests. Had the Taliban played according to the rules set down by the US, they would not have been faulted to the point of vicious bombardment. After all, social and political conditions in Saudi Arabia are only marginally better. Yet, they have never stirred the conscience of the US government. But then, the Saudi regime agrees to play by US rules.

US objectives are far more strategic than elimination of terrorism. Ten years ago, the US assembled an international coalition to attack Iraq and forced it out of Kuwait. However, the bombing of Iraq continues as a periodic routine on the grounds that Saddam Hussein is still a danger. US electronic intelligence is sophisticated enough to know which palace and which bedroom Saddam Hussein is sleeping on any particular night. It would take just a click of a mouse to exterminate him.

Yet, he lives on; because a live Saddam is a threat to the monarchist regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and they continue to need US military protection — for a price, of course. Needless to say, the price is continued flow of oil to the West at prices determined by the buyers! In a similar vein, the bombardment of Afghanistan can also go on for another 10 years.

The attack on Afghanistan is a repeat of the Gulf War and the Balkan wars in terms of its objectives. The placement of US troops in the Gulf since 1991 has secured oil supplies for the present. And the fragmentation of Yugoslavia has enabled the US to secure a corridor for a projected oil pipeline for the future.

The thousands of lives lost was acceptable collateral damage for the US. Likewise, the assault on Afghanistan has enabled the US to force Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to grant it military facilities, if not bases. The war is intended to secure a corridor for a projected oil pipeline for the future. The bases will also be crucial in the future confrontation with the emerging superpower — China. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are merely intermediate inputs towards achieving US policy output.

The economic sovereignty and political independence of our entire region is at stake. The fragmentation of Afghanistan — a la Yugoslavia — is a real danger and will cause havoc for the entire region, including India. That will merely be acceptable collateral damage for the US; for us, it will be our lives and our future.

If the US is genuinely committed to the eradication of terrorism and the defence of freedom, it can move towards its objectives through political means. One such political measure would be the promotion of democracy in all the countries of the world and in the world order. In a democracy, dissent can be voiced through the loudspeaker. In the absence of democracy, dissent tends to be voiced through the barrel of a gun. The absence of democratic instruments of expression of dissent and of formulating state policy creates a grey area of legitimacy for dissidents. Even those recognized as criminals acquire popular acclaim if they are seen to have acted against a despotic regime, domestically or internationally.

Had there been democracy in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden or any other dissident could have formed an opposition political party and campaigned for their views. This option is not available in Saudi Arabia and indeed in most Muslim states. If democratic choice is made available to the people of Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir, there will be no militancy there either.

Democracy in Pakistan would never have led to the situation that has arisen in Afghanistan. The vast majority of the people of Pakistan have never countenanced religious bigotry. Unlike India, the Pakistani electorate deserves to be credited with the fact that, in all the elections that have been held since 1970 to date, the religious political parties have never been given more than eight per cent of the vote. A democratic government in the 1980’s would never have found it in its interest to mobilize the most retrogressive elements on behalf of the US to fight in Afghanistan. And an effectively democratic government in the 1990s would never have promoted an 11th century minded force like the Taliban.

Even today, an effective democratic government — unencumbered by intelligence agencies — would ensure that the Taliban government is denied official funding, arms and other support and that the madrassahs — the fountainhead of Taliban support — are denied official patronage and support. But a democratic government would not be amenable to US needs for taking care of its dirty laundry in the region. The US needs monarchist and military regimes in the region and cannot be expected to support democratic movements.

The second reason for opposing the US war in Afghanistan is its fallout on Pakistan. The war has already strained the socio-political fabric of the country. The Bahawalpur massacre is merely an opening move in the unravelling of the social and political entente. The removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is an objective of all liberal, progressive Afghans and of the free world. However, whether the current move and the method to dislodge them is advisable is a moot point. Whenever there is foreign aggression, moderates within a government and opponents outside it lose their political ground and have to line up behind the hard-liners. This is precisely what happened in the US in the aftermath of September 11. This is precisely what the US bombing of Afghanistan is doing and will do in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. The goal of effectively removing the Taliban has become all the more remote.

It is also pertinent to ask who and what will replace the Taliban? Two decades of ravages that Afghanistan has suffered at the hands of the Soviet army, the American CIA, and the Pakistani ISI has torn their political fabric apart. Post-Taliban Afghanistan will fracture into different regions under the control of different warlords, leading to a repeat of the 1989-96 situation; with one very significant difference. This time one of the elements in the new civil war will be the Taliban. Pushed out of Kabul and the cities, they will retreat to the mountains of Afghanistan and the mosques and madrassahs of Pakistan. They will wage their war in Afghanistan along with an attempt to gain a political and military foothold in Pakistan. Unlike during 1979-89, Pakistan will become part of the active war zone. The battle for the re-Talibanization of Afghanistan will also become the battle for Talibanization of Pakistan.

Fall in trade deficit

THE United States is poised for its tenth interest rate cut this year or the third one since September 11 terrorist attacks. It is designed to prevent the economic downturn that began last year degenerating into a real recession with its global fall-out.

The Federal Reserve is expected to bring the fund rate, which determines the interest rate charged by banks, to 2 per cent — the lowest in four decades. The fund rate has dropped by 4 per cent in 2001, and brought down the three-month money market rate to 2.14 per cent from 6.60 per cent within a year to fuel the revival of the economy which has been slipping after a decade of boom in the 1990s.

In addition President Bush has been acting on the fiscal front with real alacrity. He had announced substantial tax cuts after coming into office in January and also sent tax refund cheques to the tax-payers. And now in as a part of the post-September 11 economic strategy the US Congress is debating another fiscal stimulus package that may cost around 75 billion dollars so that the people can spend more, increase demand, raise industrial production and refloat the economy.

Such steps are being taken in feverish haste to prevent further rise in unemployment rate, which at 5.4 per cent now is the highest in 20 years. The manufacturing sector which has been taking a heavy beating for long has to be helped to invest more and reverse the declining production trends.

Compared to the US, the unemployment and grossly under-employed rate in Pakistan is 15 to 20 per cent, and the people in Pakistan do not have the social security net of the US. And yet we are too slow in coming up with remedial measures. And that is because of our excessive dependence on external aid for taking any significant initiative. And now it seems we can’t take any meaningful move without the prior approval of the IMF as on that hangs our immediate economic future.

In fact, even the relief announced officially or indicated the government has not been able to pass on to the people or ensure the intended beneficiaries really gain by that. The State Bank of Pakistan has reduced its rate for short term lending to banks to 10 per cent from 12 per cent; but the banks are too slow to pass that on to the borrowers.

Unlike in the Western countries led by the US tax cuts for economic revival in Pakistan are out of question as the IMF would not countenance that. It wants the budget deficit not to be brought below the agreed 4.9 per cent, and not to the 5.3 per cent which the government now seems to prefer in view of the post-September 11 fall in revenues.

And let apart tax cuts the exporters are not able to get the refund of duties and sales tax paid in the agreed time. Exporters are bitter they are not able to get the refund of Rs 12 billion promised by Commerce Minister Razak Dawood and are taking out newspaper advertisements to make the CBR expedite the repayment.

Normally, in addition to appealing to foreign governments like those of the US and European Union to increase the access of Pakistani product to their markets the government should have taken positive steps to help individual exporters with their new problems. Their lot is made more difficult by the fact they have to pay stiff war risk insurance, higher port charges and higher banking charges. But despite the earnestness of Razak Dawood to be helpful to the exporters the government machinery as a whole is not being as helpful as it should be.

However the trade deficit during the first four months of this financial year ending October at 275 billion dollars is not as bad as feared earlier. The exports at 3.025 billion dollars have shown an improvement of 19 per cent over the same period last year, while imports at 3.3 billion dollars marked a fall of 11 per cent. Even in the difficult month of October exports were 761 million dollars which meant an improvement of 2.2 per cent over October last year. The trade deficit has been reduced by the fall in world oil prices, and a drop in prices of other imports of Pakistan and reduced imports overall because of the post- September 11 global crisis.

In this context our inability to take positive economic initiatives to improve our lot has been spotlighted by our omnibus external dependence. The Asian Development Bank is to give 950 million dollars as assistance to Pakistan in this calender year which means an increase of 324 million dollars over what it gave earlier and that will be on fast-track basis, says Tadao chino, president of the Bank. Of that 350 million dollars is to be concessional loan.

Look at the range of assistance we are seeking from the ADB it will cover poverty reduction, financial sector reforms, judicial reforms, development funding and environmental protection Mr Chino is very complimentary to Pakistan for the manner it is implementing various reforms. We can only hope as we seek and get loans for more reforms in more areas we will make a real success of those reforms, and make re-structuring of the system truly effective.

Two major external developments are of significance to Pakistan in the economic sector now. The first is the current move to form an East Asia Free Trade Area comprising the ten ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea with a population over two billion. The move originally made by Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia was last year given a boost by China at the ASEAN summit, and is to make further headway at Bandar Seri Begawan in Malaysia where the ASEAN summit plus 3 is taking place now.

In that part of the world there is the North American Free Trade Area, and then the far larger Asia Pacific Economic cooperation (APEC) in addition to the expanding ASEAN which has ten members. And now China, Japan and South Korea are wanting to join that and form the East Asia free Trade Area.

Pakistan feels left out of such trade blocs. The SAARC of which it is a member has made no headway during the last 15 years save for its numerous meetings where pious resolutions for enlarging mutual cooperation are passed. Political roadblocks stand in the way for the SAARC to become effective or meaningful. The ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) of which Pakistan is a member has not been effective either. And Pakistan is not a member of any Gulf co-operation arrangement.

China premier Zhu Rongji has said: “China is now the world’s safest, most stable place for investment.” Foreign direct investment in China increased between January and September this year by 21 per cent over the same period last year. No wonder a Pakistan company headed by Shahid Javed Burki, former vice-president of the World Bank, is to make a large investment in a theme park in China that will cost 1.6 billion dollars prior to the 2008 world Olympics in Beijing.

The other major development is the ministerial level meeting of the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar later this month to lower global trade barriers. To what extent the trends initiated there will be helpful to the developing countries or harmful remains to be seen. The rich countries want to enlarge world trade or remove or reduce the barriers; but the developing countries with their weak economies are apprehensive of the speed with which the rich countries particularly the US want to move. If the developing countries act in concert, as they have been trying to do in recent times, they can safeguard their interests more than they can do if they act in small groups or work at cross purposes.

Who developed anthrax?

AS our world continues to spin out of control, two horrible events last week had special resonance for me: the spreading anthrax terror, and the death of my old Afghan comrade-in-arms, Abdul Haq.

First, anthrax. In late 1990, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, I was in Baghdad, covering the impending Gulf War. In a futile effort to prevent threatened US air attacks, Saddam Hussein rounded up foreigners and held them hostage in Baghdad hotels. This brutish act — which provoked outrage around the world — was a typical example of Saddam’s uncanny knack for negative, self-defeating, public relations.

Among the hostages, I discovered three British scientists who had been employed at Iraq’s top secret Salman Pak chemical and biowarfare plant. Two of the Britons confided to me they had been working to develop a weaponized form of anthrax for Iraq’s army.

At the time, no one yet knew that Iraq was trying to use anthrax as a weapon. My dispatches from Baghdad were the first indication that Iraq had progressed beyond crude, World War I - style chemical weapons. The Iraqis threatened to hang me as a spy.

What made this news so fascinating was: 1) the British scientists told me they were part of a large technical team secretly organized and ‘seconded’ to Iraq in the mid-1980s by the British government and Secret Intelligence Service, MI6; 2) the feed stocks for all of the germ weapons being developed by Iraq came from an American laboratory in Maryland. Iraq received full approval from the US government to buy anthrax, plague, botulism, and other pathogens. Here is a prime case of what spooks call ‘blowback.’

Why did Britain and the US covertly help Iraq to develop biological weapons? When an Islamic revolution overthrew the US-backed Shah of Iran in 1979, the US and Britain decided to overthrow the new regime in Tehran, which was seen as a threat to their Mideast oil interests. Washington and London urged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in 1980 and march on Tehran. US and British money, arms, and military assistance flowed secretly to Baghdad.

But by 1983, Iraq was on the defensive and near to losing the war. Iran, with nearly four times Iraq’s population, was fighting back ferociously, swamping Iraqi defences with human wave attacks. In desperation, Iraq, America and Britain began a crash development programme to produce chemical and biological weapons to break Iran’s attacks and offset its numerical superiority. Iraq’s chemical arsenal savaged Iran’s infantry and helped Baghdad win the war by 1988. Over 500,000 soldiers died in the conflict.

In the Anglo-American view, chemical and biological weapons were fine — so long as they were used to kill or maim Iranian Muslims who opposed western interests. Such monstrous weapons, it seems, are only associated with terrorism when used against westerners. My view: what goes around, comes around, as the old song goes.

Second, Abdul Haq. A leading mujihideen leader during the great jihad, or holy struggle, of the 1980s against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Haq was a burly, colourful, intense man, one of the most charismatic Pakhtoon leaders and a CIA favourite. I was with Abdul Haq and his men both in Peshawar and inside Afghanistan. Haq, and his brother, Haji Kadir, gave me the hospitality of their home and their badly needed protection during the important battle for Jalalabad.

When the Afghan communist regime offered $50,000 to Afridi tribesmen around the Khyber Pass to capture me, two jeeploads of Haq’s warriors ensured I was not kidnapped and sent to be tortured and executed in Kabul.

After September 11, CIA resumed contacts with its old ally Abdul Haq that were broken off in 1989. When it became clear in recent weeks that the Russian-created Northern Alliance would be unable to take over Afghanistan from the Pakhtoon Taliban, CIA sought an anti-Taliban Pakhtoon leader, and naturally called the renowned Abdul Haq.

Last week, CIA sent Haq and a handful of supporters into Afghanistan with bags of dollars to bribe Pakhtoon tribal leaders away from the Taliban. Haq, who was headstrong and impulsive, foolishly went along with CIA’s hasty, poorly concocted scheme.

Like CIA’s unbroken record of bloody fiascos in Iraq, this amateurish venture also failed disastrously. Forewarned by sympathizers in Peshawar, the Taliban surrounded Haq’s party. Haq, who had lost a foot to a Soviet mine, tried to flee on horseback. CIA bungled an attempt to rescue him, though two of its agents with Haq managed to escape on US helicopters. My old friend was captured and summarily executed by the Taliban as a warning to any potential defectors.

The life of one of the heroes of the great jihad against Soviet oppression was thus thrown away in a botched, amateurish mission in an unnecessary war. Another CIA ‘expendable asset’ had been expended.

Ten days before his fatal mission, Abdul Haq had urged the US not to bomb Afghanistan, warning that doing so would only rally Afghans to the Taliban, inflict massive new suffering on an already tortured nation, and plunge Afghanistan into disintegration and chaos.

No one in war-fevered Washington listened to Abdul Haq. —Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2001

Security vs. freedom

THE big battle in America on the home front is security vs. freedom. What makes it so important now is that it affects the social status of every citizen in the country.

Gloucester, who is now in airport security, is a very happy man.

“I’m working class and I can tell the middle and upper class what to do or not do.”

“In what respect?”

“As a security guard, people have to obey anything I tell them. For example, despite their wealth and title, if I tell them they can’t go through that door, they can’t go through it. They have to go through the other door I tell them to, which is two miles away. If I make the passengers open up all their baggage, they have no choice. I don’t make a lot of money, but I get a lot of respect.”

“I should think so. The lower class must be having a ball feeling that power.”

“We’re better off than we have been in the past. Take underpaid doormen in apartment houses. They used to take a lot of guff from the tenant. Now doormen give out guff. You can’t get upstairs in the elevator if they don’t want you to.”

“Do you need a lot of education to be in the security business?”

“You don’t have to be a nuclear scientist to search the trunk of someone’s car or spend 12 hours a day as the bodyguard of a movie star. I know guys who don’t have a high school education who are now searching in the mail for anthrax spores.”

“Is there any difference between security people who wear uniforms and those who don’t?”

“American women are much more attracted to guys in uniforms. Because of the war, they stand taller and look sharper. I know a guy who guards the pandas at the zoo. In the name of security, gals are crazy about him.”

“What is the most important thing for someone in charge of keeping the home front safe?”

“First I would say you have to have good feet. Most security people have to stand on their feet eight to 12 hours a day. Secondly, you must be prepared to shoot a suspicious person if he fits the FBI profile, and thirdly, you must have a sense of humour.”

“The Senate voted 100 to 0 to federalize security at airports. The House voted 286 to 139. What’s the difference?”

“The House had information the Senate didn’t have.”

“Does being a security guard give you the perks that the upper class no longer have?”

“It certainly does. Where else but in America can you win the power struggle for seven dollars an hour?” —Dawn/Tribune Media Services

The worries of a front-line state: WASHINGTON NOTEBOOK

TWO days hence, General Pervez Musharraf will be in New York where, on the 10th, he will meet President George Bush, who will later host the Pakistani leader at dinner. This is just one indication of how much the world has changed since September 11.

The two presidents will be in New York to take part in the United Nations General Assembly session, which was earlier due to begin in the third week of September but was postponed after the attacks on New York and Washington. Both leaders were due to be present at the postponed session also, and Pakistan was working hard to arrange a meeting between them, but the outlook was unclear.

It was generally believed that since Mr Bush would be meeting Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, it would be too much of a snub to Pakistan if the US president did not also have at least a perfunctory bilateral with Gen Musharraf, particularly since the general and Mr Vajpayee were also due to meet in an effort to rescue the Agra process. But no word either way had come from the White House or the Pakistan embassy till Sept 11.

This time around, there hasn’t been the slightest hesitation on the part of the White House in setting up a dinner date for General Musharraf. Mr Vajpayee is due to meet President Bush at the White House on Nov 9, but there’s no balancing act involved now: the general will meet Mr Bush in his own right as head of the most frontline of frontline states.

When Gen Musharraf had elevated himself to the presidency of Pakistan, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar was in Washington, caught as much by surprise by the manoeuvre as the US officials he had been talking to. The minister’s embarrassment is now old hat. But for at least two or three days, the State Department had, not so subtly (and not without providing some satisfaction to Pakistani democrats interested in such things), refused to use the word ‘president’ when referring to the general. This was another indication of US disapproval of the general’s move. However, the pose could not be kept up for too long because what had happened was, after all, a fait accompli and, second, because the general seemed in an agreeably conciliatory mood as he prepared to travel to Agra for his summit with Mr Vajpayee, an exercise that had full US support and approval.

Now, of course, what diplomats call the “OBL (Osama bin Laden) factor” has interposed. US officials cannot tire of referring to “President” Musharraf and the “tremendous job” he is doing. Both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have been to see the general in Islamabad, both to hear his assessment of the situation first-hand and to express their backing for him. When many of us were younger and were active in newspaper trade unionism, we would get worried about the prolongation of a particular crisis or strike; when our concerns were conveyed to the leadership, the feedback famously always was “Datey raho” (hold fast, victory will be ours). Something of the same sort of buck-up message is now being passed on to the general.

If Pakistan was feeling a little petulant over the way the US administration was warming up to India, it is now India’s turn to consider itself somewhat left out, and it is making its feelings known in a surprisingly ungracious, if not actually a petty, manner. Some of Mr Vajpayee’s recent remarks have diminished his stature: when he had come to Lahore on his “bus diplomacy” trip and followed then prime minister Nawaz Sharif to the podium at a reception at Governor’s House in Lahore, he had towered over his Pakistani counterpart as a statesman and an intellectual. His recent utterances have been unbecoming of a politician of his standing. It is wrong for both India and Pakistan to so abjectly seek to curry favour with America, but such, alas, are the political and economic realities of today’s world. It would be tragic if the trend towards one-upmanship vis-a-vis the US and the present crisis was permitted to stall the process of detente that was set in motion in Agra. Both countries should decide to be friends without the help of outside vested interests.

What now for Pakistan? US officials continue to assure Pakistani diplomats and journalists that America is with Pakistan now for the long haul, that it will seek to build a durable, long-term relationship. Some economic aid has already been announced, there’s more said to be in the pipeline, and there’s even been some lobbying in the media endorsing loosening, if not altogether abolishing, textile quotas for Pakistan. Appreciation is constantly expressed in public by senior officials of the risk Gen Musharraf has taken in reversing his policy of support to the Taliban and in aligning himself with the US, thus incurring the wrath of right-wing radicals.

However, you cannot get over the suspicion that there is still an underlying current of distrust in some policy-makers about the future of US-Pakistan relations. You cannot find a single official statement or comment that can be presented as evidence to back this suspicion, but, then, there are the comments and reports in US newspapers suggesting that Washington should move with caution in its dealings with Islamabad. There have been reports of continuing links between people in the Pakistani intelligence services and the Taliban, allegations based on leaks from US intelligence sources. There are the constant Indian reminders to Washington of Pakistan’s links with groups New Delhi believes indulge in “cross-border terrorism”.

It should be fair to say that both Pakistan and the United States are approaching each other rather warily. Perhaps the Bush administration was working for an improvement in relations with Pakistan before September 11, but it has been forced to drastically speed up the process. Second thoughts, dictated by geo-political compulsions, will come after the focus shifts from Afghanistan. Much will depend upon how Pakistan manages the present opening, and almost certainly it will be expected by the US to scale down its rhetoric on Kashmir. India may be suffering from a sense of angst at the turn of events, but it has greater capacity to bide its time.

In this context, an extract from a briefing given by a senior administration official to a group of foreign journalists on Tuesday may not be entirely irrelevant:

Q: With relation to Pakistan, it has been said that America is now with Pakistan for the long haul. But as you must have seen, there’s a lot of scepticism about whether America will be able to stay on. So would you like to comment on that? And in that context, would there be any long-term agreements when Mr Bush meets General Musharraf in New York?

SENIOR OFFICIAL: On the issue of long-term agreements, I think in some sense that it’s too soon to say. There have been very good discussions between the two (Bush and Musharraf). The two men have a very good relationship. Obviously, I will say to you, before September 11, it was a priority of this administration to strengthen its relationship both with India and with Pakistan. Obviously, September 11th, in an odd way, has given us an opportunity to accelerate both of these efforts fairly dramatically in the case of both countries. Obviously, Pakistan, as India, is very important in the war against terrorism. And the position that President Musharraf has taken has been very heartening. It has required a great deal of courage on his part, and we are trying to support him.”

The phrase “zero-sum game” in relation to Pakistan and India needs to be abolished for reasons other than of philological refinement.

Q: Would it have made sense right off the bat to help the Northern Alliance more with ammunition than perhaps assistance of other kinds, farming and so forth?

RUMSFELD: Well, I’ve heard a Northern Alliance spokesman say something to that effect in a dress suit from the Press Club. The fact of the matter is, we are supplying ammunition and supplies to the Northern Alliance and to other forces opposing them as fast as we can. And to the extent we have a chance to find out about these people, whether or not they’re a people who are going to do anything with the ammunition other than sell it, which is always nice to know — it’s preferable that it ends up in a weapon and is shot...

The TV programme Saturday Night Live suggested that Vice-President Richard Cheney, who is being kept in a “secure” location since the US commenced its assault on Afghanistan on October 7 and has not since been seen in public, is — like Osama bin Laden — living in a cave in Afghanistan.